THE NEW INFANTARY TACTICS.

New Zealand Tablet, Volume IV, Issue 187, 27 October 1876, Page 7

THE NEW INFANTARY TACTICS .

T I ■■■ ■ ■ (From the ' Pall Mall Gazette.') We certainly move slowly, but it is satisfactory to see that we do move. Ever since the campaign of 1866, and the publication of tha " Tactical Retrospect " — the first and perhaps the ablest of the many German pamphlets which have treated on the subject of modern warfare in relation to modern arms — a strong feeling has been prevalent among military men that our infantry tactics should be modified to suit present requirements. The campaign in France only confirmed the impressions formed from that in Germany, and it was felt that, whet her by regulation or without regulation, an alteration must, in the c\enb of war, be made in our existing system. At length the n nbliorilies have spoken, and the result has been a short treatise in the 1 form of sin addendum to the field exercise book, termed the " Attack Formation of a Battalion." The principles on which these tactics are founded appear sound. Owing to the increased power of field artillery, troops acting against an enemy in position mu*t not be exposed in close formation (unless under shelter) at a distance of less than 3,000 yards. Owing to the range and accuracy of small arms, the ground over which infantry have to advance harassed by the destructive fire of the rifle has greatly increased in extent, and, owing also to the rapid recharge of the bre?chloader, troops advancing are able toreply to the fire of troops in position. For these reasons an op< n order of movement became necessary, and the sanction of authority and the force o£ system appeared desirable to forestall the action which all felt must be inevitable, and which many were teachiug without a fixed plan. Men could not advance without firing over the thousand yards which the enemy's rifles would, with more or less effect, sweep. They could not use their weapons in close order and in double rank, and there seemed room for tactics between the old skirmishing formation and the close order of infantry in line or column. In skirmishing the soldier sought to approach the enemy individually, and, so to speak, by stealth, but positions cannot be carried by a thin and wavering line, they require to be forced by a bold attack. Consequently, as the distance diminishes, the skirmishers disappear, not by being withdrawn or relieved, for traops once under fire must always be pushed forward, but by being swept onwards by the advancing waves of attack. These waves or lines are consequently formed of companies, or rather of half companies, extended at about tliree paces interval. As they approach the enemy they absorb the skirmishers, as they come nearer they receive their supports ; as they arrive within about three hundred yards the reserves come up, until with what remains of skirmishes, supports, and reserves, the final rush is made and the position carried. This in a few words is the system of attack founded on common sense, and recognising the necessity of organising disorder. It is no loose drill, it ought to be the perfection oi intelligent training. Steady advance, accurate firing, good leading on the part of the companies' officers, flexibility and individual intelligence on that of the soldier, are the requisites for the new system of tactics. As in the last great war the English infantry, in two ranks, met its opponents formed three or four deep, so now will they, in single rank, cope with the denser formations of continental troops. Included, and in addition to n prescribed rule of formation, certaiu important principles are enunciated in the new regulations ; greater latitude is allowed, and more discretionary pjwer conceded, to the company's officers. The commanding officer is directed to explain clearly the point of attack. Until the advance be made the conduct of the half-battalions is left to the majors ; then the first and second lines come under the|enfcire supervision of the company's officers, who are responsible for their due conduct and for the proper time for ordering up the supports. Only when the reserves join the first lines and the final rush is to be made do the superior officers resume direct command. While laying down accurate rules for drill, the new regulations evidently point to modifications necessary in the more advanced teachings which all intelligent commanding officers should afford to the troops under their comirand. Partial training ought to supplement mere drill.