The Assembly of Nations

New Zealand Listener, Volume 37, Issue 947, 4 October 1957, Page 10

The Assembly of Nations

HE election of Sir Leslie Munro to the presidency of the United Nations General Assembly is an honour for the man and his country, but it can also have practical results of much value in New Zealand. Debates in the current session are expected to be lively, and will touch upon great issues — disarmament, Cyprus, and the Middle East. Interest in them will be sharpened for New Zealanders while their own countryman is presiding. And this may stimulate a wider interest in UN’s contribution to world affairs. It will also be easier to see what may, be done by the smaller nations. After all, New Zealand’s part cannot be insignificant when her representative is in the President’s chair. There has always been a disconcerting gap between the official and public attitude towards UN. Much work has been done at international conferences by officers of the Department of External Affairs and by educationists and scientists who have gone abroad with our small and overworked delegations. These people -know the weaknesses of UN, but they know also its indispensable functions, and are committed to the ideas by which it lives. The general attitude, based on the distant view and second-hand knowledge, has been a mixture of doubt, suspicion, and impatience. It was there from the beginning, but the full extent of misconception was not revealed until the Suez crisis. Passive and unorganised prejudice then became active and vocal. United Nations was treated as if it were a self-contained entity to which member states were entitled to look for swift action, firm control, and miraculous results. The organisation was scolded by newspapers. In an _ overheated atmosphere, when people wanted to be convinced that they were supporting a just and wise policy, they turned eagerly in search of a scapegoat. They did not seem to understand that the scapegoat had a collective identity, and that their own nation was part of it. Internal conflict was severe at UN headquarters in the days of

crisis, but there was soon no doubt where the majority stood, It was much to the credit of Britain, France and Israel that the majority decision was acted upon; and when all the reverberations of Suez have died away it will be seen that UN was strengthened by their acceptance of a higher authority. Russia gave a different answer. The failure of UN to restore freedom to Hungary has been used as a further illustration of debility; but the only intervention that could be made, without grave risk of a world war, was by moral pressure, and the results have not been negligible. Historians will notice the persistence of Mr Hammarskjoeld, and the devastating UN report on Hungary. World opinion can _ be ignored, but only at a price. The Russians have seen in a dozen countries that the price can be embarrassingly high; and the end of the story is yet to be written. In these events and commotions the centre of moral authority was in a meeting of nations. It is still there, imperfect and diffused until great issues arise, but a force that can be stronger than armies. There is no world government: the Secretariat can on occasion use an executive power, but only when it has been delegated by nations which can also take it away. The Security Council, intended to be a guiding body, has fallen out of credit through the dissension of its permanent members. Revision of the Charter is seen by some to be the best hope for the future; but legal changes are not changes of spirit, and there can be no avoidance of the slow and painful advance. In the meantime the General Assembly has taken a new importance. All the nations can speak there, and the world hears them; and the small nations, less entangled with the past, often speak straight to the conscience of mankind. The debate can have no end, only interruptions; but if this forum disappeared there would have to be another. If United Nations fails, the civilising spirit fails -with it.

M.H.

H.