THE IMPENDING WAR.

Ashburton Guardian, Volume V, Issue 1504, 11 March 1887, Page 3

THE IMPENDING WAR.

That a great war is impending there are the most unmistakable indications, but at this distance from the immediate scene of operation — though it may be that Australasia will be caught m the outer edge ot the whirlwind that is brewing — it is quite impossible to diagnose the situation with any approach to certainty. That Germany and France will ere long be once

more engaged m a fierce struggle appears to be one of the salient probabilities, but it is not perhaps m that 'direction that the interests of the British Empire are chiefly concerned. It is rather with the movements and j intentions of Russia that we have to do, and that the. Imperial Government scent a danger of no ordinary magnitude is apparent from various scraps of intelligence which pieced together have an ominous signification. For example, close enquiry has been made as to the number of additional men from the Naval Reserve which can be found room for m the ships of the fleet, no less than twenty swift cruisers are being armed as swiftly as the dockyards are able, and the Thames is being as rapidiy as possible put m a condition of defence by the building or equipment of forts. Large purchases of horses are being made for cavalry mounis, and enormous quantities of ammunition made and stored. Surely all this is significant that something out of the common is m the wind. We do not think that any probable action of Russia as towards Bulgaria explains the real motive for all this unusual activity, and m seeking to find what it really is all about it strike us that the key may be found m two other items of news to hand, namely, the " Jehad " or holy war said to have been proclaimed by the Ameer of Afghanistan, and m the attitude of France on the Egyptian question. Possibly it has been seen for some time that Russia is about to strike a blow at our Empire m India, and that France means at the same moment to pick a quarrel with us o^er our continued occupancy of the land of the Pharoahs, our continued control of that great water-way, the Suez Canal. If this be so, then the alliance between Russia and France is easily understood, and much light is also thrown upon the hitherto incomprehensible attitude oi Turkey. And if it is from this direction that the storm is to burst, then the recent action of the Ameer will probably precipitate it, as England as an ally of Afghanistan could not suffer her to be crushed by the Muscovite power, and thus admit Russia to the very gates of India, rhat it is from this quarter that the danger really threatens appears to be :he view of our Wellington contem porary, the " New Zealand Times/ which m the course of a suggestive and remarkable article on this subject says : — " Can it be that all these tremendous preparations on the par!: of Russia and France, so ostentatiously aimed at Germany, are really a feint to cover a projected sudden onslaught upon Afghanistan and Egypt respectively? Ihe idea that France might be mediating such a coup on her own account s no new one, having been broached m several quarters ; but this, while serious enough, would be a trifle compared with such a combination as is indicated m the other theory. A simultaneous movement by Russia on Afghanistan and by France on Egypt, especially if carried out as a sudden surprise — as no doubt it would be — could not be regarded otherwise than as involving a very awkward state of affairs for England. The aid of Turkey would almost certainly be given to France and Russia m an effort to drive England out of Egypt, her protracted occupation of which has always been a sore point with the Porte. We hear, too, ol M. de Lesseps, who has never forgiven England's domination of the Suez Canal, invoking the concurrence of Germany and Italy m a project for neutralising Egypt. Again, Russia is now m a position of exceptional advantage for beginning a fresh advance m Asia. That gigantic work, the Trans-Caspian Railway, has just been completed to the Bokharan frontier, and troops could be poured m from Russia with the utmost celerity, while England is separated from her Asiatic dependencies by a sea voyage of three or four weeks — long enough for irrevocable disaster to have been sustained. That great Russian railway has not yet, it is trae, been carried to Herat, but M. Lessar declared more than a year ago, that it could be continued thither m a month if military • necessity required it. It might not even need an ostensible commencement ot hostilities on Russia's part to involve us m a struggle. A late telegram mentioned that there was some talk m Afghanis;an of beginning a "holy war." It has even been suggested that this " holy war" might be intended to be directed against the British, and that it may be fomented and supported by Russian gold and Russian arms. This, however, is scarcely probable m view ot the Ameer's notorious hatred and distiust of Russia and the golden bonds which unite him to England. . , . . But assuming the fidelity of the Ameer and his people, the position is still very critical; for should this " holy war" prove to mean an onslaught on the Russian forces near the frontier, Muscovite reprisals would be inevitable, and then we should be most awkwardly placed through our alliance with Afghanistan, and the political, necessity of our maintaining the integrity of the Ameer's dominions as against Russian invasion and annexation. Herein is ample material for the starting of a vast conflagration, and with France, Russia, and Turkey united against us it cannot be denied that England, it caught unprepared, would be placed at a formidable disadvantage, to put if mildly. The case, too, would be one m which European alliances could scarcely be looked for, and this knowledge would unquestionably exercise much influence on the action of our theoretical antagonists : while it is certain that a good deal ol weight has been attached abroad tc the Irish difficulty as hampering the hands of England, and to ihe unfortunate split m the* Ministry as implying divided counsels, and consequeni weakness at headquarters. It is devoutly to be hoped that this sinistei concurrence of circumstances m point ing to one conclusion may turn out tc be illusory. This often has been the case, and may be again. Still it woulc be folly to ignore the possibility of suet

a scheme being on foot,, and yet greater folly to be unprepared for the contingency."