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CONFUSED CAMPAIGN

THE WAR IN MALAYA, by LieutenantGeneral A. E. Percival; Eyre and Spottiswoode. English price, 16/-. (GENERAL PERCIVAL’S thesis is the " $a3 " wWnpreparedness for war of the British Commonwealth. It should be the duty of Governments, he contends, to put the, issues before the people in time of peace, however unpalatable those issues may be. We have seen in New Zealand, in the recent referendum, an indication of how such an appeal would be received. We paid heavily in Malaya for that unpreparedness, in prestige as well as in men. General Percival stresses the importance of this loss of prestige and its effect on the morale of troops (especially Indian troops) and civilians. The process was cumulative; the sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, Japanese superiority in aircraft and tanks, the loss of territory through continual withdrawals, the evacuation of the naval base. The "scorched earth" policy of denying the country’s resources and installations to the Japanese during the withdrawal was especially damaging to civilian morale. With the help of 18 excellent maps and diagrams General Percival has written a clear account of this confused and unfortunate campaign. But more important than the operational narrative are his comments on British strategy. In the light of those comments it is not remarkable that Singapore was lost; when Japan struck at the end of 1941 it was too late to put things right. With few aircraft (and most of those obsolete) we relied on our strength in the air for the defence of the Far East. We relied on the British Fleet to come

te the rescue as soon as danger threatened; but the Navy already had its hands full guarding Britain’s supply routes in the Atlantic and protecting convoys to Russia. The Army’s job was to defend advanced airfields in Malaya and to hold the naval base until the Fleet arrived; it lacked tanks, modern weapons, and experienced officers and men, and few reinforcements. could be spared from other theatres. And lastly, because Britain was weak and. wished to avoid war with Japan and because she could not depend on support from the: United States should she provoke Japan to attack her, our policy in the Far East, especially in our relations with Thailand, was timid. in the ex-

treme.

W.A.

G.

This article text was automatically generated and may include errors. View the full page to see article in its original form.I whakaputaina aunoatia ēnei kuputuhi tuhinga, e kitea ai pea ētahi hapa i roto. Tirohia te whārangi katoa kia kitea te āhuatanga taketake o te tuhinga.
Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/periodicals/NZLIST19491014.2.24.2

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

New Zealand Listener, Volume 21, Issue 538, 14 October 1949, Page 13

Word count
Tapeke kupu
385

CONFUSED CAMPAIGN New Zealand Listener, Volume 21, Issue 538, 14 October 1949, Page 13

CONFUSED CAMPAIGN New Zealand Listener, Volume 21, Issue 538, 14 October 1949, Page 13

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