The New Zealand Tablet. Fiat Justitia. THURSDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1899. A FLAW IN THE BALLOT ACT.

New Zealand Tablet, Volume XXVII, Issue 52, 28 December 1899, Page 17

The New Zealand Tablet. Fiat Justitia. THURSDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1899. A FLAW IN THE BALLOT ACT.

SHE system of voting by ballot is no npvelty. " 'Long before the birth of Christ it had an ..even wider application in- the public life of pagan Greece and Borne than it has in any part of the British Empire to-day. ' iFor centuries after its eclipse as a political resort, it was used in the Catholic Church, as it is to this day, in sundry elections, such as those of bishops, abbots, popes, etc. It was first introduced., into English political life by the Act of 1872, and in one shape or other has been adopted by practically every civilised nation on the earth. It has tended to remove the idea that a vote is an article of commerce, made intimidation immeasurably more difficult; than under the old * open ' system, and so softened the asperities of electoral contests that they are no longer associated with the broken heads and the scenes of noisy merriment and violence immortalised in the vigorous, if not over-delicate, caricatures of Gi&lray and Rowlandson. The old open-voting system is gone with 'Hans Breitman's barty' 'afay in the ewigkeit.' The ballot fits the political conditions of our day so neatly and naturally and comfortably that public opinion would be as averse to falling back again on open-voting as flour manufacturers would be to substitute the quern for the roller-mill or military men to replace the Lee-Metford rifle with that weapon of the war correspondent — the long-bow. In the circumstances it will probably come as a surprise to many of our readers to learn that the days of academic discussions on the merits of voting by ballot are by no means past. Even in the present year so distinguished a writer as the historian Lecky has denounced it in his Democracy ami Liberty as ' essentially an evil ' 'in any country where politics rest on a really sound and independent basis.' That country is probably the one which Carlyle, in his Sartor ffssartus, calls Weissnichtwo ( the land of ' I-know-not-where '). Ifc lies three and a half leagues beyond Amauros or the Vanishing Point. We can resign ourselves with a tolerably good grace to so much of ' essential evil ' as the ballot mayJUnflict on the land of Weissnichtwo. • • • The chief obstacles to free and conscientious voting, are bribery and intimidation. These, in turn, depend for their success on the possibility, or public belief in the possibility, of interested parties acquiring a knowledge of the manner in which particular votes are ca3t. The chief value of the ballot lies, then, in its secrecy. And the more thorough, the secrecy the more effective is the protection it affords the voter against intimidation by employer or by mob, and the greater the difficulties it throws in the way of the tempter who would purchase the elector's independence with gifts. It is, or ought to be, evident that the State, which confers the right of voting-, should make the protection of the voter from undue influence as complete and thorough-going as 'it could be reasonably made. In other words, the secrecy of the ballot should be safe-guarded to the farthest limit that is consistent with the prevention of personation and doublevoting and such-like offences against honest electioneering. Now this is precisely what our Ballot Act does not. It affords a ground of fact for one of the stock objections to the ballot : namely, the conviction that its imagined secrecy is to a great extent a delusion and a snare.- Bjrfcdme strange fiction or legend what is known as the ' Australian ballot ' is supposed to be the model of all the rest — Heaven knows why. In the recent work quoted above, Lecky roundly declares that it 'secures to the voter absolute, secrecy.' 'In five years,' says he, 'the Australian ballot has. been adopted in thirty-five States, and it appears .to haye done something to diminish the power of the caucus, organisation and to check the various fraudulent practices 'which . had

been common at elections.' The Australian ballot has proved a benefit to the United States in so far as it took the printing and distribution of ballot-papers out of the hands of the various political parties and protected the voter from undue interference at the polling-booth. But the ', absolute secrecy ' is a myth. The number of every voter is written on a turned-down corner of the ballot-paper in the order in which he records his vote. This number, with the voter's name appended, is forthwith entered in a book kept at each polling-booth ; and the whole is retained sufficiently long in a free-and-easy custody of semi-responsible persons to render it a matter of comparative ease for them to ascertain how every vote was cast. Even during the actual scrutiny the destination of any particular vote may be determined without difficulty by the scrutineers. The New Zea'and ballot is apparently but a bedraggled variant of the Australian. It has the three following crying faults : (1) It gives even less of the protection of secrecy to the elector than does the Australian system ; (2) it makes personation much easier ; and (3) it affords special facilities for carrying out the good old American motto : ' Vote early and vote often. 1

In fact, there is no system of ballot with which we are acquainted that offers so miserly a modicum of protective secrecy to the voter. We make a record in folly by writing on the turned-down corner of each ballot-paper the number which the voter holds on the printed electoral roll ! It needs no Daniel to see that this at once opens the door to wide possibilities in the matter of determining, at the Bcrntiny, on which side any particular vote 1 is cast. Under our present system such discovery may be made without difficulty by the scrutineers in any one of the following ways : (1) By the accidental or intentional turning up of the number of the ballot-paper ; (2) by holding the turneddown corner of the ballot-paper (which is of the flimsiest kind) to a strong light, as to that of a window or to that reflected from a scrap of broken mirror on table or desk ; (3) by the fact that in the many varieties of folding adopted by voters, the number on the electoral roll must, in a great many cases, come directly under the eyes of the scrutineers ; (4) by the sanctioned use of other pencils than those supplied in the booths — a method which enables a * squared ' elector to provide evidence as to the manner in which his vote was cast. We do not know what becomes of the voting-papers after the scrutiny. But if it be true, as stated to us, that they are retained for a considerable time and without adequate safeguards, then it is manifestly possible for individuals to ascertain how every vote in any given electorate was cast. The old Greek plan of voting with inscribed potsherds was preferable to this. The effective protection of the elector is, after all, the main purpose of the ballot. For this reason we are strongly convinced that neither the presiding officers of the pollingstations nor others present during the voting should have anything to do with the counting or scrutiny. The reason is very obvious. The presiding officer has, we understand, to witness his stamp on every voting-paper before it is dropped into the ballot-box. Apart altogether from the chances — referred to above — of noting the voter's number on the ballot-paper during the scrutiny, there must necessarily be a great variety of methods of foldiDg the papers, some of which he could notice and indentify when perusing them. It is no answer to this to say that his oath binds him to secrecy. The possession of such knowledge should be made practically impossible, instead of being, as it is, a matter of comparative ease. Scrutineers who are present during the polling have it in their power to acquire the same information as the presiding officer. As a rule, they have also a greater interest in acquiring it. And as they are bound by no oath of secrecy their possibilities of securing information constitute a far greater danger to the secrecy which should safeguard the elector in the exercise of his right. The proper purpose of the scrutiny should be merely to secure formality of voting, not to imperil the secrecy of the ballot.

The chief flaw in our system manifestly lies in the ballotpaper. It is not, but it ought to be, a political truism that the ideal ballot-paper should show only (1) the names of the .candidates, (2) the cross or other mark which indicates the elector's choice, and (3) the presiding officer's stamp. It

should give no indication whatever, direct or indirect, to show who used it. The prosecution of personation and certain other offences against the Act should be secured in some way unconnected with the voting paper itself. The system adopted in Great Britain— or at least in Scotland — presents the nearest approach to the ideal that we know of. The returning officer is a Sheriff of a County, or a Recorder, or other official whose position cannot be affected by changes of Government. He provides each presiding officer at the polling-stations with a locked, sealed, and empty box, retainingthe key himself. This box must be returned to him with lock and seal intact and with an affidavit from the presiding officer of each polling-place that he has seen so many voting papers placed in it. These papers are supplied by the returning officer to each presiding officer, with outts, numbered consecutively like cheque-books. Each voting paper is stamped on face and back before being presented to the elector. At the same time his number on the roll is marked on the butt only. This is an improvement on the New Zealand system ; for the identity of the voter can be ascertained only by reference to the butt. The secrecy of the vote is further safeguarded by a wise provision which deserves the flattery of imitation in New Zealand : authority to examine the butt of any particular paper can only be obtained, on special cause being shown, from an election judge of the Supreme Court. &.nd we are not aware that any such authority has yet been given. The presiding officer at each polling-place is empowered to clear the room of loiterers. When illiterate voters present themselves and demand assistance the room is cleared of all persona but the illiterate and the presiding officer, and no person is admitted until the former has passed out again. When polling time is over, the butts, unused and spoiled papers, etc., are sealed by the presiding officer and forwarded to the returning officer. They are never opened except by order of the Supreme Court and in the presence of the Court. In due time they are, unless challenged, destroyed unopened. Personation and double-voting — so easy in New Zealand — are prevented or made both difficult and dangerous in Great Britain by having the constituencies divided into wards or districts. Each has its own polling-place, its own presiding officer, and that portion of the roll containing the names of the electors in that district. Identification is thus made comparatively easy and two temptations practically removed from the path of the sbaily elector. Here is a system much of which might be advantageously adopted in New Zealand. As it stands, our Ballot Act is, perhaps, the most defective of the many that are in force throughout the Empire, and strangely out of harmony with the progressive character of our legislation in other directions.