England and France

Radio Record, Volume V, Issue 21, 4 December 1931, Page 7

England and France

A Study of Contrasts

By

L. R. R.

DENNY

M.A., F.R.Hist.S.

. « « The European war, instead of tending to an increase of understanding has . . . served to emphasise . . . their common incapacity to bridge their divergences. A Talk Broadcast from 3YA, Nov. 26

iG is a frequent . matter for surprise that, separated as they are by no more than twenty miles or so of sea, France and England, after more than a thousand years of intimate relationship, are yet so far from any real understanding of each other. The European War, instead of tending to an increase of understanding, has, superficially at least, served to emphasize, not indeed their divergences, but their common ifcapacity ,to bridge them.

Before I pass in rapid review the main features in the political relationships between the two countries over the last twenty-five years, there are one or two points which deserve at least passing notice. Public opinion is still prone to hasty generalisation about great countries. People still dismiss foreign and international relations with an airy wave of the hand and, perhaps, the remark "All foreigners are so spiteful." Others, especially with respect to France, make the mistake of regarding Paris as France. In this way the difficulty of appreciating the ultimate motives of the French becomes well-night insuperable. Any one who has to.any extent travelled in France knows that there is a world of difference between the France of the capital, and the France \of the Provinces: the thoughts and aspirations of the Marseilles Cannebiere are not those of the Grands Boulevards; and always as Paris grows more and more cosmopolitan so must her statesmen, and her men of letters fall increasingly out of touch with the slower impulses of their provincial and rural fellow citizens. A second factor in building up public opinion is | the superficial observation of indiscriminating tourists. Admittedly the foreign visitor

is a fair prize for fleecing. The scale of charges for any con modity varies surprisingly from shop to shop; and it varies, too, within each shop according to the status of the customer. The native comes off the best; @ strange French pays a little more; the regular foreigner more still, and the strange fore eigner most of all. If he has served his apprenticeship he will save something by bargaining. Mostly he pays up. Still it is not always easy to accept it

philosophically. The impression gained by a foreign eye-witness tra~ velling through France was, is of a country with little unemployment and considerable contentment; taxation is definitely lighter than it is in England; and it seems likely to remain so. , I want to emphasize that in all questions of reparations, of taxation for armaments and for security it is the opinion of thousands of peasants and artisans that counts infinitely more than the noisy tirades of politicians. The French peasant is no different from any other peasant in desiring security for his home, his income, his land. If armaments and militarism are essential for that security he will pay. But he is much more pacifist and non-aggressive than he is given credit for. His opinions are seldom those of an excitable Quai D’Orsay executive.. I turn now to a survey of the history of my period. INCE the days of King John, some seven hundred years ago, rarely have the relations of England and France been worse-save in times of acute controversy or of actual hostilities-than they were at the opening of the present century, | (Continued om page 8):

France and England

(Continued from page 7.) The feuds between the two countrias have indeed been numberless-we think of Orecy and Agincourt, of Joan of Are, of Blenheim and Fontenoy, of Trafalgar and Waterloo. But excepting these as bygones, the records of the last two decades of the nineteenth century alone were filled with one quarrel after another, for the most part due to the clashing of incompatible coloniai_ ambitions. The climax was reached when in 1898 Kitchener, after his victory at Omdurman, steamed up the Nile, only to find his progress barred by Marchant, who had crossed the African Continent from the Atlantic, and had hoisted the

flag of France at Fashoda. The uniyersal outburst of wrath in Bngland, and the rough uncompromising tone adopted by both Government and people, might well have made war inevitable if France had not backed down completely, although with dignity. Such a public humiliation is not easily forgotten, and it is no wonder that for a'space Britain displaced Germany as thé chief object* of French hatred. Germans were more welcome than British at the Paris exhibition in 1900; and when during the Boer War news came of British reverses, Frenchmen high and low jeered to their heart’s content. The British Foreign Office actually sought repeatedly between 1899 and 1901 for a German alliance or at least a binding agreement of some kind. But there were a few rare spirits, in France as in England, who looked and worked for happier relations. Soou

after the failure of the British Government’s overtures to Germany, it was questioned by the French as to whether it was disposed to enter into negotiations aiming at a broad settlement of troubles between them. It is curious that Ngypt and Morocco, the two most important matters, were disposed of very easily. It.is remarkable, too, that the small minority who had the courage of their convictions, and were earnestly seeking a reconciliation, should find such rapid support in public opinion. Egypt and Morocco were settled on the old principle of give and take. And the old bone of contention of the French ‘shore rights. in Newfoundland was amicably settled by a cash payment. Edward the Peacemaker. To adjust the diplomatic situation wary walking was necessary. A false step might easily provoke disaster. King Wdward VII took, on his own nitiative, the courageous and striking tep of visiting Paris in 1903. As -rince of Wales he had been weil snown and popular there. French politeness accorded the King a reception which, if not enthusiastic, was at least courteous, and the ice was broken. Out of that came President Loubet's return visit, and the Anglo-French agreement of 1904. The agreement was enthusiastically received in both countries. Bach was glad to clear away obstacles to better relations, and neither felt inclined to haggle over technical terms. The meaning of the change is fairly clear. France decided that it was hopeless for her to attempt to rival at the same time England on the sea and Germany on the land, and she must make her choice. Conversely, England, true to an age-long consciousness of the balance of power, realised that France was not to be feared, but that German competition at very turn threatened Britain industrially, commercially, and even in that command of the sea which she held to be essential to the feeding of her own people, and to the existence of her Empire. So much for the surface explanation. There were unconscious motives, too, rather more difficult to fathom. It is a truism to remark that the French and the English are radically dissimilar in many ways, indeed both are probably nearer to the Germans than to each other. The attitude of millions of British for generations was one of scorn for the French and all that was theirs: that of the French, worsted in many wars, was marked by positive hatred, mingled with contempt for a folk whom they regarded as gross and stupid. Yet the Frenchman did recognise in a lurking way that there was something in the English achievement that extorted admiration: and the Englishmen, despite a superiority complex (which in some ways is'not so marked at present), has many times yielded to the charm of French culture, and to the marvellous products of the French mind. After all, granting that the twain are not alike and cannot be expected to see many things in the same light, may they not for that very reason serve as a better complement to one another, and perhaps live in truer harmony on that account? I shall pass over the years intervening until the war, merely remarking that the Entente was well maintained, the foreigu policy of the two nations Was similar, they took the same stand

in international relations, and this intimacy was also strengthened by meetings of military and naval experts to agree on principles of joint’ action should ever the need arise. War Years. WHEN the crisis of 1914 set the world on edge, despite the fact that there was really much more common interest as well as sympathy ‘between the English and French than between the French and Russians, there was actualy no Anglo-French alliance, similar to the Anglo-Russian one. Consequently, when France, as she was pledged to do, took the Russian side, when Germany declared war, she was, until the last moment, in desperate uncertainty as to whether she could rely on English help. ‘ Sir Hdward Grey, who believed ’that Britain was morally committed, pointed out again and again that she was bound by no express promise, If, indeed, the Germans had avoided taking the offensive in the West, or at least respected the neutrality of Belgium, England might well have remained neutral, at least for a time. Only after the appeal of King Albert, when it was clear that the violation of neutral territory had not taken place with Belgian connivance, did the British Cabinet commit itself, aiid even then the last word was reserved to Parliament. The prolonged tragedy of the World War led to five years of the most intimate association between the Dnglish and the French; to the actual personal contact of millions of people belonging to the two nations. It would be asking too much of Governments or individuals to expect that they should invariably see eye to eye under such circumstances. Rather, the wonder is, not that faults, suspicions, jealousies, and the thousand and one ills the flesh is heir to were in evidence, but that the relations remained so good as they did to the end. Post-War Differences. HEN the gigantic combat was over, the triumphant Allies were soon to discover how widely their views differed. Both had suffered terribly, both could look back on their achievements With justifiable pride, and both felt justified in demanding reparation as well as security for the future. But there the resemblance ceases. Bngland had by now attained practieally all her war objects. The German Navy was to be no more a menace}; German commerce was prostrate; and the mercantile fleet, like the colonies of the former empire, in the hands of the conquerors, who proposed to keep them. For Britain, whose territory had not been invaded, it was not difficult to forgive and forget, especially as it sopn became evident that for the reconstitution of her own trade and industry, the peace, prosperity and purchasing power of her neighbours was infinitely more important than any money payment by reparations. France wanted more. The recovery of Alsace-Lorraine was not asnough to make up for the actual war losses from the flower of her population. Then there was the age-old "damnosa hereditas" of the Rhine frontier. So she usked first for security from another invasion along ihis frontier in the «®oncluded on page 28.)

France and England

(Continued from page 8). future. Then the rehabilitation of her devastated areas would involve a huge outlay, which she looked to reparations to finance. That Germany might be ruined in the process did not worry her, She preferred German ruin to her own. ‘ Ol Also, France is a more economically self-sufficing nation, and she was less keenly concerned about the prompt rebuilding of Europe than was England. These fundamental differences in outlook and situation have, I believe, been at the bottom of most of the troubles, not to say antagonism, between Great Britain and France from the days of the Peace Conference to our own. With the best of will, it has often been more than difficult for them to work hat,’ moniously together when their respegtive necessities have been so impossible to reconcile without painful sacrifi¢es on the part of one, if not both. Old Rivalries. There have been other reasons, ico, , Old rivalries renewed themselves in the Near Hast and other quarters. Personal elements have come in. Lloyd George was for a time the bete noire of Frenchmen who believed that he got the better of them in every transaction. Poincare in his turn became ever more unpopular in England, whose outspoken disapproval he calmly disregarded. Animosity grew up rapidly on both sides of the Channel, inflamed by the tone of the Press. Each seeme the other to be utterly selfish, Wht. the Ruhr occupation ceased and FrancoGerman relations became less strained, the relations between England and France also improved. Ramsay MacDonald and Monsieur Herriott worked in well together; Briand and Chamberlain co-operated loyally. M. Briand is the French Minister for Foreign Affairs at the moment. I think M. Briand must be singled out as one of the few statesmen who have the distinction of exercising an almost unbroken continuity of post-war power. He is as tenacious of French interest-as ever the blundering M... Poincare was, yet he excites as lit resentment in the Wilhelmstrasse as Whitehall, He has remarkably few enemies, and has been, on the whole, as pacifist in motive and effect as any contemporary statesman. That is a big achievement, for the French Foreign Office is full of restless, quick-witted diplomatic speculators, whom a quics4

XK i eent Minister of Foreign Affairs would *normally goad to madness. The influence of the various Foreign Offices is often overlooked; such institutions have tenacious memories, and are frequently seized with views differing violently from those of their chiefs. Looking at the situation broadly; one must frankly realise that the close mutual friendship of England and France is not necesseftily the one above others that either would prefer. France has flirted with the idea of a United States of Hurope: Would England be of those States? Their colonial policies differ; and in the domain of manufactures and commerce they have always been rivals. The natural question is, How can anyone expect two peoples so dissimilar in character and manner of thought, and whose aims are so often opposed to liv together in more than temporary acord? The obvious answer is that life, whether individual, national, or international, has become vastly compllcated. The very fact that the relations between England and France are more intricate than perhaps those between any other two of the great nations of the world means that it is of the ‘atmost consequence to both that they should be friends, not enemies. King Edward once said: "I know of no two countries whose prosperity is more interdependent."

Politicians. A WORD in conclusion on politicians: _ Myr. Baldwin recently wrote: "Tf disaster comes, if bloodshed comes, 2s it often has in our history, the poli- . ticians always escape. The worst that can happen to a politician is loss uf office; and the men who give their blood are generally those whose hands had nothing to do with the laying of the train that led to the explosion." Is it asking too much of the nations that they should select for their responsible spokesmen those who are resolved to see the best in other nations and maintdin constant loyalty to the international ideal of peace. When a politician like Poincare hitches his wagon to the slogan, "Delenda est Germania," he was a public nuisance. When, like M. Briand, he has humour he may do much good. I sincerely hope that the Disarmament Conference of 1932, upon which all eyes will turn, will find both great countries unanimous in their desire to iegmote the peace of the world by diverting into productive channels some of the terrific expenditure on armpments to-day.