SELFISHNESS AND IGNORANCE WRECKED THE PEACE

New Zealand Listener, Volume 17, Issue 426, 22 August 1947, Page 18

SELFISHNESS AND IGNORANCE WRECKED THE PEACE

i THIS is the third and last |

1 " article by

ERIK

SCHWIMMER

on the crisis in Indonesia. Here the emphasis is on the influences which over-ruled the moderates on both sides.

HE Indonesian question may be regarded in two ways. The first way is that of the newspapers. According to them the public could judge the situation by hearing the Dutch and Indonesian accusations, and by comparing them, approving of the party whose complaints are weightier and more trustworthy. By this method conflicts between equal parties are commonly judged, but in the Indonesian question the public soon found that it was worthless. There was no end to the accusations and all were extremely seriaus. The Dutch accused the Indonesians of violating the demarcation line set up between the two armies; the Indonesians accused the Dutch of violating it no less. According to the Dutch, this was because the Indonesians did not supply the rice they had promised. According to the Indonesians the rice was not supplied because the line had previously been penetrated. In fact, the newspaper reader has been so confused by these contrary claims that he, quite justifiably, suspended judgment. How could he decide whether it

was the Dutch or the Indonesians who had sabotaged the currency or whether the confiscations of agricultural produce by the Dutch Navy were more or less justifiable than those by the Javanese people? Incorrect Comparison The instincts of New Zealanders in this respect are correct. When the newspapers pitted the Dutch against the Indonesian case, they assumed that the fight was between two equal parties whose violations of the accepted code can be estimated in the same way. The conflict is however between a people that is in-the process of gaining its independence and is at the same time fighting feudalism and primitiveness in his own ranks, on the one hand, and a fully-developed commercial nation concerned about its interests on the other. What two parties so widely different in character ‘are doing can never be compared. A violation that from the Indonesian side is an outburst of popular rage regretted by the Government is a different thing from action decided at Dutch Army Headquarters.

The Indonesian Republic is in important respects different from all older nations and also from any states newly formed. On the one hand the feudal period in Indonesia is so near to its close that Sultans and other aristocrats have no decisive voice in the government. On the other hand no indigenous capitalist class has yet sprung up, The leaders are therefore all simple men without hereditary glory or large wealth whose ‘personalities attracted followers in an atmosphere of political excitement. These Indonesian intellectuals are all-round men rather than experts in any particular branch, They are rather like-European politicians of the Renaissance who were considered capable of dealing with strategy one day and with financial or diplomatic problems on the next. Their experience in the Dutch Civil Service, if any, was limited to that of lower non-responsible personnel, This experience however is not always the basis of their present activities. Sjarifuddin, the present Premier, used to be a minor official at Economic Affairs, but before his premiership he

was Minister of Defence. Sjahrir’s knowledge was almost entirely theoretical before he became Premier and had to negotiate with Dutch, British ~ and American diplomats. Awareness of the State The visitor to these departments feels himself carried back to the Renaissance, for if the officials lack that specialist knowledge which is only obtained through a tradition of centuries, they have another quality which servants of; a modern state have frequently lost=~ the capacity to see the state as a to discuss it as one body for whose welfare and fate they are responsible in all its aspects. Indonesian politics are made by the body of officials serving in the most divefse functions, Decisions are ofteri made by the common intuitiog of a group rather than the judgment of a department head supported by documents. This does not mean that the de--partment head does not exhibit the" autocratic attitude inevitable in the Orient, but that there is little specialisation and therefore one man may have the most varied responsibilities. (continued on next page)

(continued from previous page) In the days before the present hostilities one of the centres was Sjahrir’s front verandah. His residence was then in a small pleasant suburban home in the outskirts of Batavia. An unusually wide grass lawn separates it from the street. The verandah, with about six rattan chairs, looks out on to this lawn. On the walls are a number of pictures painted by Indonesian artists, members of a school of painting which tries to combine western tonal technique with oriental motifs. One of the largest is by the President Soekarno, It is a blue and grey portrayal of a battlefield. When I was there a number of young Indonesians weré sitting on the verandah discussing the events of the day. Most of these men were in their twenties and erefore far below the age which responsible government officials usually are. Most of them belonged to a corps who were in the immediate environment of Sjahrir in the underground movement during the war years, and carefully instructed by him in political theory and practice. These young men had also learned a great deal about European culture, and especially literature, which is one of Sjahrir’s chief interests; At -present they are prominent in the small minority of well-trained civil servants, Some of them are sent to outlying districts where local chiefs have to be persuaded to follow the policy of the Republic. These chiefs were in the first few months opposed to Sjahrir’s policy and militarily, stronger than he. When they gradually came round and, many of them, if grudgingly, approved the negotiations, this was a result of diplomatic victories by these emissaries. Achievements and Failures ° What has this Republic achieved and where has it failed? Its first and capital achievement lay in the pacification of the country. The villagers who had formed bands laid down their arms and returned to their. fields. The second achievement of the Republic has been in education. In every Residency, schools for adults were started in the fight against illiteracy. In Jogjacarta especially this was done on a large scale and anything up to 18,000 adults per month have passed examinations in reading and writing. In high school education the Government is hampered by the almost complete absence of teachers. A university at Jogjacarta was started however in March, 1946, of which the arts and law faculties especially are said to be flourishing. The Education Department in Batavia publishes material for instruction in various magazines that are circulated throughout the country. In the Republican Army there was an unparalleled opportunity for education, and, according to reports, it was used te the full, anyone who had ever learned the alphabet being used as a teacher. Other features of development of. which much is’ written in Republican publications are women’s emancipation and athletics. In all government departments there are a number of women in ~ asponsible pos#tions, and the Minister 1 Social Affairs, Maria Ulfah Santoso, is also a woman. We also read that sports, first introduced among the mass of the people by the Japanese, are being vigorously developed. The trouble here is the absence of suitable playing fields and trainers. Still, the Indonesians have great expectations for the Olympic Games in 1948, especially in javelinthrowing in which they claim to have improved a record.

The namies of Marx and especially Engels often occur in Sjahrir’s writings. It is clear everywhere that Sjahrir has been deeply influenced by Socialist thought. In this he is followed by a very large part of Indonesian nationalism, because the Indonesians are, as already pointed out, almost entirely a. nation of have-nots. Yet Sjahrir has emphasised in his Indonesian Manifesto and in all his speeches and directives,

that it is premature to establish socialism in Indonesia at present. He has always stressed that Indonesia’s first need is industrialisation and therefore foreign capital. Thus the political ideas which he wishes to impress upon his people have been rather complicated. On the one hand he had to use Socialist slogans because to the uneducated masses capital was bound up with imperialism, but on the other hand he had to stress the necessity of at least a transition period. To a large section of the Indonesian population this compromise had seemed evil, ever since the Republic was formed. Add a hatred of foreigners and the interests of the Mohammedan religion, and you have the explanation of many of the violations with which the Indonesians are charged. Although a number of these leaders oppose the Sjahrir Government for selfish interests, the antiWestern point of view is supported chiefly not by interests but by ignorance. The Government had a difficult task in persuading and explaining the situation. If it had been possible for this process of education to continue undisturbed for some time, no doubt Sjahrir would at length have succeeded in introducing Western capital peacefully. Opposition to Peace This peaceful solution was originally the intention of Dr. Van Mook and the Dutch Labour Party. Against strong opposition they were able to force the agreement of Cheribon through the Dutch House of Representatives in March this year, and the Opposition did not confine itself to the Council Chamber; it included Dutch business, some of the officials in Dr. Van Mook’s civil service, and especially the Army and Navy in the Indies. Every show of power by these elements of course resulted in a temporary strengthening of the Indonesian groups opposed to Sjahrir, When on the other hand Dr. Van Mook was successful for a while in keeping them in the background, Sjahrir’s position too became stronger. Then just before the Cheribon Agreement was signed, a new complication strengthened the position of Dutch conservatives: the Dutch loan from America was almost exhausted and an acute shortage of foreign exchange developed, just as in Great Britain at present. It became imperative to develop foreign markets and reopen Indonesia for exports. The Dutch could not help. becoming impatient, and their impatience strengthened the position of Indonesian reactionaries. The result was that Sjahrir’s government weakened rapidly. It would therefore be incorrect to describe the Dutch attack as an unmixed imperialist aggression. There were three factors in it of equal importance; (1) the desperate position of Dutch economy after the war, (2) the pressure of Dutch Conservatives who wished to attack the Republic before it could formally become a sovereign state in 1949; and (3) the strengthened resistance to Sjahrir’s Government in Indonesia. Now the whole complicated problem goes before the Security Council of the United Nations,