The Strategical Question

New Zealand Tablet, 13 October 1921, Page 17

The Strategical Question

WOULD AN INDEPENDENT IRELAND BE A DANGER TO ENGLAND Why does England refuse freedom to Ireland? A host of evasive and contradictory answers have been given to this question in the past (says the Irish Bulletin). But the last two years have cleared the ground of unreal controversies and fictitious issues. There survives but one answer to the eternal question posed, and that answer is that it would be "unsafe" for England to do otherwise. All the recent utterances of responsible British statesmen, including the Prime Minister, have narrowed the question to this single point. "An independent Ireland on our flank," they have repeated again and again, "would be a military and strategical danger to us." It is a brutally frank proposition, proclaimed without hypocrisy and seemingly without a suspicion that it amounts to a denial of all international right, and violates the principle in the name of-which Europe was drenched with blood for four years. But whether it be morally right or wrong, is the proposition true? Would an independent Ireland, in fact, be a danger to England , The difficulty is to place this important theme upon the plane of reasonable discussion. The supposed danger, for those who believe in it. is usually not a matter of argument but of unreasoning fear, while the trained strategists, accustomed to regard the world as a battle-field and humanity as cannon-fodder, take it for granted that every country, even an island, must be a military danger to its neighbors. Yet it is a, shocking and unconscionable thing that men should fight with passion for an empty delusion" above all in a war which, at the time hostilities were suspended, was threatening to become a veritable war of extermination upon the Irish people, and which, if peace is not to result, may resume that terrible complexion. We appeal, while there is still time, for a cool and thoughtful consideration of the subject. The Choice Before England * In the first place let us have it clear that for England the question is not one simply of safety, but of contrasting the relative safety of two opposite courses. Is she safer, with an Ireland under her military control, as at present, than she would be with an independent Ireland? A violently hostile Ireland is undoubtedly a danger to her, and, in the larger sense of the word "strategy" a strategical danger. It chains to the costly and odious task of coercion a large army which might at any moment be needed for vital work elsewhere. It requires a money outlay far exceeding any profit derived from the possession of this island. It involves in a war of a kind which is damaging to her prestige and admits of no finality because the objective is an unconquerable abstraction, the soul and spirit of a people. Lastly it makes England bitter enemies among the Irish race throughout the world, with results, especially in America, which are ah embarrassment to her imperial policies. / These facts are , unquestioned. Those who say that our independence would be a danger to England are bound to prove that the danger would be, greater than it is now. Mr. Lloyd George, in a speech at Carnarvon on October 9 of last year, came nearer to a reasoned strategical argument than any statesman in recent days, and the reasons he gave for the military subjection of Ireland will serve as a basis for discussion.

He made .two points, not merely against an Irish Republic but against "Dominion Home Rule." The first was that England would be forced to have conscription because '-you could not have an armv of 500,000 or 600,000 men in Ireland and only an army of about 100,000 men here.' 5 - . .:■•' .The second point was that "they (the Irish) need not build a navy. You do not need to spend much on submarines. They are vicious little craft but they are not expensive. ' * . Here are two assertions with which we can grapple The danger to England is alleged to come from an Irish army and from Irish submarines. ' Mr Lloyd George spoke as if Ireland, single-handed, could make these menaces effective, and the simplest plan is to begin by following him in this assumption, because the underlying strategic principles will thus emerge most clearly. Afterwards we can suppose that Ireland had an ally or allies or that her neutrality, like that of Belgium was violated. The Supposed Danger from an Irish Army Let us take the army first, and passing bv the rhetorical use of some rather startling figures, get'to the point J lie only rational meaning to be attached to Mr Llovd Georges proposition is that the Irish Armv would in some way threaten England. . Now let 'us suppose that little Ireland with her 4* millions of people and her revenue screwed to the highest point by exorbitant taxation, of only oO .millions, were really to form the insane ambition of menacing with military force her mightv neighbor. Hntain. with 42 millions of people and a revenue of 1,000 millions. "How is the threat to be carried out?-.' The Irish army could certainly be used up' to the limit of its strength for defending Irish soil. But defence is not a menace. For offence it must be transported overseas on ships which would have to be protected bv a navv capable of defeating the British Navv, and securing the permanent and undisputed command of the sea, for it is an accepted axiom of strategy that an over-sea invasion is not possible without the secure maintenance of seacomniunications. Germany, with the largest armv in the world and the second navy in the world, was not able to land a man in England in the recent war. England, thanks to her command of the sea, was able to land millions of troops continuously upon the continent, place them upon the battle-front,. and eventually throw them-into Germany Ireland, then, starting without a single naval ship to her credit, must in order to menace England with her army, first, become a naval power greater than England. -Now it certainly is not reasonable to refuse Ireland independence on the ground that this prodigious inversion of relative positions might be a miracle come to pass in the far-future. It is hardly necessary to add that all the small nations of Europe could legitimately be extinguished to-morrow by their great military neighbors if the principle applied to Ireland were to be sanctioned by the opinion of the world.

Governing Strategical Facts .Some governing strategical facts are now becoming clear: & 1. Ireland and Britain are islands. 2. Their offensive and defensive power in war depend therefore, primarly, on naval strength. - 8. Ireland is immeasurably weaker than Britain not only in naval but in military resources, and cannot'even begin to approach equality within any forseeable period. An appreciation of these governing facts, ignored bv Mr. Lloyd George, should dissipate the submarine peril also—a. peril with a peculiar appeal to nervous and unreflecting mmds. It is so easy to conjure up pictures of these mysterious little craft, "vicious" and "not expensive," issuing from a small nation's ports "to- paralyse the fleets and commerce of*a mightv enemy. But is this really possible? Observe. Mr. Lloyd George's words': "They (the Irish) need not build a navy." But we have seen that in reality they must build the greatest navy in the world in order to threaten England with their army. The same manifestly applies to their use of submarines. . Submarines, to be 'of the smallest use in modern war are, of course, not cheap. They must be large, numerous and costly out of all proportion to the slender revenues of Ireland. Germany built 400, lost 200, and failed in her objective But their cost is a minor matter. The bases from which they operate must be secure, and with a hostile power like England in command of the neighboring seas, the Irish submarine bases would have to be impregnably secure against attack by sea, air, or land.' They must be secure from sea and air attack-because naval bombardment with aerial observation, or aerial bombardment from aircraft carried on warships can destroy unprotected dockyards and submarines ;on the surface— they must.be on the surface in and approaching port—can prevent the v

establishment of protective minefields and play havoc with the auxiliary surface craft which are indispensible to submarine* bases. But protection by sea and air would itself be wholly Masted without protection by land, because the command of the sea would enable England.to throw, into Ireland at selected points armies capable of enveloping and destroying the submarine bases, or at any rate of rendering them strategically untenable by cutting their communications with the Irish military centres. A submarine base cannot exist in the air. The strategic conditions in the North Sea during the world-war supply a vivid illustration of these facts. Germany with her vast resources and the second navy in the world was just able, by immense outlay in men and money upon protective air squadrons, ferro-concreted dockyard protection (including a Icollossal bomb-proof shelter for submarines at Bruges, which is one of the wonders of the world), numerous squadrons of destroyers, minelayers and minor surface-craft to maintain against naval and aerial, attack on her advanced submarine base. Bruges, with its seaport, Zeebrugge, until near the close of the war. Ostend became useless owing to naval bombardment. In April 1918, an assault on Zeebrugge closed access to Bruges, which lies nine miles inland, for several weeks' and might if repeated, have' closed it permanently. But, whether this happened or not, the existence of the Bruges base depended on uninterrupted communication with the military and industrial centres of Germany. When the Allied armies began to break the battle-front in Belgium in October, Bruges, Zeebrugge, and Ostend, threatened with envelopment, were instantly/evacuated. This Mas the final'result of England's command of the sea, enabling her, in spite of fleets of German submarines, to maintain the transport of her growing army across the Channel for more than four.years. An Irish Minister of War, therefore, asked to prepare estimates for a naval establishment, with or without submarines, capable of threatening England, or even of providing an adequate defence against English aggression, would refuse or resign at the first survey of the facts. Tie would say that he M-as asked, literally, to throw money into the sea. The utmost he, like the Naval Minister of any other small country Mould sanction, Mould be a smalToutlay purely for defensive purposes, on small vessels of war, including perhaps a few small submarines, strictly for fishery, coast, and harbor protection, together with a modest air defence mainly for reconnaissance. Ireland's Defensive Power against England From the purely defensive standpoint these provisions would be useless in the last resort against an attack by a strong naval and air power, though they could cause delay, and necessitate some additional output of strength in the enemy's offensive. This, in the last resort, though with a marked difference of degree, is all that Ireland's main lino of defenceher army — do to prevent a resolute invasion by a Power as great -as England. We cannot now by sheer military force expel the British armies, and we could not prevent them .from re-entering if they were inflexibly determined to do so. In the final reckoning wo must face the fact that our resistance depends on moral right. But from England's standpoint that moral right and the resistance founded upon it is an insurmountable obstacle now. Unsatisfied with the far-reaching results flowing for its refusal, it is her strategical danger. Satisfied, it would be her strategical safeguard. For it is not to England's interest that Ireland, her best, and, indeed, her indispensable food supplier and market, shtmld bo under the control of a hostile Power. A free Ireland would be her strongest guarantee against any such eventuality. Kor a free Ireland would fight to the death against any kind of foreign control. This, plain inference from ordinary human motives, taken with the root of strategical facts, should be a sufficient answer to the fears expressed about the other contingencies we have to consider—the alliance of Ireland with some other Power or Powers, or the forced violation of her neutrality. The Violation of a Neutral Ireland We have already disposed by implication! of the latter case.- Leaving: aside for the moment the naval possibility 1 of a forced landing in a neutral Ireland by a foreign Power, the military defence of the island," supposing the landing were effected, could not be ill better hands than that of an Irish army fighting with vehemence to defend its sown soil. An. English army of occupation, with an Irish rebel army upon. its back, perhaps in actual sympathy with the invader, would bo paralysed from the first. * - The contingency of a hostile Ireland, allied with an- : other Power, '• must in justice be considered; though At ; is

one that ''hardly comes within the scope of reasonable discussion ; and, without some little tincture of reason, : all discussion is futile. What could be the motive for such an alliance? Ireland has, and would , have, no continental entanglements or colonial ambitions, no land frontiers, no irredenta, nothing to covet or intrigue for. To win her freedom from England has been the single object of her policy for .700 years. To retain it when won would be her supreme object in the future. The instinct of self-pre-servation, if nothing else, would dictate friendly relations of a small neutral nation with a powerful neighbor. There would also be powerful motives of economic and commercial interests. Ireland would not profit from the destruction of England—she would be at a heavy loss. So much for motives. But for the sake of argument credit Ireland with the lunacy of deserting her safest role the safest role for all small nations — of strict neutrality. and of entering into some joint design against England, based, one must suppose, upon a senseless spirit of revenge for wrongs already reunited. The strategic facts demand that her alliance must be with a naval Power, or Powers. The combined navies of Europe are neglible beside the British Navy, and are likely to remain so for further than we can see. Japan? A war between England and Japan, waged in European waters, is not a possible contingency, and an alliance between Ireland and Japan raises a smile. America? The independence of Ireland would itself remove .the main obstacle to friendly co-operation between England and America, and would render war. between them an unnatural and unlikely event in any case, practically unthinkable. If it did take'.place, it would not be fought in waters where Ireland could be a strategic factor. America" is too distant, her communications too long. It would bo an economic struggle. The First Consequences of an Alliance Nevertheless, to omit nothing,, let ns suppose this alliance, or any other, however unlikely, to ho entertained by Ireland, what would he the result? At the first glimpse of preparation for —and the preparations could not be concealed—perhaps at the first wind of it an ultimatum from England, with all the fearful perils involved. Sup-, pose, even so, that the war actually came to pass. Ireland would certainly he "the first to suffer, -and heavily, from England. . But could she be of any practical assistance to ho. 1 ally ? None, if the’governing principles of naval strategy he remembered. Her only contribution to the war would be to offer her shores as a foothold to the armies of her ally and her ports as' a shelter for his ships. But neither of these offers could take effect until" the English Navy had been destroyed or driven finally from the seas. Until that happened no hostile Power could land a man in Ireland, or derive any appreciable advantage from the use of Irish ports. The idea that submarines can be based surreptitiously on the ports of a little country without a navy, and in direct defiance of an enemy Power holding the local command of the sea is a delusion horn of. the tittletattle of scaremongers. But let ns make the final supposition ; that England did in fact lose the command of the sea. In that case there would he no need for her enemv to land a man in Ireland or to use Irish ports. England’s economic position is such that her loss of the command of the sea means starvation and defeat. Such is thjo position. Where doe.H England’s true strategic interest lie? In antagonising Ireland or confiliating her? There can be hut one reasonable answer. Tfc is her interest to recognise onr independence. To contest it in a war of extermination is not only shameful, hut ruinous to her. .... _

As the soul is the life of the body, but does not keep it alive without bodily food, so God is the. Life of, the Soul, but docs not keep it alive without spiritual food) that is, without the Word of God.—St. Augustine.