French Hammer — German Anvil

Radio Record, Volume V, Issue 24, 24 December 1931, Page 11

French Hammer — German Anvil

"Through their long history they have abundantly exemplified the proverb, ‘Iron sharpeneth iron; so a man sharpeneth the countenance of his friend’. . ."

A Talk from 38YA by

GORDON S.

TROUP

MS

A

RENCH relations with Germany are generally considered to be the key to the problem of European stability. This is true, if we do not fall into two mistakes, one, of thinking exclusively of political relationships, and the other, of regarding French and Germans as two types that are poles asunder and doomed to be antagonistic. The truth is that cultural, economic, and social relationships are far more vital, and ir many ways more advanced, between the two. countries, than purely political ones, which, as usual, lag lamentably behind. Ever since there has been a France and a Germany, each has been acting anc reacting upon the other, sometimes to their mutual hurt, more often to their mutual benefit, much as two members of one family mutually affect one another.

Often they stimulate one another to greater efforts; sometimes they are terribly hard on one another’s nerves, because of their very similarity dees down, and differences on the surface. All European nations, and especially these two and _ ourselves, have roughly the same mixture of discontent, adventure, hypocrisy, idealism, materialism and individualism, together with a socialising instinct which makes us usually very helpful neighbours, but occasionlly very bad ones. Through their long history they have abundantly exemplified the proverb, "Iron sharpeneth iron; so a man sharpeneth the countenance of his friend." It is interesting to analyse the results of 2000 years’ cultural interplay. The Huns invade France, and succumb, as conquerors often do, to Roman organisation and Christianity as preached by their victims. Then Charlemagne replaces the Roman social system with the Feudal one, and German chivalry becomes acclimatised in France. Gothic, and the scholastic philosophy, are taken over the Rhine to Germany, and for hundreds of years, till the French revolution. no creat dis-

I covery or movement in one country fails to make its mark speedily in the other. ; Often the results of such movements are far more extensive in the country of their adoption. Thus the Reformation, beginning in Germany, laid France waste with religious wars and disputes for close on a century. And when the successive batches of Protestants were expelled, they went in large numbers to Germany, where they started a second Renaissance, more brilliant for that country than the first had been. It was sparks from this camp-fire that kindled the bonfire of the French revolutions, which lasted through eighty years and four big upheavals before leaving a relatively stable society, Napoleon revived the plans of Charlemagne of a European-wide

society with a homogeneous culture, but the main result of his attempt . to mould Germany was the introduction into France first of a romantic, then of a scientific, revival on the model of Germany. Then nationalistic barriers began to rise on both sides of the Rhine, and from 1870 on, there has been less and less of the fruitful intercourse of former times. The crowning estrangement of the Great War saw leaders in science and art and literature mobilised for cultural recriminations which the survivors surely regret now. But once more normal relation-. ships are being resumed. They have taken turn and turn about being hammer and anvil all down the centuries. Now Germany has got her first revolution safely past, and anxiously looks when’ the next one will appear. It is her turn to be hee 14.

anvil, and cultural Hrance piles tite traditional hammer, rather mercifully than otherwise, if we forget her political dealings. Meanwhile individual contacts of all kinds are carrying on the same process. At present, for instance, there are over 1000 German students in Paris alone, keen to absorb as much of French culture as they can. It is true that only about fifty French students are to be found in the whole of Germany. But several holiday tours have taken French students into the heart of Germany, and into a full understanding of her problems and achievements. Sport also brings host of French and Germans together year by year. Cycling, track athletics, swimming and football have all international meetings, while for the last Soccer match between France and Germany several thousand Germans made cheap excursions to Paris. An involuntary piece of Franco-German co-operation came near the end of the game, with the score O-O, when a German miskicked and beat his own goalkeeper, winning the match for France. German artistic and operatic companies also frequently visit France, and

the visits are returned less frequently. md a most enthusiastic Tecepe | tion was given in Paris last year the conductor Weingartner, in a concert hall containing 5000 people. Previously his visit had had to be postponed, for the French "Young Patriots" had given out that they would not let him away alive. But the promoters of the visit were too strong and clever for the patriots, and no violence occurred. In addition to these contacts, there are conferences, mainly during the summer, bringing together all sections of the community on all sorts of subjects. Teachers, students, economists, doctors, workers. children, Catholics, Protestants, Quakers, and workers for peace, social uplift and prison reform meet in a friendly way and help to bridge the gap. The interesting fact is that among the members of these conferences, convinced internationalists of (Concluded on page 30.),

French HammerGerman Anvil (Continued from page 11.)

pacifists are rather few. There is no need to bring them together for agreement. It is the more or less convyinced patriots who benefit most from these experiences, and yery striking changes are wrought in the outlook of many of them. The Ruhr Problems. PILL the 19th century, both countries. were economically almost selfcoutained. But the discovery of coal and iron in a belt traversing, in defiance of frontiers, first Belgium, then Northern France, the German Ruhr Valley, Luxembourg, Lorraine and Alsace has made the heavy industries of that region virtually one. ‘he big industrialists have been far ahead of the politicians in their perception of the need for unity, and had formed uw syndicate on international lines in 1925, when political relations were most strained. Till the Great War, France was not nearly on a par with Germany as an industrial power in Burope. Two factors have contributed to make her so: First, in the peace treaty with Germany and the other vanquished powers, she inserted a clause ensuring for herself treatment equal to that of the most favoured nation. ‘ Secondly, when Germany fell short in her payments of reparations, she had already virtually rebuilt on modern -lines France’s northern industrial region, and to make good a deficiency of only 1.5 per cent. in the reparation payments, France was able to seize and paralyse the key German industries of the Ruhr. \

e Later, when the value of these industries depreciated with the fall of the mark, many French industrial magnates were able to acquire large interests in the German concerns threatened with bankruptcy. When, or if, business returns to no«mal, Germany can searcely help reaping the lion’s share of the industrial direction of the Continent. But France can hardly slip back to self-sufficiency

again, and the destinies of {he two countries economically must remain fairly closely interwoven. Alsace Lorraine. T is most interesting to see how internal conditions in Germany affect France, and, to some extent, Hrench conditions react on Germany. Germany has carried out a thoroughgoing policy of industrialisation, and, since the war, tempered the harsh conditions of life and work of the masses by much social legislation, raising wages, supplying insurance and unemployment relief on the highest scale. France, less indu:trialised, is following suit very slowly. The recaptured provinces of Alsace am:l Lorraine are far ahead of the rest of the country in this respect, owing w their German administration. Political Forces. ey Germany, however, the industrial system is strained almost to breaking point, and the great industrialists, between closing markets, rising production costs, and growing discontent of the workers, do not know where to turn. It is not necessary to waste any sympathy on them; they have a knack of) getting out of such difficulties, whoever else does not. What is important is the means they choose to combat the. Reds of all shades, whom they recognise as their chief enemies, They sub- sidise the nationalistic forces, symbol-. ised rather than led by the adventurer Adolf Hitler, that they may be a thorn in the side of the Communists. In this they certainly succeed; but they do not stop there. They make wild gestures on the Mussolini model against France, against

Poland, and the other clients of France, they talk about "storm troops" anil "revenge," and in the hectic rush for recruits among the new poor and the discontented they can outbid the Communists, for they have so much more money at their disposal. But their activities are looked at askance across the border, where they raise much disquiet, And thus, while the nationalist Germans are called into being to watch the Communists, the Nationalist French ure organised to keep the Nationalist Germans at bay. If they confined themselves to their occasional violeit crimes and outbreaks, and to dispensiug abundance of east wind for the pu ric belly, the results would be tolerav y bad. But the extreme Nationaiists un each side have a preponderating say in polities, and because of the fancied or real menace of Communism, each Government imagines, rightly or Wrongly, that their best course lies in bolstering up these so-called "patriots." Strained Relationships. NHIS gives us the clue to the main political relations between the countries since the war. They are more strained at present, probably, than at any time since the occupation of the Ruhr. Briand, who seemed un shakable as French Foreign Minister, has lost a great deal of ground in his own country, and the conciliation policy elaborated by him and the late Dr. Stresseman is being less and !ess followed, both in France and in Germany. The policy is just as sound as ever, but the accession to greater power cf the right-wing nationalists in both countries has vitiated it. The French Parliament senses a nationalistic revival in the electorates, and the elections are due to take place next May. In the meantime the members Jose no opportunity of stressing the "sacred and inalienable right" of France to full reparations, the need for watchfulness lest Gerwiainy should re-arm, and the determination of France to control all attempts at unifying Europe. At the debates during the past year. When such questions as the Hoover plan, the French dreadnought to reply to the German "pocket battleship," and the Austro-German Customs Union. Briand has sat absolutely dumb, though he seemed clearly the man most fitted to give a lead. His cause was lost before the debate began, because of Governmental commitments to the extremists. But the Government would never have listened to the nationalists, had not their opposite aque.

— numbers in Germany been going to more and more violent and threatening lengths. Meanwhile, European union, which all the Continent urgently needs, is languishing. Germany is geographically and econemically marked out to be the keystone of such ‘a union; but psychologically she is quite unfitted; she creates apprehension jn stead of confidence. France has not the situation, nor the organising atility to carry through a move of that sort, but her prestige among the lesser powers of Europe gives her a valuabie card to play. Single-handed, neither of them can achieve what William II and Chavlemagne on the one hand, and Napvleon and Louis XIV on the other, dreamed of and failed permanently to effect. Perhaps, while France and Germany are blinded -by the dust of their own dispute, the grandiose descendant of Julius Caesar, or the newer godsonus of Peter the Great und Lenin, will make their dreams a reality. ; But it is not yet too late for the moderate elements on each side of the Rhine to join forces, and, after taking in hand those primitive elements among them that have been left untouched by the onward sweep of lib- eral ideas, or debased by war and privation, follow out a policy of forwardlooking co-operation for the good of Turope and the world. There is also the hope that the captains of industry will realise that their interests do not lie in the direction taken by the extremists whom they secretly support. Most of all, perhaps, we can take hope from the muny individuals who have crossed the frontiers, mental as well as geographical, and seen and felt for themselves whut the possibilities of reconciliation sre. Six months before the Hoover Plan ; was proposed, a young Frenchman, a returned soldier who had travelled in Germany, proposed in a weekly review a plan very similar to Hoover’s own. It was not accepted, but the initiative was there, and others may be bold to carry on, where present leaders are timorous. The words of another leader, of the new world, have special significance for the old: "We are not enemies, but friends. The golden chords of memory, reaching back from every battlefield to every heart and hearthstone in this vast continent will yet swell the chorus of union, when breathed upon, as surely they will be by the better angels of our nature."