Current Topics

New Zealand Tablet, 10 June 1915, Page 21

Current Topics

" ■ '. ;;.. m "' — ; self»Qovernment for Poland Russia's promise to grant autonomy to Poland was received somewhat cynically in many quarters, and there were many knowing ones who predicted that the promise would never be kept. That prophecy has already been - belied, for Russia has recently conceded a substantial earnest of the promised emancipation. In the first week of April a law was promulgated from Petrograd giving local self-government to all towns in Poland. The language question is settled on practical and com-mon-sense lines. Correspondence with State Departments, as also with public bodies or private persons outside Poland, must be in the common language of the State—namely, Russian. Replies to letters addressed to Polish municipal departments in Russia must be in Russian. Municipal placards and similar notifications must be in both languages in parallel columns. Debates in either language may be at the speaker's discretion, but the President is obliged to explain the substance of a speech if any member present announces his inability to follow it. Minutes of meetings and other official proceedings must be recorded in both languages. It is provided that any cases of disputed interpretation where both languages have been used shall be decided according to the State language—namely, Russian. The municipal autonomy now granted to Poland is \ equivalent to that enjoyed by Russian towns; and it is stated that the new law is welcomed alike by Russian and Polish orgaus of public opinion. The War We hailed the capture of Przemsyl by the Russians on March 22 as a great victory, and we are bound in justice and in logic to admit that its recapture by the Austro-Germau forces is what Mr. Lloyd George has described as a 'set-back.' At the same time there is a sense in which our eastern Ally is justified in regarding the loss as only temporary, and as merely an incident in a great and complicated struggle. The Russians have an almost illimitable capacity for absorbing defeat. After even a really heavy reverse, when other nations would become seriously demoralised, they quietly pull themselves together, and continue to peg away almost as if nothing had happened. In the meantime these concentrated massed attacks, even where they are successful, are costing the Germans dear; and the Russian policy of pegging away and keeping the enemy busy, is playing the Allies' game of 'attrition 7 to perfection. Russia is filling exactly the role that is desired and expected of her ; and, considering the enormous advantage of the enemy in the matter of strategic railways and of munitions, she is filling it well. The real trial to the spirit, as the long European summer days ebb away, is not these isolated German successes here or there in the hundreds of miles of front, but the weary wait for the commencement of the Anglo-French offensive in the west. Wo may console ourselves with the reflection that the delay is quite possibly not wholly due to unpreparedness ; or, if it is, it has at any rate the compensating advantage of enabling the Allies to mature their diplomatic measures, so that every iron may be in the fire at once when the time is ripe for the final effort. The war is a war of diplomats, as well as a war of troops and generals and munition workers; and the diplomatic representatives of both sides have been very assiduous in their attentions to those interested neutrals who, it was known, were morally certain sooner or later to come into the struggle. So far the adherence of Italy to" the cause of the Allies has been secured; and there appears to be a near prospect of Roumania and Bulgaria entering the arena on the same side. If and when that eventuates, it may safely be taken for granted that things will begin to happen all round. A German Press Item Referring to the early fighting in connection with the landing at tho Dardanelles and with the struggle

to secure a position on the Gallipoli Peninsula, our Friday s papers contained the following cable, dated Fremantle June 3 :-< Renter's Cairo correspondent's reports of the fighting at Gallipoli contained in the newlvarrived papers by mail state that the Australasian wounded are very, cheerful, and speak with glowing pride of the part they played in the great fight. - They are proud of having been chosen for a task the success. of which depended entirely on extraordinary dash-and daring When the wounded heard of the rejoicings in Australia and New Zealand they cheered, and criedWe are-going to do better when we get back." ' • * That we know, is the truth; and it is only what we should expect of and from our boys. But it is very different from the sort of stuff with which German papers, and pro-German papers in America, are being ted up by official German press agents. Referring to precisely the same time, place, and incidents, the following inspired paragraph appears in pro-German American papers: 'Reports from Cairo, Egypt state that there has been a mutiny among the Australian troops in which many lives have been sacrificed The mutiny was caused by the Australians urged to the front to breast the withering fire of the enemy while the British troops lagged behind. It was the same way with the Indians. These poor, brown men were compelled to take their places before the guns of the foe, while the flanneled fools and oafs of the home regiments sheltered themselves in the trenches behind the bulwark of Hindus on the firing line. As a consequence thousands of the Hindus have deserted the British colors and gone over to the Turks, preferring to fight in the cause of men who will fight along with them to fighting and exposing themselves for the sake of cowards who take every advantage, however mean, to save their own skins.' It is a sure sign of weakness when a country has to resort to the publication of that sort of stuff to ' keep its end up.' A Belgian Florist's Troubles As is generally known, many thousands of the stricken Belgian people have depended for work* and livelihood on bulb culture; and, thanks to the advent of quite another ' kultur,' a large proportion of these have been reduced to complete beggary. With immense difficulty and at cruel loss, a number of growers have managed to transfer large parcels of their stock to Holland : and they are writing letters and publishing short catalogues entreating British customers to send them even the smallest orders. The Belgian firms are selling very cheaply, and are willing to take all the risks and to wait for their money until the safe arrival of the goods. Probably not very much can be done from New Zealand, but every little helps, and will be appreciated : and we bring the matter under the notice both of professionals and amateurs, and, in particular, of the directors of public gardens, in the hope that anything that can be done will be done. * As illustrating the straits to which Belgian growers are reduced, we publish a sample letter which has been received at this office. It is headed 'A Modest Supplication to Our English Friends' ; and the quaint English in which it is couched in no way lessens the interest and pathos of the document. We print the letter exactly as it has reached us: —■ ' Sas Van Gent, Holland, March 1915. 'Sir and Madam,Herewith I . beg to take the liberty to refer to my previous letter and catalogue; I should not trouble you so much by requesting you for orders, but as you are aware of the great trouble I have been put to by taking in my begonias from Mellefez Gand, Belgique, and to bring them all the way up • to Sas. van Gent (Holland), with old horses and carriages, as my best horses have been confiscated by the Germans, one would lose his spirit by the fact to know, that this beautiful crop would remain unsold; and what

to do then? y It v is easily to understand, that one must have a great deal of courage not to run away from all business and leave thing, so ; it is and really I should do so, if I could do something else. I sincerely hope, my English friends will pardon me for having written them this all,.but as I was a. substantial man before the War'broke out and disposed of a good many pounds, I feel sorry that I must repeat, that I have lost everything except only my stock of Begonias. .:,,'Believe me, one feels the trouble with doubled force, if one is doing his utmost and puts his spirit in the scale in order to sell his bulbs, when unsufficiently orders are coming in. . I am obliged to say, that a. great deal of my English friends has given me his favors and so I am coming up to you to sell a few dozens as a help in this difficult time. 'I. am very fond of orders for Begonias, and all orders have my special attention. You will see that my Begonias, when in flower, will give flowers far better than they are described on the opposite page. ' Do not think, an order for a few dozens will be too small; every quantity will help to make the stock smaller. The carriage is not so expensive; the very safe way is to send by Parcel post, and the costs only amount to 2/-. Orders from 15 - and up are sent carriage paid. Begonias are payable upon safe arrival ; your own cheque, postal order, money order will be safe. ' As Begonias never have been so cheap, caused by the war, I am sure, you will apology, that I urgently appeal to Your goodwill and do not doubt, You will favor Belgique with Your so very much appreciated order. ' Your obedient Servant, ' Gerhardt Van Hauten.' The writer's present address, and during the war, is Gerhard Van Hauten, Sas Van Gent, Holland ; and we willingly give him this free advertisement in so deserving a case. The Line of the Rhine Under this title, Mr. Hilaire Belloe discusses in Nash's Magazine for April a question which we hope in the course of the next three or four months will become one of acutely practical interest. Assuming the enemy finally beaten back to his natural stronghold across the Rhine, have the Allies in the western theatre of war any reasonable prospect of overcoming the difficulties presented by the line of the Rhine, that long, wellfortified stretch of waterway running from Switzerland in the south to Holland in the north, and covering a length of over four hundred and fifty miles? To cross the Rhine successfully will certainly he one of the most tremendous military feats of the present conflict ; but difficult as it is, Mr. Belloc thinks it can be done. At the outset he is careful to guard against a foolish overconfidence, and to explain that in what is written he is not in the least degree attempting to prophesy, or to suggest that such an undertaking is a probability of the near or even of the remote future. He is, lie explains, merely discussing a purely hypothetical case. 'lt is necessary,' ho sanely remarks, 'to emphasise that prime truth that war is the least certain of all .our uncertain human activities, and that prophecy in war is futile. It is also well to remember that public opinion is none the better, in the midst of a perilous struggle, for expecting victory. One studies the line of the Rhine only on an hypothesis, only on the chance of the Allies' success and Germany's increasing embarrassment in the west. But in doing so, one must always remember the other.alternative, which is that the enemy may break our containment of him, and that no necessity for him to retire at all, let alone to stand noon the line of the Rhine, may ever come. , One only examines the problem because it will enter into one of two possible results, and one does so in the full appreciation of the other possible result in which we should be hard put to it, to defend the west after a new German victory, and not the enemy put to it to defend his territory after a victory of our own forces.'

j; -, So much being premised, he proceeds toi discuss at considerable length, and with the aid of a . detailed series of diagrams, the question as to what advantages—and disadvantages— line of the Rhine would have for the enemy as a defensive position under modern conditions, and whether, in the event of his ultimately standing upon that line, he would be able unassailably to maintain himself there.- He explains,, and again and again emphasises, that the governing factor in such an undertaking is the matter of artillery. ' Now the most important thing to grasp in connection with this line of the Rhine is that, under modern conditions, the power to cross such a river will depend not so much vpqn the number of men you can concentrate as upon the number and efficiency of your heavy guns. It does not take many dozen men to build a bridge which half a million men may pass over after it is built, and after the bridgehead on the further side is held. But you cannot build your bridge at all, at any place where the enemy's big guns can drop shells upon it as it is being constructed, and to-day shells can bo dropped from a very long way off. You must dominate his artillery with yours before you can throw your bridge across the river: if you can do so you cross, and this is particularly true of a broad river carefully and lengthily prepared for defence beforehand.' He then sums up the conditions under which Germany will be able to hold the line of the Rhine, and affirms that the line cannot be held if any one of these conditions is lacking. The conditions are as follows:— First. The enemy must not be allowed to dominate a re-entrant or loop pointing towards his positions and away from the German positions. Secondly. There must be enough men and enough heavy artillery behind the line to concentrate, within tin; time it would take an enemy to cross, a, sufficient force to prevent that crossing at any threatened point. Thirdly. The enemy must be able to distinguish between a feint and the main attempt to cross the river. Fourthly, and much the most important, he must be amply supplied with heavy artillery, at least as mobile as his opponent's. ' This last point is, under modern conditions, by far the most important: and I think it may be taken for. granted, if ever the struggle for the line of the Rhine comes, that upon this feature, almost alone, will the issue depend.' # He is sanguine enough to hold, and he maintains that really expert opinion is unanimous on the point, that in the case of a German defeat the obstacle of the Rhine will not prove by any means an insurmountable impediment to the Allies. Expert (minion, he says, is confident, not indeed that the enemy will be defeated, for prophecy of thaT kind in war is folly, but that if he is defeated the Rhine will not prove his salvation. And he explains tolerably clearly why the experts are agreed that the holding of the Rhine line by the enemy is less certain than is sometimes imagined. ' The present line of the German trenches from the Swiss mountains to Nieuport, is a. line not quite four hundred miles in length, counting all its ins and outs. The Germans can at present just hold it with the number of men they have concentrated in the west. When they can no longer hold that line it will be because they have become so worn down by persistent local attacks that their diminishing numbers will compel them to fall back upon a shorter Hue, and the best and shortest line to which they can fall back is that starting with the southernmost point of the Dutch border, passing in front of Liege, in front of Metz, and so down to the southern part of the existing line. . . . Now it is apparent that if ever the enemy is driven from this shortest line, that is, if he is so further worn down that he cannot hold it, he will with difficulty be able to hold the much longer line of the Rhine immediately behind him. . Nor is this all. It is equally apparent that, in effecting their retirement from the short line LiegeBelfort to the longer line of the Rhine, the various bodies of the enemy must leave gaps between them. The retirement must either be fan-like in character, as it spreads out from the shorter to the longer line, or it

must deliberately leave an unprotected district'to the north or: to : the south, of the retirement. In the first case there will be numerous small gaps, in the : second case one large one, and the pursuit if properly handled will at once take advantage of the one or the other. Before a diminished enemy unable to hold the shorter line could establish himself strongly beyond the river, some portion of the river line would already be within striking distance and within bridging distance of the Allies. If, as is expected, the Allies can add to this advantage in such a final phase of the war a definite superiority in heavy artillery, the crossing of the obstacle after no great space of time should follow as a matter of course.'