THE FRONTS IN CHINA

Korero (AEWS), Volume 2, Issue 1, 17 January 1944, Page 26

THE FRONTS IN CHINA

How strong are the Japanese Armies?

By

, in the Far Eastern Review

According to Chinese estimates the over - all strength of the

Japanese Army consists of almost

one hundred regular divisions averaging less than 20,000 men each, plus several dozen reserve divisions in different stages of recruitment and training.

Of this total, the largest single group is in Manchuria and Korea. A reinforcement by six divisions during March and April of this year has brought its strength to about thirty-nine divisions, including the special Japanese frontier and railroad guards. The China theatre still ranks a close second, with an unchanged total of about thirty divisions.

The Pacific Island theatre, including the Dutch Indies, New Guinea, New Britain, Timor, the Philippines, &c., is supposed to have at present about jighteen divisions of Japanese troops. In the Burma - Malaya - Thailand - French IndoChina theatre, Japanese forces have z at least ten divisions. This would seem to leave only a few regular and several dozen reserve divisions in Japan proper and -Formosa, a considerable reduction as compared with the latter part of last year.

Japan’s Puppet Troops

The total of Japanese puppet troops and auxiliaries has been diminished by frequent defections to about 100,000 men. The additional 300,000 Chinese puppet soldiers, whom the Japanese are now conscripting, training, and equipping with arms formerly captured from British and American forces, are to be ready for action within one year. They are not, however, to serve in China, where contact with the National armies and guerrillas makes the puppet troops completely unreliable, but are to be used for the defence of Japan’s conquests in the Southwestern Pacific, and probably to some extent in Manchuria. This opinion would seem to be confirmed by an

analysis of the present distribution of Japanese troops over the main part of the China theatre.

The North-western Front

North of the Yellow River the Japanese are at present maintaining about nine infantry divisions, eleven independent brigades, and one cavalry group brigade. The north-western front extends from districts near Peiping through parts of Hopei and Chahar into the inner Mongolian province of Suiyuan, and reaches southward in varying depths into Shansi, Shantung, and Northern Honan. The Japanese seem to ascribe to this area considerable importance not only for their general position in China, but for their international strategy as a whole, on account of its situation on Russia’s outer Mongolian flank.

Japanese forces have, therefore, continued in recent months to launch occasional raids against small Chinese troop concentrations, especially southward across the Yellow River from Paotow, apparently with a view to securing their own rather weak points. But their efforts at consolidation, undertaken with small units, partly consisting of Mongolian puppet troops of doubtful loyalty, have been unsuccessful. The Chinese in that area are on the whole, able to offer adequate resistance, since they continue to be in direct contact with the main body of Free China via Suiyuan, Shensi, and the distant western provinces of Ninghsia and Kansu.

The second front, adjoining the first to the south, covers the entire area within the wide Yellow River bend — that is, the bulk of Shansi and a small part of Honan Province. To the west and south the Japanese positions at that front are completely surrounded by Free Chinese territory. The main line across which Chinese and Japanese outposts have been facing each other

for almost four years is the Yellow River itself down to the city of Kaifeng, which has long been in Japanese hands. The enemy has for a considerable time made no serious and sustained attempt to cross the river at points in southern Honan.

Fighting in Taiheng Mountains

However, a considerable effort is at present going on to consolidate Japan’s inner positions within the Yellow River bend by relatively large mopping-up operations against the great and compact area of resistance and counterattack in the Taiheng Mountain Range. Here guerrillas of various inner political complexion are still supported by units of regular Chinese troops. Several Japanese divisions fighting in dozens of small columns, and recently co-ordinated

and generally aided in their diffuse action by several scores of reconnaissance planes, fighters and bombers, have been concentrated against these mountain strongholds, so far with limited success.

This is the only important military operation at present taking place in China. The main aims of the Japanese in the region seem to be to strengthen their western flank against the Soviet Union, and to remove the constant danger of Chinese guerrilla raids in areas where they are endeavouring to exploit valuable coal and iron resources.

The third front, north of the Yellow River, borders on the first and second to the east. It comprises Peiping and strips of the land along the railroads from Peiping, northward to the border of Jehol Province, and southward to the

narrow corridor formed by Hopei Province between Honan and Shantung. This sector has no direct contact with Free China, and whatever sporadic fighting has recently been going on there was purely of the nature of guerrilla attacks and relatively weak Japanese counter-measures. The task of the small numbers of Japanese and puppet troops of guarding some 400 miles of vital railroad lines has evidently not become any easier in recent months ; and it has so far been impossible for them to withdraw any troops from this area, although it is a great distance behind any actual fighting fronts.

The Fourth Front

The fourth front, extending over the coastal area of Hopei and part of Shantung to the Yellow River, has also more than indirect communications with Free China through the numerous wide gaps between the Japanese lines along the main railroads and highways. The enemy still has a hard time defending himself against the guerrillas and mobile bands of regular troops, even around strongly garrisoned cities like Tientsin. Recent attempts on a rather large scale to mop up the guerrillas in Central Shantung have once more proved completely unsuccessful. This is the main area where numerous puppet units in recent months and years have either defected to the National Army and the guerrillas, or at least have given them considerable tactic support.

The huge second region of Japanese occupation along the Yangtze has at present only about nine J apanese divisions and seven independent brigades. It extends from Shanghai and Hangchow westward via Nanking and Hankow to Ichang, the nearest Japanese position to Chungking, and covers part of the provinces of Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, Hupeh, and Kiangsi. This front contains most of the potential Japanese spearheads for further expansion into Free China. The western half of these Japanese positions is practically surrounded by Free Chinese territory, because of the huge gap between the Yellow River and the Yangtze front, consisting of most of

Honan Province and part of Anhwei, which are occupied.

In view of this situation the strength of the Japanese garrison at this most important of all the China fronts is by no means imposing. It is here that the Japanese are facing the strongest regular Chinese forces. The mobile Chinese units and guerrillas between the main concentrations of the Japanese are relatively strong and enjoying somewhat better supplies than their comrades co-operating farther in the rear. Whatever action takes place in China during periods of a general lull is chiefly on this front, and the last few months have been no exception to this rule. In some cases the Chinese have taken the initiative on a small scale ; but usually it is the Japanese who are tempted to advance beyond their semi-permanent positions and their lines of communications, in order to break up Chinese troop concentrations, and at the same time to forage in the adjoining wealthy rice-producing areas of Free China.

Communications

This front sector has an extremely well developed system of railroad, river, lake, and highway communications, over which fairly large bodies of men can be collected quickly for action against objectives like the coveted city of Changsha, the area between Ichang and Chungking, or air bases from which attacks against Japan might eventually be launched. Therefore Japanese troop movements within this sector are always followed by the Chinese with the greatest watchfulness. But no major Japanese concentrations have taken place recently, and the front as a whole shows no indication of imminent change.

The remaining two China fronts are completely isolated enemy outposts, but are also potential spearheads for further expansion into Free China. The southern coastal front, in Kwangtung and small parts of Fukien Province, is at present being held by no more than one division, three brigades, and a few small isolated units of Japanese troops, with only a few puppet auxiliaries. These forces occupy Amoy, Swatow, Canton, Hong-