Britain After Churchill

New Zealand Listener, Volume 32, Issue 821, 22 April 1955, Page 30

Britain After Churchill

Extracts from a recent commentary on the international news, broadcast from the Main National Stations of: the NZBS -~ a

DON’T propose to attempt an appraisal of Sir Winston’s career, or to assess the depth or permanence of his imprint on history, which he’s recently done so much to mould. I’m more concerned with what comes afterwards. It seems to be generally accepted that his successor will be Sir Anthony Eden, but I don’t think his term of office will be particularly long or successful. For years he’s lived in the shadow of the throne, a perennial alter ego. . . In any case, I don’t think Eden is a strong figure . . and it wouldn’t surprise me at all to see him supplanted by, say, R. A. Butler. This won’t happen, though, until after a general election, which the new Prime Minister is almost bound to hold shortly after his appointment; and it may well be his showing there, as leader of the party, that will determine Eden’s future. The election itself, whatever the outcome, is bound to be rather a curiosity None of the really important questions facing Britain will be in issue-the Hbomb, German rearmament, the form of the country’s economy. On all these and other fundamental points the two majo: parties are virtually at one. The elec tion may well turn on some inconsequential point, such as the price of tea; which is just as well for Labour, as it gives it a chance of winning that I don't think it would otherwise have. In view of this, a look at the present Opposition won’t be amiss. Personally, I feel Labour’s troubles, and not only in Britain, will just be beginning on the attainment of office. It’s a particularly melancholy reflection, for me that the Socialist movement throughout the world should be so confused and divided, and those who derive satisfaction from

it should remember that in many countries it’s the alternative government that might rule tomorrow. And for all its division it has a way of consolidating at times of crisis. Remember, too, that Churchill in his time was just as much a gadfly to his party as Aneurin Bevan is to the hierarchy of Labour today. This isn’t the occasion for an examination of the troubles of the Left, but it’s a widespread and important phenomenon in world affairs and deserves a word in passing. I think they’re essentially rooted in disillusionment, Not so long ago Socialists were convinced that however long it took, their ultimate triumph was inevitable. Their philosophy, they thought, was the only alternative to capitalism and, in the end, they must inherit power, whereupon a new world would come into being. Two flaws have now appeared in this complacent credo. Many other patterns of social organisation are now known to he possible, and new worlds are not as easy to get going as they appear, especially if the old one has to be kept going in the meantime. Where Socialist parties have been in power they've generally made considerable, though not radical, changes in the existing economy, and on eoing into opposition again they've been more concerned to protect those changes than to promote others. . . The party organisation tends to say and do less about Socialism. and more and more to make common cause with today’s unconeenial capitalism. . . I see no reason to doubt that the Labour and Conservative (continued on next page)

Parties of Britain today could drop pretty well all other political principles and share a philosophy based on two points, the Welfare State and antiCommunism. Whether that would enable them to emulate the successes and satisfactions of Victorian days is, of course, a matter of individual opinion. At least this could be said, it would make for that continuity in foreign policy which in some quarters is regarded as so desirable. . , Both parties, apparently here as in Great Britain, are agreed on the broad Pattern of defence strategy, and under Eden, Butler, Attlee, or even Bevan, there’s little likelihood that this would be changed. The defence policy of the Commonwealth was obviously discussed at the Prime Ministers’ Conference . and a new role has been assigned to New Zealand-evidenced by the proposal to send forces to Malaya. I’ve listened carefully to the debate about this in Parliament during the week, and it seems to me that most speakers missed the essential point, or at any rate, refrained from referring to it. New Zealanders are not going there to root out the "bandits" or "terrorists" as they are | called. As Mr. Nash said, there are already 350,000 men in Malaya trying to capture 5000 rebels, and a few hundred more from New Zealand-and the Australians, too, as announced yesterday --wouldn’t make much difference either way. We’re to be there, I believe, to take up the position we'll have to fight from if the war regarded by the service chiefs as most likely to happen should break out. I’m going to guess that one of the decisions taken at the recent Seato Conference was to regard the whole of the South-East Asian continent down as far as the Kra Isthmus as undefendable, or at least temporarily expendable. This notwithstanding the fact that Siam was host to the conference and Bangkok has been named for its secretariat, But, flanked as it is by Indo-China, I think the Americans have decided to write off Thailand, at least for the time being. . . In these circumstances I believe she will prefer to retire to Malaya, there to organise part of what Mr. Dulles called "massive retaliation with weapons of her own choosing." And that’s where we come in, as one of the weapons of Mr. Dulles’ choosing, and I must concede with the Anzus Pact from our choosing, too. Within the last 20 years the cockpit of New Zealand has moved from Western Europe through the Middle East to the North Pacific. With this decision we move right into the cold war. If it suddenly fanned into heat some of our men in Malaya would probably get burnt, and once that happened it would be very difficult to argue rationally in Parliament or elsewhere what we ought to do about it. What’s now written in ink, with constitutional safeguards, in the Manila Pact, would then be written, unconditionally, in |

blood.

DR

A. M.

FINLAY

April 2, 1955.