GOVERNMENT IN FACT

New Zealand Tablet, 10 April 1919, Page 42

GOVERNMENT IN FACT

(By Alfred Rahilly, in New Ireland.)

It has been the constant teaching of Catholic philosophers and theologians that civil government (a) exists for the good of the governed, (b) derives its power from the consent of the governed. Now it. is obvious that there actually exists so-called governments which do not fulfil these two essential conditions. It is therefore not only of theoretical but of practical interest to consider the exact political and moral status of such governments. For we seem to be on the horns of a dilemma. If such governments are accepted and recognised, the fundamental principles of liberty and democracy seem to be abandoned. And, on the other hand, if they are rejected, if their authority is impugned, chaos and anarchy seem inevitable. A government may be a usurpation, in the sense that it has never received the consent of the people ; or it may be a tyranny, in the sense that it has forfeited this consent by failing to subserve the good of the governed or it may be both, e.g., if one people unjustly seizes another country by force and exploits it for its own advantage. In any one of these cases the intruding government may, as a matter of fact if not of right, continue to exist. The oppressed people have, of course, the right and the duty to denounce and to seek to overthrow the usurper. “That it is unlawful and contrary to our holy religion,” writes Balmez (European Civilisation, p. 477),' “to combine together and raise forces for the overthrow of a de facto government, is a doctrine which Catholic theologians have never professed, which true philosophy has never admitted, and which no nation has ever observed.” Speaking of a tyrannical governmentand his reasoning applies still more forcibly to a usurping government—St. Thomas Aquinas says; “A tyrannical rule is not just, for it is directed not to the common good but to the private good of the ruler. And therefore any disturbance of this rule is not of the nature of sedition—unless perhaps when the tyrant’s rule is inordinately disturbed so that the people suffers greater harm from the resulting disturbance than from the tyrant’s rule. It is rather the tyrant who is seditious.” St. Thomas is here quite explicit concerning the people’s right to resist ; though he recommended prudence, he did not disguise it under a false doctrine. Even when a community cannot enforce its rights against a ruler, these rights are merely in abeyance waiting-perhaps for centuries—for the opportunity of assertion. The mere fact neither creates nor destroys a right. But meanwhile what are we to say of the authority of the government in possession ? There is of course no meaning in an unjust authority ; all authority as such must be just. But there may be unjust possession of just authority ; a man or a body of men may hold, actually in fact and against right, the right of commanding. A community requires social order and coordination in order to maintain its existence ; when it is itself unable to exercise the necessary authority, it must do so through the only physically possible means, namely, the usurper. Thus the right in the usurper is not his own but comes from the oppressed community itself it is this, and not any intrinsic claim of the usurper,. which the people obey. Thus a robberchief has force Jiut no authority; whereas an illegitimate civil government has not only physical force but though unjustly — also has moral authority.

This distinction may seem subtle, but it is absolutely essential in order to assert and preserve the undiminished rights of a nation against an oppressive usurpation which it cannotjust yet shake off. On the one hand, there are people who think that the smallest attribution of authority to the usurping government—e.g., payment of taxes, availing of courts thereby acknowledges the moral validity of that government. On the other hand, there are those who think that no amount of positive co-operatione.g., acceptance of office, oath of allegiance, facilitation of rule—can imply the acknowledgment that the government is in rightful possession of the nation’s civil authority. The truth lies between these extreme positions. Suarez puts it clearly (De leyihus, iii. 10, 8). People are not hound to obey the usurper’s ‘‘laws,” when these are not necessary for the social stability and existence of the nation, even though they are just in their subjectmatter. But we may licitly obey, in so far as we need not or cannot assert our rights and may patiently submit to force ; provided that such action is not co-opera-tion with, but only tolerance of, the usurpation provided also that such submission does not lead to scandal or misinterpretation and does not confirm the tyrant in his unjust usurpation. These latter reservations show the real danger of excessive submission. As soon as it appears that the negative acceptance of unorganised individuals is becoming a danger to the national claim, it is the nation’s duty to organise and to take over as much as possible of the civic authority which the usurper is unjustly exercising.