STORM CLOUDS IN THE EAST

Radio Record, Volume V, Issue 36, 18 March 1932, Page 3

STORM CLOUDS IN THE

EAST

by

J. E.

Strachn

who has recently returned from the East -A 3YA Talk

Te war which Japan has been waging with China for nearly six months now seems to be entering upon a critical stage.. Tokio announces that a new independent State has been set up in Manchuria, and it is reported that the Chinese Government has established a rapprochement with Russia. Both announcements are startling, but to those most closely in touch with the situation, they are not unexpected. That Japan’s intentions included political control of Manchuria was obvious, but just what puppet government she would set up was a matter of guess work. It now appears that rumours of the capture by the Japanese of the young ex-Emperor of China during the November fighting in Tientsin were well founded. The dramatic moment for this re-appearance as nominal head of the Independent State of Manchuria has arrived. Manchuria is again to have a Manchu ruler, but one who holds office at the pleasure of ‘the Japanese Government. Meantime, it would appear that China, having for nearly six months vainly appealed to the world for a settlement of the trouble by peaceful methods has, in despair, taken the. advice of those who advocate friendship with Russia. This, if true, does not necessarily mean that there is another Russo-Japanese war in the offing, but it is almost certain to accentuate the economic conflict which

lies behind the hostilities in the East, and which, to a great extent explains them. Apart from the obvious possibility that China may adopt a Soviet system of Government there is almost certain to "fe a re-orientation of trade relationshins in which Japan and other nations with business interests in China are likely to suffer. , ¥* NCIDENTALLY these decisions seem to throw a good deal of light upon the causes of the trouble in the Fast. As is usual in connection with the outbreak of hostilities a distinction must he drawn between ultimate causes and actual incidents. The ultimate cause in this instance may be stated in general terms as a conflict of Japanese business interests, with the growing national inspirations of the Republic of China.

Coming to the actual incident that precipitated hostilities we aré faced with conflicting stories. Naturally the Japanese blame the Chinese, and vice-versa. When I was in Mukden in October I called at the office of the "Manchuria Daily News," and got’ the Japariese version from the issue of September 21. Here it is, in the form of @ proclamation by Lieutenant-General Honjo, dated September 19:- " At 10.30 p.m. on September 18, 1931, the Chinese troops at North Barracks, Mukden, blew up the South Manchurian railway track and then’ attacked the Japatiese railway guard. The Kwangtung Army being held responsible for the protection of the South Manchurian Railway; Lieutenant-General Honjo hastened with his staff before daybreak .to Mukden and ordered attacks opened on all Chinese Regulars in South Manchuria." The Chinese version, as stated by Marshal Chang Hsueh Liarig, Governor of Manchuria, in his report, dated September 19, to the Chinese National Government, is: or "Japanese railway guards picked the quarrel by blowing up a section of the South Manchurian Railway and subsequently accused the Chinese military of having done this."

Obviously one story or the other is false, but after all, the actual incident, whatever its nature, is not very important. ‘ I shall now try to explain, as briefly as I can, what is the nature of the dispute between China and Japan. Manchuria, with its vast productive resources in agricultural land and minerals, and its cheap and abundant labour, is a very attractive field for industrial enterprise. It is, or was till recently, practically virgin territory waiting to he exploited. Tt is natural, therefore, that to a powerfuf and ambitious neighbour like Japan, such. a field for investment and enterprise: should prove very attractive. Moreover, the needs of the world to-day are sogreat that the scientific exploitation of any considerable area of productive land: has become an economic necessity. (Concluded on page 9.)

"China supplies Japan with food; Japan sells the products of its mills and factories; China can get its goods elsewhere, but Japanese business concerns are not so independent. It is an economic war and the Chinese hold the _ strategic advantage. Japan cannot win unless the contest is shifted from the economic arena to the political and military arena. That is the real clue to the present situation."

War Clouds in the East

(Continued from page 3.) It would seem then, that from the point of view of world economy, if China could not properly exploit her own territory she should grant concessions to other nations to do s0, and allow them facilities for the safeguarding of their own interests. I'or many years this has been the attitude of the Western industrial nations, and Japan, towards China. In that respect the Manchurian situation does not differ very much from the general situation involving China. with the Western Powers. Japan’s interest in Manchuria dates from 1895 when, at the close of the Sino-Japanese war, she claimed among the spoils of war the territory of the Liaotung Peninsula. This brought a "out a threat from Russia, Germany France, and Japan was forced to the territory to China in consideration of a certain indemnity. The war showed up the military inefficiency of China, and inaugurated a scramble for concessions, Russia taking the lead and getting, among other things, railway concessions in Manchuria and a 25-year lease of the Liaotung Peninsula. At the same time Germany got a lease of Kiaochow, and Britain a lease of Wei-hai-wei. In 1900, during the time of the Boxer rising, Russia occupied Manchnria. Attempts by other powers to persuade Russia to withdraw were unsuccessful, and in 1905, Japan, who looked upon _. the Russian occupation of Manchuria X as a particular menace to herself, declared war. The outcome was, as you know, a victory for Japan, who demanded a transfer of the leased territory of Liaotung and what is now called the South Manchurian railway. In 1914 the Great War broke out and in 1915, Japan, as an ally of Britain, drove Germany out of Kiaochow. On being asked by China to withdraw her troops, Japan presented China with what have been called the Twenty-One Demands. Included in these were an extension of the term of the Manchurian leases to 99 years, and certain terms giving to Japanese business men a practical monopoly of railway and other investments in Manchuria. The Chinese revolution was then in its early stages and government was in a chaotic state. Nominally Yuan Shih Kai was President, and he, either because he could: not help himself, or because he hoped by conceding something to Japan, to further his own aybitions, agreed to the main condiThey were manifestly not conditions which a self-respecting State could agree to, except under pressure, and they have ever since constituted a grievance on the part of China. Japan is not, as many people imagine, interested in Manchuria as an outlet for her surplus population. In 25 years only 225,000 Japanese have settled in Manchuria-less than one per cent. of the population-and of these only 3000 are farmers. The country interested in Manchuria as a field for land occupation and _ settlement is China, who to-day has 27,000,000 people settled in the territory. That, I think, helps to show the real line-up in the present conflict, viz.: she Ohinese Government and neople

versus Japanese business concerns. Another aspect of these special interests is that they have been acquired under treaties and agreements forced upon a weak nation by a strong one, and without, as a general rule, any quid pro quo. Japan admits this, of course, but naively points out that this is the way of the Western nations with China. Now that China is beginning to develop her own territory in Manchuria by building railways and so on, she finds herself seriously embarrassed by monopolistic rights conceded to Japan. China claims that her sovereign rights over her territory stand in danger not merely of temporary segregation, but of perpetual alienation. Under treaty eonditions she cannot purchase the Japanese-owned railways in Manchuria, nor build others, without the sanction of Japan, nor recover the leased territory before the expiration of the term of 99 years.

But Japan claims that she has other interests in Manchuria that are vital and essential to the nation. She has no outlet for her. rapidly growing population. Therefore she must industrialise. To industrialise she must have raw products and coal for her factories, must import food supplies, and must find a market for her manufactured goods. In the solution of these problems Manchuria and other parts of China are the natural suppliers and the natural markets. ‘Today 21 per cent. of Japan’s trade is with China, including Manchuria. Without supplies coming in regularly from Manchuria and a ready market throughout China, the industrial life of Japan would break down and her people starve. That is why so many earnest men in Japan are saying, as I have heard them say, "We must have Manchuria." This is indeed a very strong claim and one that the world must sym

pathise with, up to a point. But its great. weakness lies in the assumption. that it is necessary for a trading country to exercise political control, or even business management, over its suppliers or its,.markets. So it would appear that much of this claim to special interests is dictated by the owners of railways, shipping concerns, mines, and factories established on Chinese soil and employing Ohinese labour. Ruling these out, it is difficult to see wherein lies the vital interest of the Japanese people in Manchuria. But this trade relationship really brings us close to the real occasion of hostilities. China, especialy Manchuria, supplies Japan with food, raw products for the mills, iron, and coal. Japan sells to China mainly the products of its mills and factories. China ean, if its people choose, get its manufactured goods elsewhere, and sell its raw products in other markets. The Japanese business concerns, factories, railways and shipping companies, on the other hand, are not so independent. In an economic war between the Chinese populace on the one hand and the Japanese business concerns on the other, the former hold the strategie advantage. That is precisely what has happened. The aggressive tactics of Japan, in~ spired by business interests are resented by the Chinese people, who counter with a boycott. It would appear that the Japanese cannot win unless the contest is shifted from the economic arena to the politicul and military arena. That, I think, is the real clue to the present situation. In conclusion I might suggest that there are several possible explanations for the Shanghai fighting as distinct from the Manchurian operations. (1) It may be in the nature of a punitive expedition, Shanghai being the centre of the boycott movement. (2) It may serve to divert atiention from Manchuria, where Japan is con solidating her position in occupation of the territory. (3) It may be designed to create a Japanese Concession in Shanghai similar to the French Concession and the International Settlement. (4) It may even aim at the political disruption of China, with the possibility of more effective Japanese control of the provinces north of the Yangtse. But (5) It is most probably simply an attempt to force the issue off the economic arena in which Japan fears | to lose on to the military and politicad arena, where she is confident she can win. If I might say one final word, it is this: Surely this conflict in the Hast is symbolic, symptomatic rather of the sickness that afflicts our civilisation. Old ideas, well entrenched and fortified by confidence in past victories are being countered by new, raw, and crude ideas. In this instance, militant, aggressive Japan stands for the old, while the vociferous revolutionary element of China that clamours for retaliatory measures stands for the new. A decided victory for either would be disastrous. Surely there can be an amicable compromise. And that is what the responsible element in China through the mouthpiece of its Government has asked for. Is the League of Nations great enough or are the nations of the League disinterested enough to discharge the responsibility placed upon them?