Infighting in Midwinter

New Zealand Listener, Volume 37, Issue 944, 13 September 1957, Page 16

Infighting in Midwinter

ITALY (Vol. 1, The Sangro to Cassino); by N. C. Phillips; War History Branch (De-' partment of Internal Affairs, Wellington).

(Reviewed by

L. W.

T.

S the war recedes, one tends recall only the crowded hours, and to forget the continuum of sombre discomfort and frustrated hope which contributed to every campaign. For the New Zealand Division, such a petiod occurred during the mid-winter battles fought in the "narrow waist" of Italy between October, 1943, and March, 1944. Other campaigns were more costly, other terrain as difficult (it could scarcely have been more difficult), and other winters as rigorous; but no other period demanded so much in fortitude and endurance from the men of the fighting ‘echelons and returned so small a measure of "apparent glory." ‘This is the unpromising background of the Jatest volume of the Official History; yet this book is among the best, if not pre-eminent, in a very satisfactory series. The author’s chief design is to "corsider what was going on in the minds of the commanders." Nevertheless, the jecing together of the sequences of attle is a fine exercise of historical imagination (as Sir John Fortescue understood it, ". . . never a creative function. It is rather re-creative and reproductive"). The volume is introduced

with a scholarly marshalling of the political and strategic factors which brought the Allied armies to battle in the Italian peninsula and kept them actively engaged in grossly unsuitable conditions of climate and terrain. The story begins with the Division in Egypt, crossing uneventfully to Taranto, and advancing to the Sangro River to gatecrash that considerable obstacle. The Siegfried winter line is broken into as the weather deteriorates, and the Division shapes up to the obtiuracy of

Orsogna. The story of the assatilts upon this fortified town and the unsuccessful attempts to by-pass its commanding position conclude this section of the book. The second and major portibn deals with events in and around Cassino — a sombre and évocatoty name to all who witnessed its ordeal and defiance: a_ retrospect upon the operational plans and their execution, with possible alternatives, concludes this work, The author is beset throughout by the intricaciés of simultaneous @

activity at all levels, surely the bugbear of all military historians. He has overcome the difficulty and achieved remarkable clarity by adopting, neither obviously nor too rigidly, a constant arrangement within chapters. The writing is enlivened by the apt phrase and colourful imagery. There are no fruitless diversions, but happily, the "general historian" .is never fully suppressed, so that we have stimulating, if fleeting, glimpses of the past, illuminating a moment of decision or a locality of historical consequence. The author has offered opinion, but never dogmdtically; indeed, the sense of dispassionate analysis is well sustained, Only at one point, and this is an incidental one, does the author re-

veal anything approaching personal pre-judice-in a passing reference to a 25pounder as "this lovable gun. . ." The term will no doubt pass unnoticed by other field gunners. Inevitably much of the interest in this excellent volume will centre upon the analysis of the Cassino battles, and especially that of March 15-26. The morality of bombing the monastery at Montecassino may still be debated, but few will quarrel with Professor Phillips's dictum that the command of the New Zealand Corps had no "realistic alternative’ but to demand the bombardment; greater weight might have been given to this conclusion by the revelation of how universally it was believed by the ordinary soldier in the Division that the

Monastery was being used by the Germans for military purposes. Even if this view wefe erroneous-and it is difficult not to be persuaded by the evidence here adduced-the destruction had to be ordered if. morale was to be preserved. A full reading of the historian’s assessment of the main battle for Cassino will leave little room for disagreement. His finding that the New Zealand Corps lost its "best opportunity of gatecrashing Cassino" by failing to flood the town with infantry as soon as the initial bombing ceased, should not be taken alone, In all that has gone before, Professor Phillips has made it very clear that this "best opportunity" was a very poor best indeed, by no means certain of success. One lapse in the argument could perhaps be criticised; after noting the failmre to order more infantry more quickly into the town, he remarks that the commanders in immediate control of the battle (at brigade and division) could obtain no information as to the outcome of the fighting in the town for several hours, owing to poor communications. These points should be connected, to show that by the time the situation was realised, the "opportunity" (such as it was) had passed. But the "big picture" is accurate and fair, and ali the many tactical difficulties are fully set out. Even in retrospect it is difficult to see any course that would have had a real likelihood of success without heavier casualties than were justified by an admittedly pressing strategic situation. General Freyberg, as usual, saw the battle in these wider terms. It was well for New Zealand that he did so, and for those who faced the enemy across the rubble of Cassino. This book is a significant contribution to the history of our country at war; the second and complementary volume by the same author will undoubtedly be worth waiting for.