What 2YA Says Of Singapore

Radio Record, Volume I, Issue 7, 2 September 1927, Unnumbered Page

What 2YA Says Of Singapore

iA Si | kU ITLL Is 4 IN Lib Nut-Shell Summary Of Empire Factors In the interesting talks on Imperial Affairs given from 2YA, Singapore was last treated, and the reason why it is vital to New Zealand and Britains oversea’s interests for that base ‘to be built. These talks are proving very popular for they summarise the points of value that are too often unrevealed in scattered newspaper announcements and references. Our Photographs here and on another page give some interesting glimpses of the site of the base and ‘the sights of Singapore. Py ATT 7

SI D> — De Dy — me = As a sequel to the lecturettes on naval disarmament it might be fitting to discuss very shortly the proposal to establish a naval base at Singapore. This is not a new proposal. It has formed a portion of the naval policy of Great Britain for many years, and was discussed very fully and approved at the Imperial Conference of 1921. Preparations for the very extensive works that were considered necessary were put in hand after the most careful and detailed investigations had been made by Admiralty experts, to ensure that the most suitable site might be chosen for the base. The final selection fell upon the island «f Singapore, on the opposite side of the island to the city of Singapore, facing the mainland of the Malay Peninsula. from which it is

ITITURAANSA 74 ji ills WITH is ¥, ‘S Sa | aS Wi V) BEA EF TA separated by the Straits of Johore, a deep sea-water pasgage about one mile wide and forty miles long. The opposite shores of the straits are in the territory of the Unfederated Malay State of Johore, aud the straits have ample depth for the largest ships in the Navy, and space enough for the entire British fleet. When the proposal had been put into concrete form, the question arose as to how far the British Dominions might be disposed to assist in the work. The Parliament of New Zealand, as a first instalment, voted the sum of #100,000 to be devoted to this purpose, and the Australian Government also announced its intention of providing financial assistance, WORK INTERRUPTED. At this stage, however, a change of Government took place in Great Britain, the Baldwin Government being defeated, and the Government led by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald coming into power The policy of this Administration was opposed to the establishment of the Singapore base, on the broad general principle that a gesture of

peace made at that time by the British Empire would enormously assist towards the cause of international disarmament and _ international peace, which the British Empire as a whole was and is disposed to assist to the’ utmost degree. As a result work on the base was discontinued and the coutribution, voted by New Zealand was not paid. The Australian Government, feeling it necessaty to take precautions for its own defence, embarked upon a naval programme covering a number of years, WORK RESUMED AS VITAL NEFP When the MacDonald Goverment was in turn defeated and the Baldwin Administration resumed control it was decided once again to proceed with the Singapore base. The subject was one of those considered at the Imperial Conference Jast year, when it was madg plain that in the opinion of the BritBSA TORU TRAST tS SASHIMI

ish Government and of the British Admiralty, it was vital to the security of the Empire that the scheme should be proceeded with, in order that the ficet should haye that full freedom of movement throughout the British Empire that is essential. Mr. Baldwin said: "This development is most urgently needed at the present time from the point ef view of Imperial defence. We would, therefore, ask those Dominions which are speciaily interested in the Far East to consider most carefully whether there 1s any way in which they can co-operate in the development of Singapore either now or within the next few years, There could be no more yaluable contribution to the. defence of the Empire as a whole."

NEW ZEALAND’S SHARE. It will be within the memory of all that the Prime Minister of New Zealand has recently announced the intention of the New Zealand Government to propose, for the approval of Parliament, a subsidy of £1,000,000 towards the prosecution of this base, the amount to be paid in annual instalments between the present time and the date when the base will be completed, estimated at some eight years. A debate on the proposal will take place in Parliament very shortly. Now a few details zs to the work that it is proposed to do, ‘The intention is to provide on the site chosen an aerodrome, an aeroplane station, a floating dock, and a fuelling and refitting base capable of handling the largest ships in the Navy, all adequately defended from hostile attack, It is estimated that the total cost of the work, as at

present proposed, will be some £9,000,000, but it is quite possible, of course, that considerable expenditure will be required ultimately in addition to that, ‘Towards this huge sum the I’ederated Malay States have voted the sum of £2,000,000, the New Zealand Government have offered £1,000,000, HongKong has yoted £250,000, and the Straits Settlements have donated the land, valued at some £130,000, upon which the base is to be erected. So far as the New Zealand contribution is concerned, it might be noted that our expenditure per head on the maval defence of the Empire is at present some 8s. per annum, and with the extra cost of the proposed contribution towards the base, it will amount to some 10s, The Australian contribu-

> 2 tion towards nayal defence is over 17s. a head, and in-Great Britain the cost per head is more than 25s, SOME OF THE OBJECTIONS. It must not be thought that the proposal meets with approval in all quarters throughout the Empire. Various objections have been raised, and a few vf these should be quoted here. In the first place, there is a comparatively strong body of opinion that it ill becomes the British Empire. holding the views that it does on the subject of international disarmament and international peace, to embark upon such an enormous scheme of warlike preparation. Those who hold this view contend that if the British Empire refrained from any such preparation for war a most important lead would be given to other nations, and that the moral effect would be a greater defence to the Empire than

any instrument of war. This is the principal objection to the proposal, and that ist has considerable force cannot be denied. nA As against this, however, those who defend the proposal point out that however great may be the desire of the British Empire for «universal peace, and however genuine her attempts to assist and to lead the nations of the world along the paths of peace, the plain fact remains that other nations retain their armas ments, and that while this is the case Britain must in self-defence do the same. , ANTI ht A SMOC2SINUINT TI She cannot aftord to abandon all practical considerations of national safety, and, disarmed herself, depend entirely HU,

on the goodwill of au armed world. A second objection is: that. capital ships (i.e., battleships and battle-cruisers) are fast becoming obsolescent owing to the steady increase iu the effective power of airships and aeroplanes; and that the huge expenditure proposed to provide at Singapore for the wants of these ships will be almost entirely wasted. In reply to this, the supporters of _ the base assert that the controyversy as to capital ships, which was a burning question some years ago, is now practically a thing of tlie past. They point to the Washingtou Treaty, and to the fact that all important naval Powers are retaining these ships, as a conclusive reply to he suggestion that these vessels are no longer an effective instrument of war. IS THE LOCATION RIGHT? The next objection is that Singapore is not the correct place for the base. ‘This suggestion has not met with much support, and the reply given is that Singapore is ideally situated for the defence of all British territories in the Igast and in the Pacific -India, Ceylon, the Malay States, Tlone-Kong, British TOTS Za Al FAY 1 STEN A fh A IAINETAMUUT AIG: EULUHUHUAI SA TT

Borneo, Australia, and New Zealand. It is situated in close proximity to large supplies of oil, which will be required for refuelling, and in addition to its use as a naval base is excellently situated to form a link in the chain of Imperial airways, about which we shall have something to say in a future lecturette. On this aspect of the matter Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, who, as explained above, 1s opposed to the base on ethical considerations, made the following remarks in the British House of Commons some years ago:"I? we were driven to create a great fleet in the Pacific for the purpose of a meeded Imperial defence, then the strategical position of Singapore is second to none in ile whole vast area of those waters." (CONTINUED ON PAGE 2.) UUIULI VA TES ATT lA A TRUUAHUAGLI

The Singapore Base

Continued from Page I

NO THREAT AGAINST JAPAN, Another objection is that the establishment of a naval base at Singapore is contrary to the spirit of thé Washington Conference, and that it can only be regarded as a threat agaist Japan. To this it is answered that the Washington Treaty, which among other things prohibits fortifications ir certain areas, was explicitly drawn so as to exclude Singapore from the sphere of this prolubition, and that Singapore is situated at such a. distance from Japan that no reasonable mind could regard it as a threat against that nation. It has been said that if the comparative distances are taken into consideration it might just as well be argued that the fortification of Gibraltar could be regarded as

SHIPS USELESS WITHOUT A BASE. a threat to the United States of America. Finally the objection has been made that it Is unnecessary to have a base in the East at all, but it is here that the supporters of the base find their strongest argument. TFhey point out that a fleet is helpless without an ade‘quately protected and equipped base -in which it can in safety refuel, refit, and repair; that with the increase m size of modern capital ships and the alteration in their structure to pro‘vide protection against torpedoes (the bulge") existing docks in the Pacific and in the East are unable to accommodate the modern capital ships. They call attention to the startling fact that at present, and until

the Singapore base has been completed, British capital ships cannot in time of war operate in the Pacific at all. The nearest suitable base 1s at Malta, some 6000 miles away, and should circumstances ever necessitate the defence by arms of the British possessions im the East, or im the Pac:fic, then the British capital ships now in commission might just as well, for all practical purposes, be .laid up-they conld render no assistance in these waters, and would represent in these circumstances so much useless expenditure and so much useless scrap iron. They say, "If we are to have a fleet at all, and if that fleet is to contain, as it does at present, capital ships, then it is absurd that these ships should not be able to operate in anv

portion of the world where British territory requires defence." LESSON OF THE LAST WAR'S RAIDERS. Let us conclude by quoting what Mr. Amery, then First Lord of the Adnnuralty, said as long ago as 123: "One small German squadron beginming in the China Seas caused us infinite anxiety, and at one moment was Im serious danger of affecting our whole strategic problem. Imagine a position in which von Spee’s squadron had been appreciably stronger. Imagime 1t had been what the battle fleets of other great nations in these distant waters are-a mighty fleet comparable and even equal to our own. How conld you then cope with such a situation except by being able to take out your battle fleets? It has been said that we have the command of all the seas. We have not. We are not in a position to-day nor shall we be for many years toa come te put 2 battle fleet into

the Pacific or even as far as Singapore, In all these waters, with their immense consequences to us from the Strategical point of view, and from the point of view also of the Empire of which we are the trustees and the main defenders, we are helpless, and rehant on the good-will of a friendly and lately allied Power. But no selfrespecting Power can afford indefinitely to be dependent on another Power for its security and cven its existence, and it is because we wish the Navy. to be free to fulfil its historic function-to operate freely anywhere in the world and to operate with an additional freedom because we have so eut down the margin of naval strength -that these are the gentral grounds on which the Board of Admiralty have come to the conclusion that it is essential to develop-not hastily nor in any manner which would appear.to aim to hit anyone-but steadily and surely. to develop a base with which we can maintain the Navy in those waters."