SIR C. DILKE ON THE ARMY.

Ashburton Guardian, Volume VII, Issue 1889, 10 July 1888, Page 3

SIR C. DILKE ON THE ARMY.

HOW IT SHOULD BE REORGANISED,

Sir Charles Dlika'a aeries of magazine I artiolea on the British army has not been of a (rnoiratu'atory character. The inquiry has bseo searching and the criticism severe. It will be readily admitted that many of the hard sayings, if not all, have been justified by the faots. Oar army la a very expansive and comparatively small and inefficient machine. Its bone and ■Inew may be as good aa ever ; Its fighting power, maa for man, may be as great ; its strategic genius m the higher ranks may ba as brilliant ; Us weapons may be better than at any previous period Id our history; but the brains that direct its organlsa'ion, its mobl ijatlon, and I'a equipment are Bvldeutlr too light for auoh » heavy task. The bleundering m the equipment ani provisioning of the forces euyagud m the Egyptian and Srudan oampslgns was inexcusable Btupid. If there was such a deplorable want of readineua for those " little ware," ho* much time would ba required to prepare for a great «ar ! Other nations can pnteocrmom armies lv the fi*)ld at a fortnight's notice, bui car war office could not be trusted to do muoh m that w«y lv less than three months. Yet we pay more for our army, m proportion to its numerical strength than any other oountry. The coat par head of the principal European ntmlcs In time of paace is as follows. Frenoh £35 17a ; German, £33 15s ; Italian, £31 13a ; Russian, £22 10s ; Austrian, £22 13s ; and the cost of (he British army In time of peace is £105 per head. A. difference bo tremendous can hardly be believed to be nothing; more than the necessary difference between the voluntary Bystem and conscription. Surely when we pay bo heavily we should get something approaching perfect efficiency. On this subject destructive criticism la easy — maoh too easy ; and Sir Charles Dllke has not been sparing m that respect. In his latest rrt'ele, bower >r, he has reached the oonstruotive part of hla nndertaklng, and has not failed to formulate a large Bcheme of reorganisation, which indicates and deserves serious thought. He would divide the active Army into two partB — the one a short-service forao, and the other a long-service force for India and the colonies. The Indian army would rest upon its own depots, and not be constantly disarißDKing the home battalions by its oils on them for drafts. The oolonloe would for the moat part provide their own garrlsona, commanded by trained officers. For the home army the period of service would be three years, and the men would then pass into the reserve for more than the preaont full term. This ehort service would gradually give ua either a large force— aotive army and reserves together— or a force equal to the present at a leas cost ; the argument being that the larger the proportion of reserves to the aotive army the cheaper must be the organisation for any given number of men. Recruits would have the choice of short or long aervioe. The First Army Corps would be kept bb ready as the British troops m India ; and the Second Army Corps, which would be built up chiefly oat of the Firsl-olass reserve would always have its rquipmont m readiness. Such are, briefly stated, Sir Oharlea Dllke'a main proposals for the two preat divisions of tho army. There are alao some bold suggestions regarding the militia and volunteers. To these forces the army reserves will be affiliated. Sir Charles would take power to call out the militia for foreign service whenever the First- clasa Reserve might be called ont for the same purpose, and would employ the militia as a second Hue, or aa garrisons for our great fortresses aorosa the sea, thue freeing ali the regular troops for active cperatiouH. On the First-nlas« Reserve being summoned to the colors, and the militia taken out of the country, the volunteers would be called up for permanent service m ho.-no di-fenco. These would be Bilious oh*a ci, Intended to meet serious emergencies. They may appear repulsive m time of peace, but they might be neoeasary m time of war. The question la, therefore-, whether or not they ought to be carriod out as precautionary meaauros, bo that the machinery might ba ready to our hands if it were required m tho last reßort. It is not a question to be has'ily doclded, but it is undoubtedly one to bo carefully considered, without any needleaa delay. On one point we entirely agree with Sir Oharleß Dllkff— nancoly, that at all our maritime fortresses and ooallng stations obsolete guns must be replaced by artillery that will bo a matoh for ships armed with guna of the longest range. Oar important stations and ports are praotioally defenceless against powerful ships of war, and no time should be lost m providing them with proper means of defence. There moat be no entrance on a game of brag with other nations In respect of a display of military power, but snuiolent defensive preparations mast not be neglected. It is pleasing to see Sir Oharles Dllke ; devoting his time and ability to this Important question* By his exposure of our military weakness, and his suggestion of remedial measures, he b»s brought the qaestlon to the front, and m doing so has done a pnbllo servloe,