Current Topics

New Zealand Tablet, 27 May 1915, Page 21

Current Topics

Joffre and His Generals General Joffre, in a recent friendly chat with the Editor of La Dipiche of Toulouse, said some interesting things about his generals. There is a manly frankness about his utterance, and his remarks carry with them the emphasis of sincerity and the ring of truth. The disclosures are not altogether new, some hint of the facts having already leaked out, but the General's definite statement stamps them with the hall-mark of authenticity. Asked about the defeat at Charleroi-, or Mons as the British call it, he said : 'We ought to have won the battle of Charleroi; wo ought to have won ten times out of eleven. We lost it through our own faults. Faults of command. Before the war broke out I had already noted that amongour generals many were worn out. Some had appeared to me to be incapable, not good enough for their work. Others inspired me with doubt. Some with disquietude. I had made up my mind to rejuvenate our chief commands, and I should have done so in suite of all the commentaries and against all malevolence. But the war came too soon. And, besides, there were other generals in whom 1 had faith and who have not responded to my hopes. The man of war reveals himself more in war than in studies, and the quickest intelligence and the most complete knowledge are of little avail if they are unaccompanied by qualities of action. The responsibilities of war are such that even in the men of merit they paralyse their best faculties. That is what happened to some of my chiefs. Their merit turned out to be below the mark. I had to remedy these defects. Some of these generals were my best comrades. But if I love my friends much, I love France more. I relieved them of their posts. I did this in the same way as I ought to be treated myself, if it is thought I am not good enough. I did not do this to -punish them, but simply as a measure of public safety. I did it with a heavy heart. When I have been alone I have wept.' The Coalition Ministry The announcement of the proposed formation of a Coalition Cabinet in England has been received in this country without enthusiasm —as well it might be. Apart from the fact that the whole business looks bad, and is calculated to have anything but an inspiriting effect either in the outlying portions of the Empire or amongst our Allies, there are no convincing indications that the proposed changes will be accompanied by any real access of strength to the Government. To pretend that such a reconstruction is necessary in order to obtain the best brains of the country for carrying on the present struggle is somewhat transparent humbug. The members of the Opposition Party who have been mentioned as likely to be given a place in the Coalition Cabinet are Messrs. Balfour, Bonar Law, and A. Chamberlain. Mr. Balfour has, admittedly, intellectual ability of a very high order, but whether it* is of the practical kind which would, presumably, be most pressingly needed in time of war, is very much open to doubt. Messrs. Bonar Law and A. Chamberlain are the merest mediocritieswhich would not matter so much, and which might, perhaps, even be a recommendation, if they themselves realised the fact. But both of these gentlemen have an altogether extravagant opinion of their own abilities; and a conceited mediocrity is always liable to be dangerous. There is probably more foundation in the explanation that some change is necessary in order to do away with the recurring friction between Lord Fisher and'Mr. Winston Churchill; but surely a solution of that problem could be found by some less violent method than that of a suspension of Parliamentary government. So far as the management of the war is concerned, the Government has, on the whole, an excellent record,, and one which, apart from mere party press and politicians, has given general satisfaction. If there were weak units in the Cabinet

they could have been replaced in the recognised constitutional way. We suspect that the Daily News is not very far from the truth' when it declares that the reconstruction of the Ministry has no practical meaning , except as a concession to the press,' and when it refers to Lord Northcliffe, owner of the Times, Daily Mail, and other newspapers, as "England's Dictator." The only thing that is calculated to reconcile the public to this generally-deprecated swapping of horses when crossing the stream is the fact that Mr. Asquith apparently approves and desires it. That being so, it must be judged to be in some sort a necessityalbeit a not very pleasant or reassuring necessity. Germany and Her Prospects Worse any day than a defeat in the field is internal dissension and domestic bickering; and the reconstruction of the Ministry—or, rather, the reasons which have given rise to such a proposal—and the attacks which are apparently being levelled against Lord Kitchener, are not exactly exhilarating reading. As a setoff against these somewhat disquieting items of our late news, it is interesting to note that German apologists are beginning seriously to discuss the possibility of Germany's defeat, and the nature of the losses which such an outcome might, be expected to involve. Both aspects of the war situation are treated at length, from the purely German point of view, by Frank Koester in the New York Tribune; and the article is remarkable for the very unexpected admissions that are made. The two points of special interest in the contribution are the writer's comments on the probable duration of the war, and his anticipation as to the terms which will be imposed on Germany in the event of the Allies' success. He recognises the significance of the failure of the great drive against Paris, and of the fact that after so many months' of fighting Warsaw is still unreached; and he admits also the theoretical reasonableness of the assumption that financial exhaustion, if not physical starvation, will force a cessation of hostilities and the capitulation of Germany and Austria. He contends, however, that the notion that such a result can be brought about in anything like a reasonably short period of time is fallacious. He points out that after more than half a year of war, German soil is practically untouched, while large areas of the enemies' territories are overrun. 'Assuming, even, that the fortunes of war go against the Germans, and that they are forced out of France, Belgium, and Russia, the most optimistic of the Allies' sympathisers can hardly expect it until after a year of warlias passed. Relative (economic) conditions would then be more favorable to the Germans than at the beginning of the war, for the territory fought over would be ruined. It would then take at least a year, with Germany on (he defensive, for the Allies to penetrate as far into Germany as Germany has driven into their territory. Thus, it will require at least two years of war for the Allies to overcome initial German successes and gain a parity with her, even assuming that the German military' forces lose consistently, which even the most sanguine of the Allies cannot expect. Assuming that the German forces are gradually pushed back, with fluctuations in the tide of battle, the Allies cannot hope at most to gain a parity with her by the end of the third year of the "war. ■ The actual defeat of the Germans could not, therefore, be expected short of four years under the most favorable circumstances. Kitchener, who should be among the best informed of the Allies' leaders, does not promise the British public less than three years of war.' Unless there should happen to be some unexpected -down on the German side, that is not an unreasonable line of argument: and the indications are that—unless the entrance of Italy should materially expedite matters— Kitchener was not very far wide" of the mark when he made his preparations for a three years' war. As to 'the terms of peace, the writer's estimate is based on the expectation that Germany's defeat will not be absolute and complete, but that the war will end in what may be described as a draw in favor of the

Allies He holds that Germany cannot possibly be v defeated quickly and suddenly. 'lf he is to lose, it Wtf be by gradually being forced back at ever-increasing cost to her enemies, as on the offensive their losses will multiply. At terrific cost, bit by bit, they will push her back until the task of pushing her further back will appal the stoutest. Blood and treasure will finally cease to be worth the candle. The preponderance of moral stamina will remain with the Germans, and the hearts of the Allies will sicken and their purses grow thin to no good purpose.' Then will come the time for peace bargaining. 'Perceiving, however, that continued resistance can gain nothing more for Germany if she is to be defeated, a time will come when her leaders will realise that peace, even to the cost of territory and indemnity, will be in Germany's interest. . And the Allies will be content with a slice of territory and the money rather than to continue their sacrifices. Thus peace will be more desirable than war to both sides, and then and not until then will peace come. If Germany is to be defeated, it will in. all probability be in such wise. The result will be, say the Rhine as a western boundary, the loss of Heligoland, Denmark down to the Kiel Canal, Russia, biting off East Prussia and an indemnity to be paid. More than this, the most optimistic of the Allies can scarcely hope for.' That is very different from the smashing talk of Bernhardi and other's at the beginning of the struggle; and the difference in tone, and in the line of thought, is deeply significant. Through German Eyes It is always interesting to get disinterested aud reliable information as to the state of public feeling in the enemy countries, and particularly in Germany, which, of course, still dominates the war theatre. So far as this information is now available it goes to show that, while the German people are beginning to realise that absolute victory, as they had at first so "confidently expected it, is now out of the question, there is no slackening of the war spirit or of readiness to continue the enormous sacrifices necessary to obtain what is termed an honorable peace. Mr. Ernest Pooh', an American journalist, the author of a novel, The 11arbor, who has just returned from a two months' stay-in Germany, thus gives his impressions, in the columns of the Nation, of the effect of the war upon the German soldier and German people:—'Although himself an ardent pacifist, he fails to discover any signs of a more pacific sentiment among the German people. lie believes that Americans fail to appreciate sufficiently the ethical effect of the war on the workers from mines, factories, and workshops. The men have no sense of the horror of war; they have, most of them, for the first time in their life, been taken out, of the humdrum life and drudgery of the ordinary worker, and made to feel that they are making a sacrifice for an idea. This sentiment of sacrifice permeates the whole nation; even among the women there is no complaint.' * While that is so, the more thoughtful section of the German people have ceased to look forward to the glorious triumph of which they had once dreamed. The distinguished neutral, who on a previous occasion provided readers of the London Times with a very accurate account of German opinion and feeling, now makes the following important statement, of the changes visible during a visit to Germany from which he' has just returned: The truth as to the dangerous position in which the German Empire stands at present" is slowly, but very slowly, finding its way into the minds of the Great General Staff, the captains of industry, the higher officials, and, generally, the leading men in'almost every great centre. Just as the facts were speedily' grasped months ago by men like 1 1 err Ballin, Herr von Gwinner, and Walther Rathenau, so they are now being assimilated by men of lesser decree. The idea of* anything approaching absolute victory has passed entirely from the minds of many with whom I came in contact.' But the writer unite confirms the statement of Mr. Poole, quoted above, as to the confident and determined spirit still prevailing in the Fatherland. 'To imagine,'

rf'SEi ; th »***»» 1S in Germany any idea whatever. Ailts TnVT 1 ; ,, e *°- T USe h ° pes in the minds ° f the Allies and lull them into a sense of false security. It s true that Germans now say, Wir.mussen siegen (We must win) instead of Wir werden siegen (We shall win) as formerly It -is somewhat consoling to note that Germany hke Britain, has her internal troubles and domestic differences. Her generals and diplomatists are coming in for severe and open criticism, and even Von Hindenburg is no longer a national hero. Says the Times contributor: 'lf only we had a Joffre (or Shoffer) as he is called, was a remark made to me more than once Von Hindenburg is no longer a national hero Indeed, if there be any hero at all in Germany to-day it is the Kaiser, who is regarded throughout the land with an esteem and affection not hitherto accorded to him. . . . Criticism of German generals and of German diplomatists has risen to a height unknown in my recollection of the German Empire. The approaching centenary of Bismarck has caused much heart-searching— among those who are inclined to swallow the stimulating syrup administered by the German Press Bureau. Von liethmanmHollweg is the subject of universal animadversion. He is considered not to have been sufficiently cunnincr i n his treatment of Sir Edward Grey. Prince Lichnowsky is bitterly cursed for misleading the German Government, as are several well-known English politicians and financiers. Can it be possible that Sir Edward Carson is amongst those who are now receiving the Kaiser's curses ? -x----it is interesting also to hear something of he attitude now adopted in Germany towards the other belligerents and towards hitherto neutral countries such as Italy and America. Taking the last first, the Times writer tells us that ' Animosity to Americans, owing to export of ammunition to the Allies, and the attitude of such men as Colonel Roosevelt, Dr. Eliot, the present head of Harvard, and the American newspapers, has reached such lengths during the past few weeks that many Americans no longer think it wise to use the English language. As for the Allies, England is regarded with increasing loathing, and Russia is no longer despised; the French, on the other hand, are comparatively popular— strange as it may seem. But the Germans believe they will have to withdraw from France and cede Alsace-Lorraine, with pecuniary indemnity for damage, in order to bring about a separate peace' with the Republic. Germans' attitude towards the Austrians is one of contempt. _ "We should do better without these . . . ," — using an unprintable expression —was a remark I often heard with a hint that the defeat of Austria by no means ensures the submission of Germany. . . . As to Rumania and Italy, the average German believes that they can be bought off and will be bought off.' The recently cabled news of Italy's decision to intervene in the war shows that in this last respect Germany has once again miscalculated. How to Read the War News To the average reader the daily page of so-called war news is more or less of a jumble. Taken at its face value, it would compel the conclusion, as somebody has cynically put, it, that 'everybody's gaining victories everywhere ' ; and it requires the exercise of a good deal of discrimination and intelligence to winnow out the few grains of truth and fact from the bushels and bushels of chaff. The lines along which this discrimination is to be applied have been indicated for us by that very competent authority, Mr. Hilaire Belloc, who, in an illuminating article in Pearson's Magazine, explains A his method of reading the war news, and of arriving at 7 at least an approximate estimate of the facts. * First of all he describes, in an interesting way, the peculiarities of the different Governments in their communiques:—'The British Government publishes short notes of advances made or of positions maintained, but very rarely refers to the losing of ground. It publishes

casualty lists, which are; r of course, not complete till very long after the events wherein the casualties were in-' curred. It supplements the short communiques, •' and this by a more or less expanded narrative, written by an official deputed for that purpose, and giving accounts often graphic, but necessarily of no military value; of no value, that is, for following the campaign. For if these narratives were of that kind the object of the censorship would be defeated. The French Government is by far the most reticent. It occasionally mentions the capture of a color, but it publishes no casualty lists, no account of the field guns taken by French troops, and only now and then hints at the number of prisoners. It is, however, minutely accurate and even detailed in helping us to locate the fluctuations of the front, and by the aid of the French communiques we can follow the war upon the map better than by the aid of any other. The Russian Government is accurate, and, if anything, a little too terse in what it communicates to the public, but its censorship is far less strict than that of the French or even the English. Thus, during the fighting round Lodz in defence of Warsaw at the beginning of December, correspondents from Petrograd were allowed to telegraph the most flamboyant descriptions of an immediately approaching German retreat which never took place. But, I repeat, the official Russian news is sober and restrained, and accurate to a fault.' * So far as the enemy reports are concerned, the German communiques, Mr. Belloc thinks, are almost always accurate, except when they have a special object or very marked interest in lying, and then they lie like troopers, and on what ho somewhat mildly describes as ' an effective scale.' ' When we turn to the enemy's communiques,' he says, 'we note first that the AustroHungarians are rare, insufficient, and confused. They are of little service, and may almost be neglected. But the German "ones are numerous, extended, and precise, and it is our particular business to judge them accurately if we are to understand the war, for when or if they tell the truth it is from them that we learn what would otherwise be hidden. Well, in my judgment, these official German communiques are in the main remarkably exact, and I believe it is possible to say why they are so exact. The German General Staff makes war in a purely mechanical fashion. It gravely exaggerates, as do all modern North Germans, the calculable element in human affairs. It is what used to be called "scientific." It is obvious that if you get a reputation for exactitude your falsehood, where it pays you to tell the falsehood, will be the more likely to work. The remarkable general accuracy of the official German communiques cannot be due to any other object. It cannot be due to a mere love of truth, for the same government deliberately circulates to its own provincial press, and to certain neutrals, stories which cannot in the nature of things be true. Nor is this inaccuracy the result either of haste or of stupidity, it is very intelligent and obviously deliberate.' * In one respect all the official reports are defective and misleading; and that is in regard to any defeats or reverses that may be sustained. The censor stops all definite reference to losses, to missing, to regiments engaged, and the like, because such information would be useful to the enemy, and it is wise and necessary to suppress it. With regard to false news, he is not so particular, and will let any old tale through so long as it is not calculated to assist the enemy. We have already had almost countless instances of this. Yet these reports can in no way be distinguished from others which are quite true. 'How?' asks Mr. Belloc. 'are we to counter this danger? How is the plain man to distinguish in his news of the war what is true from what is false, and so arrive at a sound opinion.' He then proceeds to give some suggestions which will be found of real use to those who have time to read their war news in a careful and, so to speak, judicial manner. the communiques, read with the aid of a map. When

I say the 1 "official communiques,", I do not mean those of the British Government alone, nor even of the Allies alone, but of all the belligerents. You. must read impartially the communiques of the Austro-Hungarian and of the German Governments together with those of the British Government and its Allies, or you will certainly miss the truth. By which statement Ido 'not mean that each government is equally accurate, still less equally full in its relation ; but that, unless you compare all the statements of this sort, you will have most imperfect evidence just as you would have very imperfect evidence in a court of law if you only listened to the prosecution and refused to listen to the defence.. Now, these official communiques have certain things in common by whatever government they are issued. There are certain features in them which you will always find, although they come from natures as different as those of a Prussian staff officer and a Serbian patriot. These common features we may tabulate thus: (a) Places named as occupied by the forces of the Government in question are really occupied. . To invent the occupation of a town or point not in one's own hands would serve no purpose. It would not deceive the enemy, and it would not long support opinion at home. Thus, when Lodz was reported occupied by the Germans in the middle of December, all careful students of the war knew perfectly well that the hews was true. (b) Numbers, when they are quoted in connection with a really ascertainable fact, and with regard to a precise and concrete circumstance, are nearly always reliable though their significance differs, as I shall show in a moment, very greatly according to the way they are treated. Thus, if a Government says, "in such-and-such a place or .on such-and-such a day we took 3000 prisoners," it is presumably telling the truth, for the enemy who has lost those prisoners knows it as well as they do. But estimates of what has happened in the way of numbers, where the Government issuing the estimate can have no direct knowledge, are quite another matter. These are only gathered from prisoners or from spies, and are often ridiculously wrong. (c) All official communiques of whatever Government conceal reverses, save in minor points. They are wise to do this, because there is no need to tell the enemy more than he may know of his own success. Reverses are not actually denied. They are omitted. Those are the three points which all the official communiques have in common, and by bearing them well in mind we can often frame an accurate picture, in spite of the apparent contradiction and confusion which the reading of several communiques one after the other produces. For instance, the Germans are trying to cress the Bzura River, according to the Russian communique of Saturday. Next Wednesday the Russian communique says, "Two attempts to cross the Bzura at such and such places were repelled " : while the German communication says, "Our troops succeeded in crossing the Bzura River at such and such a village, and established themselves upon the right bank." In such a case the reader will be wise to believe the German communique, and to take it for granted that while the Russians have repelled certain other attempts of the enemy to cross, this attempt has succeeded. But if the Germans go on to say, "The Russians retired after suffering losses which cannot have been less than 20,000," that is no news at all. It is obviously conjecture.' It only remains to add the somewhat obvious caution that not all reports dated from London, Paris, or Petrograd are official. Petrograd in particular has been specially prodigal in the matter of unauthorised reports, and it has suffered in reputation in consequence. When the cables reach New Zealand, it is usually impossible to tell whether they are official communiques from Petrograd, or from correspondents there; and the careless reader is apt unjustly to fasten on the truthful Government some of the wild and fantastic reports, for which the authorities are actually in no way responsible. . __^____—