National and Communist China

Korero (AEWS), Volume 3, Issue 14, 13 August 1945, Page 29

National and Communist China

A KORERO REPORT

Dr. sun-yat-sen’s party joined the revolution of 1911 with two main objects—the destruction of the Manchu Dynasty, and the establishment of democratic government modelled on those of Great Britain and the United States. The Manchu Dynasty fell, but the Nationalist movement was not powerful enough to make the 1912 Republic of China a real republic or an independent nation. The new Chinese nation was not born until the revolution of 1926-28. Between the two revolutions, the nominal Government in Peking had little influence. The real power was in the hands of war lords in the provinces. The war lord was sometimes a man of humble origin, sometimes an ex-official of high rank, but his Forces were invariably recruited from the peasantry. Only when his crops fail and he is faced with starvation does the Chinese peasant take to soldiering or banditry. In normal times the soldier or bandit is at the bottom of the Chinese social scale, and therefore only a reflection of chaotic economic conditions. The stronghold of the Nationalists under Sun-Yat-Sen was in the south at Canton. They appealed in vain to the United States, Great Britain, Japan and other countries, for help against the war lords. Finally, they turned to Soviet Russia, which, alone among the powers, had earned the good will of the Nationalists by voluntarily giving up its special rights and privileges in China. At the invitation of Sun-Yat-Sen, Russian technical and political advisers set about the re-organization of the Kuomintang and the formation of a revolutionary Army. The Young Communist Party of China was admitted to partnership

with the Kuomintang, and helped to organize into unions the factory workers of Shanghai and Canton and the peasants of the interior provinces, who would play a large part in the ultimate revolution against the rule of the war lords. The Army of the Nationalists developed under the leadership of a young general, Chiang-Kai-Shek. At the same time, the Western Powers were busily playing one war lord against another, and selling arms to them all. In 1926 the Nationalists judged the time opportune for the conquest of China. Preceded by an army of propagandists who roused the peasantry against the landlords and war lords whose selfishness was ruining the country, they moved north through the interior provinces to Hankow, where, after a triumphant campaign, the Nationalist Government was established. Borodin, the Russian adviser, was one of its guiding spirits. While he lived, Sun-Yat-Sen had held the various elements of his party together, but Sun-Yat-Sen died of cancer in 1925. For a short time varying political opinions in the Nationalist party did not clash, but only until the success of the revolution was certain. With that common aim attained, there was nothing to prevent personal and political jealousy. The political rift was the more serious. Right and Left Wings The Kuomintang became divided into right and left wings. The left wing included not only Communists, but students and intellectuals who sympathized with them. This wing wished to base its power on the organization of the peasants and workers of China. An organized peasantry meant a drastic

revision of Chinese land laws. The right wing of the party, however, included industrialists, bankers, merchants, and some large land-owners. This class wanted a strong State, but was opposed to any change in the system of land ownership. The Army was Nationalist, with most of its officers the sons of the merchant and land-owning class. It was not likely, therefore, to favour the Communist land reform programme. England and America, too, viewed with disfavour a Chinese Government under Communist and Russian influence. Diplomatic pressure was brought to bear, widening the breach within the Kuomintang. Almost inevitably the revolution split, the Russians were forced to flee to the Soviet Union and many thousands of Chinese Communists were killed. The right wing of the Kuomintang, supported by the majority of the party and by the Army, set up a Government in Nanking, excluding the Communists. Such was the foundation in 928 of the present Nationalist Government of China. It was immediately recognized by most of the Great Powers. The Communists and some divisions of the Army refused to join the Nanking Government, and moved down into Kiangsi Province, where they set up the Chinese Soviet Republic. The struggle between the Chinese Soviet Armies and the National Government lasted intermittently until 1937, when a united front was formed to face the growing menace of Japan. As events proved, even this threat was not sufficient to cause the rival forces to bury or adjust their differences for long. Chiang-Kai-Shek based his power on the Army, but he could not rule through the Army alone. He could not have kept the loyalty of the intellectuals if he had not ruled through the Kuomintang, and he was never strong enough to ignore the party completely. The money for the Army came from the National Government, which, unlike all previous Administrations, did not rely on land taxes. Its revenues came from the maritime Customs, which, after 1931, were under Chinese'control, from the salt taxes, and from taxes on wines, tobaccos, and other commodities.

Another large source of revenue was by loan from Chinese banks. Therefore the National Government depended on the new China. Chiang-Kai-Shek needed technical experts, educated officers, and a good Administration. He was therefore bound to work through and with the Kuomintang, which included nearly all the western-educated men of China. His position was uncomfortable, because the old and the new China, both of which he needed, could not live side by side forever in peace. He held the balance in the struggle between them. • Japanese Aggression From 1928 to 1937 sporadic hostilities were carried on between the Kuomintang and the Communists, each of whom maintained their own Armies and Administration. But the seizing of Manchuria by Japan in 1931 had a profound effect on the Chinese people. Although the danger of Japanese aggression must have been plain to many, this act showed clearly to all Chinese the shape of things to come. In 1933 Japan annexed the province of Jehol, crossed the Great Wall, and established garrisons near Peking. The aim was to set up a Japanese-controlled State between Central China and Manchuria. This State would embrace the sources of one-third of China’s cotton, nearly all her wool, two-thirds of her coal, and half her iron-ore. It also accounted for a large proportion of China’s foreign trade. Although Japan’s fear of a united China explained her aggression at this time, it is probable that, the Japanese underestimated the strength of -the Nationalist movement in China. It is doubtful whether Japan expected the Kuomintang and Communist Forces to combine against her. That they did so is now a matter of history. Japan began to wage open war against China in July, 1937. In September of the same year Chiang-Kai-Shek was able to make a speech congratulating the Communists on joining the common front against Japan.

There is no need to discuss at length the course of the war after 1937. The Japanese occupied most of the larger cities and seized the modern means of

communications after eighteen months of bitter fighting. The Nationalist capital was moved successively from Nanking to Hankow, and, finally, west to Chungking, 1,500 miles up the Yangtse. The Japanese never succeeded in trapping the Chinese Armies. Chinese strategy, agreed on in principle by Communist and Kuomintang, was to withdraw slowly in the first stage and to worrv Japanese garrisons and lines of communications in the second. A new base was to be built in the western provinces, and the last stage was to be the counterattack. Large guerilla Forces, composed of peasants, and led by students from the high schools and universities, operated behind the Japanese lines. As a result, Japan got little benefit from North China or from large sections of Central China. After the fall of Hankow in October, 1938, Japan was held in check until the entry of the United States into the Pacific war in December, 1941. The Burma Road was open by the end of 1938, and steady though inadequate supplies from the Allies went to Chiang-Kai-Shek by this route. But Japan’s vast and rapid conquests in Indo-China, the East Indies, Burma, and Malaya increased China’s difficulties. The Burma Road was closed in 1942, and, in anv case, the Allies were so occupied elsewhere that they would have had great difficulty to make good their promises of equipment and supplies to China. Under these trying circumstances, the Kuomintang and the Communists rediscovered their differences. Industrial Co-operatives The Communists charged the Kuomintang Administration with failure to make proper and adequate use of the industrial co-operatives. These were workmen drawn from some of the 50,000,000 people who moved west before the Japanese. With them they brought useful machinerv salvaged from the path of the invaders. Both in Communist and Kuomintang territory, these workers produced many of the needs of war. The raw materials were often already on the spot.

The Communist allegation was that the industrial co-operatives, and other organizations for war production in Kuomintang territory, were hampered by a lack of capital, caused by many wealthy Chinese supporters of the Kuomintang who found speculation in land and grain more profitable than the production of needed war materials. Point was lent to this accusation by Chiang-Kai-Shek’s speech to the Second Production Conference at Chungking in 1943, in which he said that idle capital must be used “ for production, instead of being allowed to circulate in other fields, according to changing market conditions.” This remark was plainly levelled at speculators in land and staple commodities. On their side the Kuomintang can point to instances of violence by the Communists. In 1936 Chiang-Kai’-Shek was kidnapped by Communist Forces under Chang Hsueh Liang, the “ Young Marshal.” Ho Ying Chin, then Minister of War, endangered Chiang-Kai-Shek’s life by ordering troops to be sent against the kidnappers. The loyalty of Ho Ying Chin is still questioned by some, for he is a member of that right wing clique of the Kuomintang which largely controls the party machinery. Loyalty to United Nations Chiang - Kai - Shek’s loyalty to the United Nations has never been in question. His unswerving opposition to Japanese ambitions in China is also beyond doubt. How does it happen

that he permits ana has permitted internal politics to sabotage the Chinese war effort ? The answer probably is in the unhappy division of opinion among the leaders of the Kuomintang themselves. Chiang-Kai-Shek is no politician, but he is a statesman of some ability, which has enabled him to play the various parties within the Kuomintang against each other. While doing this he has contrived to keep a comparatively united front to the Japanese, concealing the cleavages within his own party. The term “ Communist ” as applied to China needs some explanation. For lack of any other opposition party, Chinese Communism has attracted support from democratic progressive groups who have little interest in Marxian dogma. Because China is predominantly rural, and rural China’s curse is landlordism in its feudal form, the Chinese Communists have become “ agrarian radicals trying to establish democratic practices.” Land reform in territory under Communist control has been assisted by the introduction of democratic systems. Tax assessment committees, for example, are controlled by a majority of local members, and exercise strictly local jurisdiction. Elected village, town, and district councils, and elected executive officials, have supplanted the autocratic system of feudal agrarian China. Such measures as these are not radical in Western eyes. It is almost certain that the progressive elements of the Kuomintang do not find them unacceptable, though there is bitter opposition from the right wing of land-owners. What, then, has been the stumbling block ? Question of National Government During the war the position of the National Government has been logical and simple. As there cannot be two Governments and two Armies in China, the Government in Yenan, to which north-west province the Communist Administration had retired, should abandon a separate regime, under promise of full recognition of its rights in a democratic Government after the war. Yenan has maintained that it could not do this

unless democratic machinery was at once set up in China to permit a minority party to function effectively. At a meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang at Chungking in 1943, Chiang-Ka-Shek said that all political parties would have equal rights and freedom when a constitutional Government was set up after the war. The Central Executive Committee voted to call a National Assembly to adopt a constitution within a year after the close of hostilities. The Yenan authority . still refused co-operation, reiterating its previous demands for the immediate creation of democratic machinery. That was the position at the time of the Japanese surrender. For a time civil war in China then seemed likely. Both Kuomintang and Communist Forces raced to occupy strategic points to increase their bargaining power in any later negotiations. The Japanese were faced with surrender demands from both Forces, each claiming sovereign authority in its own territory. Chiang-Kai-Shek asked the Communist leader, Mao Tze Tung, to send representatives to Chungking to discuss their outstanding differences. After two days’ defiance, Mao Tze Tung agreed to a meeting. It was also agreed that Japan should formally surrender to the Central Government at Nanking. The tension, therefore, eased considerably. The Situation To-day The thirty-year treaty with Russia greatly strengthened Chiang-Kai-Shek’s hand. The Communist hopes of Russian support in the event of civil war were thereby blasted. But at the present time the deadlock still exists. The Communists are reluctant to abandon the territory they have occupied until) that democratic machinery has been set up that will permit their voice to ’be heard in the councils of the nation, Chiang-Kai-Shek will not do this under threat of force from the Communists. They must first lay down their arms. There the matter rests.