Defence of Western Europe

New Zealand Listener, Volume 31, Issue 797, 29 October 1954, Page 22

Defence of Western Europe

Extracts from a recent commentary on the international news, broadcast from the main National Stations of the NZBS

HE peace we've got today, the sort of uneasy co-exist-ence we enjoy-or endurewith the Communist Powers is based on the strength and unity of the West. The West is still not as strong as it could be, or should be, and lately its unity seems to have been threatened. If we are lucky-and why shouldn't: we be -for a change?-we shall emerge from this week stronger and more united than we’ve been for a long time. In a way, this has been Britain’s week. She has taken the lead and made the proposals, and she renewed the confidence of all who believe in her. But in a way it has been America’s week, too. She has sat back and left the initiative to Britain. She has behaved like a partner, and a partner with confidence in the partnership. She has been helpfully and unobtrusively co-operative in the attempt to get the defence of Western Europe arranged with French and German co-operation, That attempt is the big news of the week. It’s an attempt to replace the dangerous vacuum of an unarmed and restive Germany lying between East and West, a situation which is full of danger and which could not be allowed to continue. . .

Europe is the one part of the world in which a decision in war could be reached between Russia and the democracies. For the time being, and for many years to come, there is no other part of the world in which a world struggle could be won or lost. If Russia could seize the Saar and the Ruhr and could threaten the Midlands in Britain, her command of these vast industrial resources would tip the balance and would give her a reasonable chance of victory. If, on the other hand, the West can keep these secure, Russia has no chance of victory whatever. The problem has been, and is, how to keep them secure. A big part of the answer to that problem is to get out of the vacuum and to make use of Western Germany manpower to provide 12 divisions of half a million men. This means, of course, that Western Germany must be allowed to rearm. That is a prospect that frightens France and some other countries as well... There are big differences between EDC, which the French National As-

sembly refuséd to accept, and the new scheme. Britain’ was not a partner in EDC and France was afraid that without Britain Germany would dominate the partnership. Britain is a full partner in the new arrangement and is committed to maintaining large forces on the Continent for the rest of this century. Under the EDC plan the armies of the various Powers were to lose their identities. . . Under the new arrangement they will still train and fight side by side, but they will not lose their identity. . . Britain’s presence in the

partnership is a tremendous advantage from the French point of view. It goes a long way towards removing the French fear that Germany will dominate the partnership. The tremendous fact, as history will note, is that Britain is pledged to return to the Continent from which she has been absent since the fall of Calais 400 years ago. And she is pledged to return in great strength. If what Mr. Mendés-France has said is correct, she is pledged to commit half (continued on next page)

her available military forces to the defence of Western Europe, and to put them at the disposal of the civil and military authorities in charge of the defence of this half of the Continent. This, for Britain, is a very serious decision. It is a decision so grave in its consequences that a good many people wonder if it is the right decision or TE... These European commitments do put a strain on the Commonwealth relationship, and they might even put an end to any effective Commonwealth relationship. In fact, some people have already resigned themselves to this happening. Bertrand .Russell has argued .. . that in order to make the countries of Western Europe powerful enough to cooperate with America, "Britain must join herself to Europe." Then he goes on to say: "It is said that the Commonwealth is a difficulty . . . the Commonwealth now is just a nice idea that strategically will not work ... our communications are no longer secure . . we cannot protect Australia and my own feeling is that parts of the Commonwealth should join’ themselves’ to America." . . . Sir Beverley Baxter has argued along something the same lines. . . In a sense, under the new arrangement for the defence of Western Europe, Britain does join herself to the Continent. There’s a look about it of the sort of future that Bertrand Russell has visualised. And when you come to think of it, there’s a look of the same thing about Anzus. . . Not many of us would care to think of the future as Bertrand Russell and Beverley Baxter think of it. but if the future’s not going to take that shape we can’t afford too many understandings of this sort. With Britain tied up on one side of the world and the Dominions tied up on the other, it wouldn’t be long before the Comrfonwealth became "just a nice idea that strategically wouldn’t work." Measuring advantages against disadvantages and risks against gains, however, this week has left us with more hope than we've had for a long time. . . The Commonwealth relationship may not stand up to_ the strain, but it is hard to believe that. it will not. . . Much will depend on Britain’s outlook and policy, and Britain is more Commonwealth-minded than ever before in her history. And the United States, too, seems far less inclined to put a strain on the Commonwealth relationship.

~R M

HUTTON PottS

October 9, 1954 1