Why The Geneva Naval Conference Failed

Radio Record, Volume I, Issue 6, 26 August 1927, Page 2

Why The Geneva Naval Conference Failed

America’s Scheme Incompatible With British Security Here in a nutshell is given, following on last week’s preliminary explanation, the reason why the Geneva Naval Conference failed. After the conference, it will be remembered, the cables reported that the American Press was busy blaming Britain for the failure. This explanation shows that the responsibility on the other hand rests primarily with America-her attitude being dictated by her own needs, regardless of Britains. By omitting essential phrases of the Fart of Balfour's statement, the American Press sought to convey a wrong impression: this calling forth from Lord Balfour the most stinging rebuke and correction of recent times,

The first meeting of the Conference took place at Geneva on Jine 20, Omitting details and stating the matter as Simply as possible, the scheme put for‘wward by the British Empire delegation proposed ;-~ Firstly: An extension of the accepted ‘Jife of the various classes of ships of ‘war-in the case of capital ships from 20: 'to 26 years-thus obviating the re"placement of existing ships for a long‘er period than had been accepted by jthe Washington Treaty, and saving a ‘very large amount of money, | Seeondly:. A reduction in the size ‘lang itt the armament of future battleShips from the 35,000 tons specified ‘by the Washington ‘Treaty to 80,000 tons, and from l6in. guns to 18.5in. guns. Thirdly, and this is where disagreesnent occurred, it should be noted care: fully: Cruisers to be divided into two "elasses, the first (as provided by the Washington Treaty) ‘with a. maximum Of 10,000 ‘tons and 8in. guns, and the second with a maximum of 7'00 tons ‘and Gin. guns. The proposal was that a 5-5-3 ratio should be agreed upon ‘for the larger type of cruisers, while no limitation should be imposed on the smaller type of cruisers. Fourthly: Certain limitations in the ‘size, number and armament of destroyers aud submarines. On the question of submarines it was made plain that the British Empire had in no way altered her view that the nse of submarines in warfare should be. ‘discontinued, but in view of ths fact. "that many nations regarded these ships aS @ necessary means of defence, the proposals put forward wece the utmost. that was considered practicable. THE CRUISER PROBLEM. Technical committees were set up to consider details and it soon became clear that the question of cruisers was to be the chief difficulty. A degree of understanding was arrived at in connection with destroyers and submarines, and the British delegation agreed to the suggestion of America and Japan to postpone consideration of the proposals regarding capital ships until it had been possible to arrive at an agreement on the other points. On the question of cruisers, however, the British and. American viewpoints were so definitely contradictory that it was not possible to make headway. The British attitude on the question was that the requirements of the British Empire, so far as cruisers were concerned, were Very much greater than in the case of any other nation. The Empire consists of territories in all quarters of the globe, each one of which depends for its existence on sea communications, and in the interests of security it is essential that a large number of small cruisers should be available for police purposes. The larger ernisers are designed as an adjunct to a battle fleet, while the smaller cruisers are of little use in that connection. Of the larger type cruisers Britain was quite prepared to accept a limitation in number on the 5-5-3 ratio already aceepted in regard to capital ships, but the safety

of her communications required a large number of smail cruisers. BRITAIN’S TRADE ARTERIES. On this subject Lord Jellicoe pointed out that Great Britain’s main lines of } communication measured 80,000 miles, on which were an avérage of 9,500,00u tons of merchant shipping. The minimum requirements of the Empire were 70. ernisers, of which at least, 45 were: | required for direct trade protéction Making necessary allowances. for, irefitting and refuelling, this. would provide one cruiser to every 2500 miles, ' Britain’s cruiser strength at the outbreak of war was 114 ship§, and even this number was insufficient to prevent immense loss from enemy raiders. Any reduction below 70 would imperil the ] safety of the Empire. To illustrate the difference between the position of the British Empire in this connection and that of the United States of America, Sir Austen Chamberlain, in the British House of Commous, quoted a statement made by the chairman of the American Committee on Naval Appropriation. This authori- } tative American said ‘Our country could be cut off from the rest of the world, but there would be food for our ‘people, fuel and oil for our use, and materials of all kinds. The lines of the sea might be closed to us for weeks or years, should the necessity arise. But the United States, within her own territories conld sustain her people without suffering, and produce materials to meet whatever emergency naval necessities might require.’’ ONLY SEVEN WEEKS’ FOOD. Contrasting this position with that of Great Britain, Lord Balfour at the Washington Conference in 1922 had (spoken as follows:-‘‘The United States stands solid and self-sufficient. All its essential lines of communication are completely protected from any conceivable hostile attack. The configuration of your country is such that you are wholly immune from the particular posi‘tion to which, from the nature of the case, the British Empire is. subjected. Suppose for example, that your Western States were suddenly removed 10,000 miles across the sea. Suppose that the very heart of your Empire was a small and crowded island, depending upon oversea trade, not merely for its luxuries, but for the raw materials on whose manufacture its swperabundant population live. and for the food upon which they subsist. Suppose it was a familiar thought that there was never a moment of the year when, within the limits of your State, there was more than seven weeks’ food for its population, and that that food could only be replenished by overseas com-_ munication.- If you will draw this picture, and if you will realise all that it implies, you wilt understand why it is that no citizen of the British Empire, whether he be drawn ftom the far Dominions of the Pacific or lives in the small island in the North: Sea, can ever forget that it is by sea communication that he lives, and that without sea communication he and the Empire to

which he belongs would perish together." And finally on this subject listen to Lord Birkenhead’s remarks at a dinner at the end of July last to a body of American editors visiting England: "This country has only sufficient food for seven weeks. No other country has ever been in such a position. EI dare not think what would happen to these islands if we could not protect our great sea routes. I care not for those fighting vessels-I am- talking only of that class of cruiser which attends to the vital arteries of the nation. That is what concerns me and my colleagues. That is the case which is deeply felt’ by those who are trusted by the British people." NO QUESTION OF SUPERIORITY. It was made perfectly plain by Great Britain that she aimed in no way at

naval superiority over the United ‘States--she was quite prepared to accept an equality with America in all classes of ships, and she had no objec‘tion to the proportion proposed to be allotted to Japan. The plain fact was ‘that she required 70 cruisers, and that her very existence would be imperilled unless 70 cruisers were aveilable. She had na objection to the United States also having 70 similar cruisers, but she could agree to no plan that would reduce her own number. America also was quite satisfied with an equality in cruisers with Great Bri‘tain, but notwithstanding the geographical position of the British Empire she would not be satisfied with less than equality. But the American suggestion was that the equality should be in total tonnage, and this is where the ‘difficulty arose that ultimately led to the breaking up of the Conference. Aimerica desired to be free to put all her ‘tonnage into the larger type of cruis‘ers. THE PROBLEM OF AMERICA'S ; PROPOSAL. Let us examine the difficulties raised from the British point of view by the American proposal. ‘Though America and Britain would have the same total tonnage of cruisers, the American ships might be all 10,000 ton ships with 8in. guns, while a considerable proportion of the British ships would be 7500 tons with 6in. guns. The result would be that America would have a large number of 10,000 ton 8in. gun ships, while Britain would have a comparatively small numiber of these ships and a large number of smaller 6in gun ships. Now the first-class of cruiser is infinitely more powerful than the secondclass. You might note very carefully the enormous advantage that is possessed by a ship with heavier guns, especially if she has a slightly greater speed than an opponent. The ship with larger "guns can hit her opponent when the | latter’s guns are outranged; owing to her slower speed the small gun ship can get no nearer, so as to make her ‘guns effective, and-more important still-she can get no farther, and as a result can be destroyed without any possibility of damage to the large gun ship. Naval experts have laid it down that the 10,000ton Sinch cruiser is, at least, two and a half times as powerful as the 7500-ton 6-inch gun cruiser, and consequently the Aemrican battle fleet would be immensely more powerful than the British battle fleet, Great Britain being left with a large number of ships which for battle purposes would be negligible. a WHY AMERICA WANTED BIG CRUISERS. The reasons for America’s preference for the larger type of crniser may he stated as follow :- In the first place, her taval bases are more scattered than those of Great Britain. A larger type of cruiser was required in order to carry sufficient

fuel to provide an adequate eriisiug range, Secondly, America, with her different geographical situation, did not require a large number of small cruisers. For fleet purposes these ships are. of course, not the equal of the 10,000ton S-inch gun ships allowed by the Washington Treaty, and America did not feel inclined to spend large sums of money in building a class of ship which she did not require, merely ‘in order to obtain an equality with Great Britain in these ships. Thirdly, she catled attention to the fact that Great Britain, with her very large numbers of merchant ships, could, by placing 6-inch guns on these ships, provide a numerous fleet, which would be carrying an armament of the same size as that proposed for the small cruisers suggested by Great Britain. ‘This argument was not regarded by the British delegation us a yalid one. It was scouted by Lord Jellicoe as a "landsman’s idea.’? Lord Jellicoe added: ‘‘An armed merchantman of large tonnage, equipped with guns mounted in awkward parts of the ship, and manned by a reserve crew, would | be no match for the smallest and most insignificant cruiser. It would present a large target, of an egg-shell character, with a mass of top hamper and highly vulnerable machinery. Any well-organised and properly constructed cruiser would be ready to take on an unlimited number of such ships." And there, put as shortly as possible, you have the rock upon which the conference split. Japan presented no obstacle, and, though America was re~ luctant to agree on a high total crniser tonnage, and was not agreeable to anything less than equality, even in cruisers, and notwithstanding the special position of the British Empire, the two nations are quite willing to accept an equality in cruisers. But the types of ships required by Breat Britain and America differed in essential particulars, and it was not possible to reconcile the varying points of view, | based, as they were, upon actual differences in the geographical structure of their territories. The one encouraging factor in the failure of the conference is the note of friendly régret on which it ended, and the possibility foreshadowed of further ne. gotiations between the three Gov: ernments, : This lecturette might well be coneluded with a quotation from the final statement at the conference made by the chief British delegate: "Our proposals for reductions in size, tonnage, and calibre of guns, and for the extension of the life of capital ships, would save ever £50,000,000 ta the British Em: pire during the period of replacement, and a proportionately large saving for other countries. Our cruiser preposals- would = save £1,000,000 on every cruiser to be constructed in futiure.’?