Japan Against the West

New Zealand Listener, Volume 31, Issue 792, 24 September 1954, Page 12

Japan Against the West

JAPAN’S NEW ORDER IN EAST ASIAITS RISE AND FALL, 1937-45, by F. C. Jones; Oxford University Press, Geoffrey Cumberlege, English price 38/-.

(Reviewed by

F. L.

W. Wood

) HIS is a massive, orderly, very detailed but well arranged and well indexed book. It is derived largely from a close study of the documents used in the War Crimes proceedings in Japan after the war, which have been carefully collated with contemporary documents and the memoirs of eminent men, On points of detail it is objective and non-committal to the point of exasperation. The broad lines of interpretation, however, remain clear and are drawn together in conclusion in a slashing summary chapter which hands out severe censure to all the statesmen involved, So far as Japan is concerned, according to Dr. Jones, her weakness was essentially in lack of central control and of intelligent policy-forming both in peace and war. The upshot was a series of compromise decisions which with odd fatality combined the worst features of available alternatives. It is odd to read, incidentally, that the Japanese High Command never -even contemplated the action which was the Australian and New Zealand nightmare-that British and Dutch possessions might be attacked leaving America still neutral. As regards the United States, the author is severe on the naivety of Cordell Hull. One doubts whether American historians will accept this picture of Hull reproaching the British for temporising, while refusing any assurance of support if they should stand firm, and sharply rejecting in 1939 the possibility of -a compromise settlement which Britain, France and his own Ambassador, Grew, thought was opening up. As seen in this book, his policy throughout, and particularly in the final crisis, was based on sheer unsympathetic ignorance of what the Japanese were like and how they would inevitably react. As for the British, they understood the Far East somewhat better than did

Hull, but were oppressed by the European crisis, by their own lack of physical power, and by the refusal of the Americans to make any commitment whatever. It seems clear, too, that personally Churchill was relatively little interested in Japan, and rather too ready to sign blank cheques for the Americans in 1940 and 1941. The tragic overall result was that British and American diplomacy (Hull insisted that it could not be Anglo-American) failed to take tactical advantage of Japan’s internal divisions, let alone to exploit the fact that up to the last minute powerful elements in Japan were, prepared to fight hard and take grave risks for a line of development in key with Western thinking. Dr. Jones has disquieting things to say, too, about the post-war world, and the lack of intelligent foresight shown by Britain and America alike in their treatment of defeated Japan. He will be criticised as an academic who makes free with hind-knowledge and preaches to practical men who had to wrestle with the relentless pressure of day to day decisions. Yet his analysis of the way in which grave problems have arisen from decisions whose results could quite read- ily have been calculated can not be wholly brushed aside. The dangers of unintelligent diplomacy are too immediate. This book should be thoughtfully studied by all those whose destiny may depend on international diplomacy in general, and in particular, policy in relation to Japan. New Zealanders are clearly very much concerned, though it is odd to note that the whole book has been written with virtual disregard of the fact that the fate of the South Pacific Dominions trembled in balance. "Dominion status" wore a bit thin in those days, and in self-defence the Dominions must in the future guard their own interests more vocally and with better knowledge. Their case will go by default unless they speak loudly, persistently and with understanding. This book should accordingly be made prescribed reading for New Zealand politicians and diplomats, with the warning that its preoccupation with politics and diplomacy will need to be balanced by

study of the economic sources of action. | These are alluded to, rather than analysed, and it may be significant that the words population, rice and fish do not figure in Dr. Jones’s index. Yet the balance between these things may prove as important in the future as the deeply ingrained habits of Japanese and American politics.