The Landing at Anzac

Observation Post, Volume 1, Issue 28, 27 November 1942, Page 4

The Landing at Anzac

(Continued from last week.) PROFITABLE ASSULT So far as the 3rd Battery was concerned, a succession of quiet days followed the big effort of June 4th. Durling the ten days following June 7th, the Battery expended on an average I less than ten rounds a day. average less than ten rounds a day. Then on June 18th, the guns were busy again assisting to repel Turkish counter-at-tacks on the left of the line, and on June 28th, they supported a most successful attempt to dislodge the enemy from his hitherto unshakable hold on . the western coast. Pivoting upon a point in the line a mile inland from the sea, the assaulting troops took all their .objectives, the attack being carried put in two phases. The greatest gains, of course, were on the coast furthest away from the pivotal point. There five lines of 'Turkish trenches were captured, and the British line was advanced nearly one thousand yards. For several day’s following this success, the Turks made strong counter-attacks, which led to bitter fighting, but he was able to press none of them home. For their close and accurate shooting in support of the infantry on these occasions, and particularly on June sth, the Battery received the thanks of the Indian Infantry Brigade, and the congratulations of Briga-dier-General If. Simpson Baikie, G.0.C.. R.A., at Helles.

ATTEMPT TO ADVANCE THE RIGHT FLANK

On the 12th and 13th July, an attempt was , made to seize the enemy’s 'foremost trench, system along the centre and right, and so conform with the advance that had been registered on the left flank. Two days ’ solid fighting, in which the French again lent the British the support of some of their batteries, , achieved only a partial success. ■> The 3rd Battery and two R.F.A. Batteries fired in- support of a diversion by troops of the 29th Division on the left, the allotment of ammunition for battery, being 500 rounds. During the preliminary registration, the enemy opened fire on the 3rd Battery positions, and one or two casualties were incurred. The Battery was again freely shelled during the operation; more casualties were suffered; material damage was done to some of the wagons, and a fire was caused in the thick dry scrub in front of the guns, one of the wagons being burnt, and t'|ie position swept clear of cover. '

3rd BATTERY’S DEPARTURE The Battery remained at Helles until the middle of August, taking part in all the operations undertaken by the British troops in that zone. On August 17th, the Battery received orders to proceed to Anzac to join the New Zealand Division, and embarked the same night on the ‘Queen Louise.’ THE AUGUST OFFENSIVE At last, while the summer was yet at its height, events began to shape themselves for the great battle of Sari Bair, which was at once to set the seal on the heroism, the endurance and selfsacrifice of the soldiers at Anzac, and to mark the culmination of their hopes. Jlarly in the campaign, it had been made apparent to the Commander-in-Chief that neither at Anzac nor at Helles were his forces strong enough to fight their way through to the Narrows. On May 10th, Sir lan Hamilton had cabled to the War Office, asking for ' two fresh divisions, and a week later, another cable was sent, stating that if the force was going to be left to face Turkey on its own resources, two additional Army Corps would be required. The 52nd,(Lowland) Division had been sent to Gallipoli, but whilst it was en route, Russia, owing to the serious turn of events on the Eastern front, had i given up the idea of co-operating from ■ the coast of the Black Sea, and as a result, several more Turkish divisions had become available for the defence of the Jlardanelles. Finally, during June, lan Hamilton was promised three regular divisions,, plus the infantry of two Territorial divisions. The advance guard of these troops was due to reach Mudros by July 10th, and the concentration was to be complete by August 10th. A decision as to the method of employing these reinforcements was | arrived at only after every practicable | scheme had been exhaustively consider- ! ed in all its aspects? These schemes were readily narrowed down to four, in number, which may best be summarised in the terms of the Official Despatch:— I (1) Every man to be thrown on to the southern sector of the Peninsular to | force a way forward to the Narrows, j

(2) Disembarkation on the Asiatic side of the Straits, followed by a inarch on Chanak. (3) A landing at Enos or Ibrye for the purpose of seizing the neck of the isthmus at Bulair. (4) Reinforcement of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, combined with a landing in Suvla Bay. Then with one strong push to capture Hill 305, and working from that dominating point, to grip the waist of the peninsular. (To be continued.)