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THE COMING WAR.

*-» • An English Whiter on the Fighting Capacity of the Nations.

FRANCE. Notwithstanding the desire which exist on the part of the French people to rush into a war with Germany, to gain revenge for the defeat of four years ago, it is' doubtful if the French' - Government would encourage the aspiration. Tom as France is by ' political dissensions, it is extremely doubtful whether any •' Ministry would add to the cares and the perils of war to the other A prominent dangers of its existence. Neither is the French army in condition — nor is it likely to be for many years — to undertake a campaign of any magnitude. The military organization of the Second Empire was entirely broken up by the disasters of the German war. At the present time no fixed plan can really be said to have been adopted for the organization of the army ; the questions as to depots and cadres are still unsolved. French military men assert that their artillery is in a powerful state ; but it may reasonably be doubted that, in the short time that has elapsed since the enormous loss of that arm which occurred in the German war, it can have been replaced by guns judiciously selected and carefully manufactured. Though there is not a great dearth of men in the French army, it can not be said the recruits are of a satisfactory kind. The weakness of the commissariat arrangement was one of the potent causes of the failure of the French in the German war. It has not yet been thoroughly changed for the better. The mitrailleuses, which were so zealously guarded, and which were expected to strike terror in the German ranks, were found to be a failure in the war, and have now been abandoned for all practical purposes of campaigning ; so that at present France is not in a condition to " rush into war." It has taken England twenty years to reorganise from the breakdown of her military system in the Crimean war, and a vast amount of money has been expended in effecting the changes j and it can hardly be possible that things are so much better managed in France that she can in four or five years put au army in the field with any prospect of winning back laurels >o rudely wrested from her in her last great contest.

BEI/GOTM AND SWITZBKIAND.

As to' the two neutral countries of Belgium and Switzerland little need be said. The neutrality of one is guaranteed by the Great Powers, and the other has perhaps a still greater guarantee of neutrality in the shape of public opinion in Europe, The Belgian army may be 80.000 strong. Perhaps they are not the finest troops in the world, but still they are not, as a great statesman is reported to. have said of them, " merely all coat and musket and little man." It is certain that Belgium, unaided, could not hold her frontiers against either Germany or France if either of these powers wished to make the Netherlands its battle-field or its line of communications.

Russia.

" A great and mysterious power looms up in the North." On the Ist of November last a law came into force in Russia by which every Russian subject became liable to military service, and the consequence of this decree is an enormous increase in the army. It is estimated -that next year Russia will be able to put into the field 1,500,000 men. These men are excellent soldiers in many respects. They may not be acute or intelligent, but they are strong, hardy, capable of bearing fatigue, have an intense loyalty to tbeir sovereign, believe that the Russian Government can do no wrong, and would enter upon any campaign ordered by that Government with all the religious excitement of a crusade. The organization of the army is simple and well-conceived. The men are tall, strong and fine, and, if properly led and supplied with good ammunition, the Russian army would be most formidable in any war, For defensive ptu-poses Russia holds a peculiarly advantageous position. The terrible example of the First Napoleon still gives a shiver to almost anybody who contemplates the idea of invading her. No doubt an invasion at the present time would be a very different matter from what it was at the i beginning of this century. Still, it would be attended with enormous ! difficulties, not the least of which would be the inhospitable climate, the impossibility of feeding an invading army on a -wild and sparsely- \ populated country, and the necessity which would fall on the inj vaders of drawing their supplies almost wholly from their base. A i line of communication might become so much extended that the ! troops requisite to guard the line, and the officers necessary to administer it, would consume more of the provisions than the line itself could bring up. In future wars it is doubtful whether, considering the number of men that would probably be engaged, it will ever be possible to rely on the supply of an army from its base of communications. A weighty oppression., however, hangs over the military organization of Russia. The official administration is so corrupt that it is almost certain that hi case of war peculation would be rife, and that the Russian soldiers— brave, loyal and hardy as they might be — would find themselves worsted by an internal enemy more deadly than any external foe. All this is well-known and talked of openly on the soil of Russia.

SWEEDEN AND NOBWAY.

The united power of Sweden and Norway possesses certainly a small but excellent army, but probably would be too wise to enter upon any European war, even of great dimensions. It would have little to gain by descending into the theatre of contest, and possibly might lose some provinces to Russia. Denmark might, indeed, be anxious to join an alliance against Germany, for the sore of the Schleswig-Holstein campaign is not healed over. But she has been so hampered by the war of 1864, and her population has been bo reduced that her tiny army of 40,000 men would rank as comparatively insignificant in the consideration in the consideration of the military capacities of the Continent.

TTJBKEY.

Turkey is always a source of danger in European policy, and must be " almost a nightmare in every foreign office." The men

of the army are good, but the administration of Turkey is much more corrupt and venal even than that of her northern neighbour, Russia. The small principalities which form the kingdom of Romabia have an army which is not to he despised. They could put in the field 80,000 men, and these not at all bad troops. GERMANY. It is Germany which is universally considered at the present time to be the first military power of Europe, and toward it. all eyes are directed. The German army has proved itself to be a most admirable military machine. Most armies after such successes as those which have attended the German army would have i got idle and claimed the right to rest on their laurels and enjoy luxury and ease, but it is a notorions fact that the German officers, high and low, have been working harder, perhaps, than they worked before the late war in order to keep their army from retrograding and to bring it steadily forwards. The opinion of those who witnessed the late German manoeuvres is, that at no time has the German army ever been in such a first-rate condition as it is at the present moment. Not content with the needle-gun, which showed an inferiority to the Chassepot during the French war, experiments have been instituted and a new arm has been adopted, which, it is confidently asserted, will be much more superior to the Chassepot than even the Chassepot was to the needle-gun. It is believed by the best judges that the German army now is the best armed force in Europe. As to the organisation of the army there can not be two opinions ; it has passed through the fire of three wars, and has proved its capacity. The empire could, at the present time, put 1,200,000 fighting men in the field in case of actual necessity, and the re-organisation of the Landsturm will increase th?t force to perhaps 1,600,000 men.

DANGEB OF WAE.

It has been said that the danger of war between Germany and France does not appear considerable, because of the impotence of the latter at this tune. It may be regarded ac almost certain that unless France should provoke Germany, to the utmost she would be content with guarding her newly-acquired acquisitions, and not again cross the Moselle as an invader, nor attempt to dictate a new peace at the gates of Paris. On the South matters hardly appear to be so entirely satisfactory. The inhabitants of Austria at large have almost forgotten the war of 1866. The benefits which accrued to their country from the results of that crushingly rapid campaign have been so great that they have blotted out the sense of soreness that sprang from the defeats which the Austrian army sufiered. But though antagonism against Germany has -ceased among the people composing the AustroHungarian empire, it still lurks between the Cabinets and Governments of the two countries, and on the Austrian side not only does there appear to be a feeling of personal resentment against the Cabinet of Berlin among some of the advisers of the Crown, but it is almost universally believed that the head of the State has a deep personal and individual grudge against his northern neighbour, and refuses to meet even half way, or perhaps in any way, the advances which have often been made to him from Berlin. This fact, if not clearly ascertained, is at leaßt thoroughly believed north of the Giant Mountains, and the belief leads to a feeling of distrust on the part of Northern Germany towards Austria. It is this attitude of the Austrian Court which is one of the prime reasons why Germany keeps up her great and expensive armament. But this state of things cannot always endure. Throughout the Fatherland there is a feeling that it must come to an end, and that the only way to reduce these enormous armaments to a looting proportionate to the capabilities of the people is to force on events, and somehow or other disarm those on account whom these military preparations are necessary.

ENGLAND S POLICY.

What role would England take in case of a great European contest ? The general answer will doubtless be — that of neutrality. But is it possible that neutrality can always be maintained ? If the British realm were confined to the two small islands which constitute its heart, it might be true that it could keep out of war, but with wideBpreading colonies and foreign entanglements it would be almost impossible for England to avoid taking part, sooner or later in the struggle. How, then, is she prepared for the emergency that is almost sure to arise ? The navy is apparently in good order. The numerical strength of the British fleet is larger 'than that of any other power, '""''and English 6ailors have not deteriorated. But a large part of the navy is composed of vessels built since England was engaged in a great naval war. .Their construction, to a great extent, has been experimental. Suppose on going to war it should be discovered that the navy had been built on faulty principles ? The result might be to . nullify that arm of the national defence, and uncover the coast of England to any powerful nation intent upon invading the country and laying it under tribute. The enormous wealth accumulated in London is a bait to avarice, which must be ignored in consideration of the possibilities of hostile invasion. Suppose tho coast should be defenceless, what kind of an army could England oppose to the magnificent troops of the Continent ? The militia and volunteers would be useless. The regular army would be effective as far as it goes, but at moßt it Would be 60,000 strong. What could this handful do against the tremendous hosts of Germany, Russia or France ? If England will save herself she must be willing to spend her money freely to maintain a large and efficient regular army. If Englishmen will not serve their country in person, they must be prepared to pay the price for that immunity as for any other luxury. That price is not so great as that which might be assessed by a committee of Continental bankers, in session in captured London.

This article text was automatically generated and may include errors. View the full page to see article in its original form.I whakaputaina aunoatia ēnei kuputuhi tuhinga, e kitea ai pea ētahi hapa i roto. Tirohia te whārangi katoa kia kitea te āhuatanga taketake o te tuhinga.
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https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/periodicals/NZT18750709.2.25

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New Zealand Tablet, Volume III, Issue 115, 9 July 1875, Page 14

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2,113

THE COMING WAR. New Zealand Tablet, Volume III, Issue 115, 9 July 1875, Page 14

THE COMING WAR. New Zealand Tablet, Volume III, Issue 115, 9 July 1875, Page 14

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