Anzus and Commonwealth

New Zealand Listener, Volume 29, Issue 743, 9 October 1953, Page 15

Anzus and Commonwealth

HE end of the week saw the internationdl beam turn towards the Anzus meeting, and the most interesting and debatable statement is that the New Zealand, Australian and United States "Ministers agree to oppose any move to seat Communist Chin. in the United Nations in the present circumstances Debatable, not on the point of inclusion or éxclusion of China from UN, but whether such political decisions should be made by Anzus, this statement is very Significant, and probably reveals a so far undisclosed American reason for the exclusion of Great Britain It has been stated by Anzus meetings that Britain will be well informed: that it will not weaken Commonwealth relations and obligations; that British possessions in South-East Asia are limited and do not justify her inclusion; and that inclusion of the United Kingdom would mean extension to include many other nations. Technically it can be argued that Britain had little place in Anzus, but equally, as the leading partner in the Commonwealth it would seem to have been advantageous rather than otherwise to have had her co-operation. In othe: words, we undertook the new obligation On the general assumption that no conflict existed between Anzus and Commonwealth policies. In fact, we find objective evidence at this meeting of what was felt by some, that the exclusion of Britain was a political as much ag a militaristic move by America. Its aim was to prevent’ British influence from counteracting American pressures. Britain has leaned towards the policy of coming to an understanding with China, America has plumped for the policy of exclusion. At this Anzus conference we in New Zealand have plumped for the American political viewpoint on the Chinese issue in opposition to Britain. Has Anzus been inspired by the White House as well as the Pentagon? I leave you and time to make a judgment. Anzus may prove to be a troublesome issue in Anglo-American relations. -THOMAS WILSON, September 12, 1953

PERSIA’S PROBLEM

\W HERE does Pergia go from here? Well, in the first place, Persia can’t go anywhere, except maybe under control of Soviet Russia, unless she has money. By. closing the oil wells, rather than allow the Anglo-Iranian interests to operate them, Mossadeq sealed off

Persian revenues as well as Persian oil. Nor, if he wished to'do so, could the Shah start

the flow of funds again simply by allowing the oil to flow. The vast supply of Persian oil has been made up in scarcely more than a year, from Iraq, from Kuwait and other Persian Gulf sources. Persian oil must be brought on to the market again, but this can be done only gradually. It is clear that it will not be achieved by denationalisation of the oilfields and their return to AngloIranian. However unpopular Mossadeq made himself, it was not on account of his seizure of the oilfields, but because he failed to deliver his promises of the good that would come to Persia from that act of piracy. What we can hope meanwhile is that the British oil interests will be compensated for the

loss of their vast holdings in Persia, and given a part with other distributing agencies in restoring Persia’s position as a trader in oil. And the reply to the Shah’s appeal to the world tw come to his aid in what he describes as his country’s terrible situation will appar@ntly be given from the United States. Persia has an offer of some £35,000,000 of dollar aid and it is reported that Genera] Za-Hedi, Persia’s new strong man under the Shah, has agreed as a condition of this and other aid that talks will be commenced for the restoration of diplomatic relations with Great Britain and for a solution of the oil dispute. -JOHN MOFFETT, September 5, 1953

LEADER IN ASIA

NDIA’S role becomes more significant when we think of it in relation to the explosive emergence of nationalism. Here is a country that hac successfully emerged from 300 years of colonial tutelage. .Nehru’s friend and master, Mahatma Ghandi, wielded a- nationgal-

istic power that defeated the political and economic and military power of Imperial Britain. That

power was of a moral and _ spiritual order. It is not always effective in any tactical situation. It did not save the Chinese, in the short view, or the coloured people of South Africa, in the immediate present. But in the long view, and as a part of a basic strategy, moral and spiritual power is both indispensable and invincible. Note how significantly India is placed geographically. To her north beyond the Himalayas, lies the heartland of Communism, clenched like a_fist ready to punch. Around her on the five oceans stretch the North Atlantic peninsular powers. crooked like a hand ready to clutch. But between the fist and the open hand is interposed a buffer belt. from Gibraltar to Indonesia, of States recently released from colonial domination, or destined soon to win their independence. They have a_ strong coherence; they believe in spiritual rather than physical force; they believe in their common mission and their common destiny. And India is the pivot of the -neo-nationalistic region. the buckle of the neutral belt. Nehru is the leader to whom all these nations look with the greatest respect and devotion... There are obvious weaknesses in India at\the moment, and these are a tactical handicap to her mediation in a world of power politics. Her division from Pakistan is one; her dispute. with that country over Kashmir is another; her undeveloped industry is a third; her languishing agficulture is the greatest of all. But her relations with Pakistan are improving; the Kashmir incident seems to be on the way to settlement at last; and industry and agriculture are being cared for in a massive five-year plan that has made quite a promising start. _ -GORDON TROUP September 19, 1953

Extracts trom recent commentaries on the international news, broadcast from the Main National Stations of the NZBS ©