Postscript to Mahan?

New Zealand Listener, Volume 20, Issue 499, 14 January 1949, Page 10

Postscript to Mahan?

THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER IN WORLD WAR Il. By Captain W. D. Puleston, U.S.N. (ret.) Yale University Press (London: Geoffrey Cumberlege). HEN an American naval officer, Captain W. D. Puleston, U.S.N. (retired), author of a biography of Captain A. T. Mahan, produces a large and handsome book named, in the largest and blackest type that can be got on its title page, The Influence of Sea Power in World War II, any student of naval history will sit up and take notice. But if the student, or the general reader, expects anything like Mahan’s classic studies, he will be disappointed. In his preface, Captain Puleston tells us that his book is not a "narrative history" of the war, not a critique of naval operations; yet the greater part of it is devoted to a lop-sided account of operations which does far less than justice to the immense part played by British sea power in bringing about the downfall and unconditional surrender in turn of Italy, Germany, and Japan. Captain Puleston obviously cannot ignore the British effort, but in the main, his book

can be described as an effort to "sell" sea power of the American brand to an uncritical American public. There are many aspects of sea power in relation to the war that are barely touched upon, if at all. There is scarcely a reference to the benefits accruing to the American Navy from the wide knowledge and experience gained by the Royal Navy during the first two years of the struggle. Captain Puleston is often unfair, never generous, and not always accurate. His accounts of several joint British-Ameri-can operations are ill-balanced, with the scales tilted against the British effort. The invasion of Normandy in June, 1944, for example, is covered in barely three pages at the end of a chapter of 30 pages devoted mainly to American operations in the Pacific. The only mention of the part played by the Royal Navy is that it was the "preponderant partner in the Anglo-American naval team that supported the landing"; but the American ships that took part are named and we are told that "the American contribution alone included 37,000 men for the landing craft, 22,000 in the amphibious bases in England and 15,000 aboard the combat ships." The artificial harbours, a "British conception," are dismissed in barely two paragraphs. "The many component parts, secretly constructed in various parts in England, wers towed to their proper positions by a fleet of tugs directed by Commodore E. J. Moran, U.S.N.R." and "a contingent of Seabees built these harbours." There is no mention of Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, the Allied Naval Comamnder-in-Chief, who had organised and directed the planning of this, the greatest amphibious operation of all time. The lop-sidedness and inaccuracy of many of Captain Puleston’s comments are further indicated by his account of the American landing on Okinawa on April 1, 1945. "Before dark, 50,000 of Buckner’s Tenth Army were ashore. , . The landing in Normandy had been a prodigious feat; 21,000 troops were put ashore in the first 12 hours. At Okinawa, (continued on next page)

(continued from previous page) Buckner poured over twice as many troops on to the beach in the same length of time..." The truth is that on D-Day, an average of more than 21,000 men were landed on four of the five Normandy beaches, the exception being Omaha beach, where the Americans were delayed by bitter opposition. By nightfall, some 90,000 British, Canadian and American troops, together with thousands of vehicles and thousands of tons of supplies were ashore. At the end of the 28th day, more than one million men had been landed. A chapter devoted to the war-time expansion of the American Navy concludes with the remarkable statement that the "United Kingdom needed roughly a century and a-quarter, from 1660 to 1783, including nine wars, three of which were global, to become the preponderant sea power and to establish the British Empire. The United States became the pe gees Ga sea power between 1941 and 1945. . .". Nowhere does Captain Puleston give any measure of the immensity of the total war effort of the United Kingdom which, in August, 1945, had 5,100,000 men and women deployed in the armed forces, backed by 3,900,000 men and women producing munitions. There is.no mention of the contributions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India and other Empire countries to the Allied cause.

The accounts of operations are cluttered with the names of American admirals, generals, and others of lower ranks. British leaders are treated with "scant courtesy. Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, who carried an immense burden as First Sea Lord with signal success for nearly six years, is given a casual mention; and Admiral Cunningham makes a fleeting appearance | here and there. The only reference in the book to the organiser of the Dunkirk evacuation and planner of Normandy is in a three-paragraph account of the former operation-"the commander of this improvised regatta, ViceAdmiral Bertram Ramsay, was knighted for his service.’ For Captain Puleston’s purposes, Admirals Tovey, Vian and Fraser simply did not exist. The only reference to the British Pacific Fleet, which is not named as such, is a fourline paragraph about the "British Fast Carrier Force under Vice-Admiral Rawlings." Captain Puleston hopes that "this book may be regarded as a postscript to the volumes of Mahan." It is a

vain and foolish hope.

S.D.

W.