TWO POLICIES IN ASIA

New Zealand Listener, Volume 31, Issue 793, 1 October 1954, Page 15

TWO POLICIES IN ASIA

Extracts from a recent commentary | on the international news broadcast from the main National Stations of the NZBS

NE of the big problems of these difficult and dangerous days is that the democratic partners do not always see eye to eye, and that ene of them, the biggest-that is Americaoften acts alone as though she had no partners, and does not foresee, as Britain does, the danger of pushing the Asian neutrals into the Communist camp, the peril of combining yellow against white, and the advantage of trying to improve relations with the Asian races as a whole. Britain and America do not hold the same views on policy in and toward Asia. They disagree profoundly about China, Britain holds the view that the present Chinese Government is not likely to be unseated and that it is best to try to improve relations with China and, in this way, to loosen the Chinese partnership with Russia. The United States-more especially the present United States Government-holds the view that the Chinese Government can be unseated, and that this may perhaps be accomplished through the agency of Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalists on the island of Formosa. i That’s why ... the news: of the Nationalist Chinese bombardment of Communist Chinese positions near the mainland port of Amoy, is so tremendously important. It’s better to be blunt about these things. This bombardment is going on with American approval and under American protection. This is the result of a radical change in "American policy. When the Korean war began about four years ago, President Truman ordered the United States Seventh Fleet, to "neutralise" Formosa by protecting Formosa from assault from the Chinese mainland, and by protecting the mainland from assault by the Chinese Nationalists from Formosa. These instructions have been altered, Today, the Seventh Fleet is protecting Formosa and not the mainland. In effect, Chiang Kaishek has been given a blank cheque to be as aggressive as he likes, under American protection. That’s dangerous. It’s particularly dangerous because there are other Nationalist-held islands near the mainland and the United States in attempting to protect them with forces which have been ordered-these are the American admiral’s own words-to "be

quick on the trigger" could easily become involved in a long and exhausting war with Communist China. About four years ago, Senator Tom Connolly, a Democrat who was then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations ' Committee, eave a warning

against this in a prepared speech which, by accident of circumstance, was never delivered, but was published in the Conéressional Record. Entanglement with Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists, he said -these are his words — "could enmesh us in a land war with Communist China from which we might’ neyer extricate ourselves. We would ‘pour out our wealth, our manpower and our physical resources into an endless struggle . . until sheer exhaustion compelled us to stop. .. When we were completely stripped of our strength the Kremlin would be quite free to move anywhere

and everywhere its greedy heart desired." There are also two other ultimate possibilities which must never for a moment be forgotten. The first is that in this process, the United States, wearying and desperate, might be tempted to reach a decision by using the atomic bomb and so bring about the very thing the world most fears, the annihilating atomic war. The second is more a probability than a possibility. It is that gradually and inevitably White would be set against Yellow and an alliance cemented which, in the end, could only mean disaster for the West. If that were to happen, Lenin’s prophecy of 30 years ago would be fulfilled: "The outcome of the world’s struggle between Capitalism and Communism," he said, "depends in the long run on the fact that Russia, China and India comprise the overwhelming majority of the world’s population,"

MR. ATTLEE’S TOUR

T is this difference between the British and American point of view, of course, which has led to the very bitter criticism in America of the visit to China and Russia of Mr. Attlee and his. Labour colleagues. Mr. Attlee has been Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. and, no doubt, hopes to be Prime Minister again with his colleagues in his Ministry. . . Every bit of understanding that he acquire will then be vital to him. It’s not a bad idea to try to get this down to the simplest basis. A man with

great responsibilities feels himself confronted with greater responsi-

bilities. In shouldering them, he will be dealing with other men similarly situated in other countries. First-hand knowledge will be invaluable to him. In these circumstances, he decides to visit these countries, to see what is going on for himself, to try to find out what is in the |: minds of these other men and perhaps to let them know what is in his mind.

This does not mean that he approves of them or of what they .are doing, or of what they have done. It simply means that he re- | ‘ognises that in future they must live and conduct}: their various affairs in the same world. Nor does the fact that he accevts their

hospitality mean anything at all. Yet for all this. Mr. Attlee has been bitterly blamed and criticised. His critics have forgotten that Sir Winston Churchill himself said: "We arm ourselves to parley." Nobody could accuse Sir Winston of appeasement. fiobeny should confuse. a fact-finding mission like that of Mr, Attlee’s with appease- |~ ment. The times are altogether too difficult and too dangerous and the issues are far too serious for any of us to be small-minded. -R. M. HUTTON-POTTS, September 11, 1954.