AND NOW WHAT? A Plan For World Peace

New Zealand Listener, Volume 12, Issue 307, 11 May 1945, Page 9

AND NOW WHAT? A Plan For World Peace

by

SUMNER

WELLES

(Former U.S. Under-Secretary of State)

AFTER the war, what? No one can say yet. Peace, as distinct from the Armistice, is a long way ahead. Many people who remember what happened after the war of 1914-18 hope, in fact, that the Peace Treaties-there will be several-will not be drawn up for some years. We must wait and see. But many other people, some of them world| figures, have of course been at work for a long time on peace and settlement plans. In addition, preliminary decisions have been made at Conferences of the United Nations. These we summarise elsewhere. But one plan that is bound to attract notice and provoke discussion-that of Sumner Welles, the former American Under-Secretary of State-has been made public. In full it makes a book; but an extended summary appeared in the American magazine "Life," illustrated with maps and diagrams, and "The Listener" has secured the right to use this in New Zealand, It cannot be necessary to add that printing it in this Victory Issue of our journal commits nobody in New Zealand to any degree of acceptance or approval. We print it (1) because the author has lived for several years in the very centre of world politics; and (2) because the first thing most people will wish for, now that the time for dealing with Germany has arrived, will be a draft outline of any possible plan that has intelligence and authority behind it. +

BASIC decision affecting the stability of the post-war world and the problem of maintaining peace is the part the German people are to be permitted to play in the world of the future. ‘One conclusion is inescapable. During a period of some 200 years the Germanic peoples, and specifically the Prussian people, have been a destructive force in the family of nations. Throughout that time they have never made any constructive contribution to regional or world peace. What became the motivating force of Prussian ambitions, operating through the brilliant but brutal genius of Bismarck, what actually made possible the creation of the Greater German Second Reich of 1914, was the germ brought to life by a handful of Prussian military scientists. It is their unholy inspiration that brought into being the German General Staff, And that instrument is ~ responsible for the havoc which Germany has been able to wreak upon mankind during the present century. What is the record of the German people since Bismarck first undertook to carry out the policies of Prussian militarism? The war of aggression against Denmark in 1864. The war of aggression against Austria in 1866, The war of aggression, based. on falsehood and misrepresentation against France in 1870, : The attempt to wage a furtheg wat "against a too-rapidly recuperating France in 1875, averted only through joint British and Russian pressure. The continuous effort between that date and 1906 to weaken France by insidious interference in her internal , affairs, such as at the time of. the Dreyfus case, and finally the ultimatum checkmated only by the Conference of Algeciras. The Agadir incident of 1911, which | for long ménths had Europe tremblin on the brink of a general war. The policies of political and military aggrandisement having as their

inevitable consequence the outbreak of the first World War in 1914. To the average person the German General Staff has been nothing more than a board of army generals appointed to determine military strategy, similar in nature to the French, British, or American general staffs, It is there that the basic error has existed. All German foreign policy during the past 75 -years, and to a considerable extent German internal policy as well, has either been initiated by, or has required the approval of, the German General Staff. This body has not been an agency of secondary importance in times of peace, as in the democratic states. Nor. did it evaporate, as so many of us were led to believe, in the years aftet Germany’s surrender in 1918, Though it went under cover, the organisation remained intact, The Partition of Germany ' [N thinking about how to deal with the German menace in the future, it is necessary to take as a starting point the assumption that a practical world organisation will be established at the close of the present war, and that it will have the power to enforce decisions believed by us to be expedient and wise. Germany became a menace to the rest of the civilised world only after two major developments in her history. The first of these was that the German people came to believe in German militarism as the supreme glory of the race. The second development was the centralisation of autherity over ail the widely-divergent peoples of the German race. With each successive stage in the centralisation of authority, the power of the German General Staff was correspondingly increased. Without’ such centralisation it could not have attained its position of supremacy in 1914. If Hitler had not abolished all the remaining barriers between the former German German militarism could never have carried out its policies so successfully in the years between 1933 and 1939, Nor could it have obtained the

complete control which it had acquired when the war finally began. Many people will agree that German militarism must be crushed and are satisfied that the major military powers should take care of this as soon as Germany is occupied. They say, however, that there is no similar justification for destroying her present unification. Many responsible Americans are already maintaining that any partition of the German peoples is inherently unjust and will prove unworkable. My whole individual predisposition is in favour of the, unity of the German people. It is only because of my conviction that German unity means a continuing threat to the peace of the entire world that I have reached the conclusion that partition is the only way of offsetting the German menace in the future, The so-called centripetal urge on the part of the German people is far from being the powerful force that so many have claimed during the past 20 years, The vociferous demand for the reconstitution of the German Reich and the unification of ali the German peoples has been largely stimulated by the German General Staff. It has provided Hitler with some of his most effective propaganda in consolidating his own regime. Certainly the unification of the German peoples is by no means a pre-requisite for the happiness and prosperity of individual Germans, The severat German Nations were both happy and prosperous during the 19th century. Those who favour the continued Unification of Germany are inclined to overlook for how brief a period the German. states have been governed by a central authority and how bitterly many of the German peoples struggled against unification. ‘ Bavaria, for instance, came under Prussian control 70 years ago and has been a part of the present form of German state for barely a decade. As against this short span, the Bavarian people for over 1000 years had maintained their independent national existence. Is it conceivable that those deep roots established during a millennium of independence and autonomy have been destroyed

in less than three-quarters of a century? Is it possible that the Bavarian people have so soon forgotten their struggle against Prussian domination and their hatred of Prussia, even though they have fought with her in several wars? It is equally unbelievable that many of the older generations in the former German states do not also still prefer their former autonomy. If the economic prospects of the German people were to be irreparably damaged by partition, the objections raised on this score would be conclusive. But there is no valid reason why they should be. In my opinion no greater safeguard can be devised against future German military aggression than measures that will afford every German equality of economic opportunity with the citizens of other European countries. He should be assured that he need not look ahead to the same dark and uncertain future that he faced in 1919, Such economic security can be obtained only if basic economic security can be obe tained; only. if basic economic arrange. ments which ensure the eventual prosperity of the German people are taken into full account in any division of the present German Reich, Next to the mili- tary considerations, these appear to me to be the determining factors. There is of course not the slightest doubt that many Germans for one or two generations to come will make every effort to evade the results of partition and to pave the way for a renewed unity. For some years they will have to be forcefully repressed by the future world organisation. But the surest guarantee of permanence will lie in the kind of partition undertaken. It will be effective only if it proves practicable from the economic and political standpoints, and is based upon economic, political, and cultural considerations. : Three German States |F one proceeds upon the theory that Germany is to be divided solely to prevent her from again becoming a military menace, and that at the same time individual Germans must be given every opportunity to achieve economic security, and ultimately to comprehend and to enjoy popular government, the folléwing basis for partition seems to me the one best calculated to procure these results, Exclusive of East Prussia, Germany should be divided at the time of the armistice into the following three separate states, the boundaries being deters mined primarily by cultural, historic, and economic factors: 1.A new state of southern Germany, comprising the former sovereign nations of Bavaria, Wurttemberg,. Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt, to&ether with those regions which may © _ roughly be defined as the Rhineland and the Saar, It will be noted that the populations which would be comprised within this division are predominantly Catholic. 2.A state consisting of the following old German subdivisions, together with the smaller subdivisions cons tiguous to them: Upper Hesse, Thuringia, Westphalia, Hanover, Oldenburg, and Hamburg. 3. A state, omitting the enumeration of small contiguous political subdivisions, composed of Prussia (exclusive of East Prussia), Mecklenburg, and Saxony. It will be noted again that in the second and third states the populations are predominantly

Protestant. In each one of these three new states the historical as well as the religious and cultural divisions which existed during the centuries prior to the creation of the Third Reich have been maintained. By this suggested division a complete economic balance, both, agricultural and industrial, would be established within each of the three states, and the proPportionate relationship within each state of the prime economic factors, such as agricultural and industrial production and mineral resources, would be roughly equivalent to that in each of the two others. If, as I hope may prove to be the case, the end of the war sees the lowering of customs barriers within Europe and the creation of customs unions, the new German states should be afforded free opportunity to take part in such customs unions. The capacity for economic development in each one of the proposed states is almost unlimited, What would vanish would be the giant combines which could be used again as a means of military penetration in other countries, It

cannot be claimed that the existence of these huge cartels was in any sense necessary to a healthy German national economy. A New Polish State HE problem of the disposition of East Prussia affects world security not only with regard to Germany but with regard to eastern Europe as well. There are four main points to consider: FIRST, it is now generally recognised that the Polish Corridor, far from providing a permanent solution of Poland’s need for an outlet to the sea, was, on the contragy, a major source of danger to her. The Corridor was an alien sovereignty separating one portion of Germany from the other. It left Poland at the mercy of Germany whenever Germany felt strong enough to close the gap which the Corridor created. SECOND, the leditionate requirements of the future Polish state include unimpeded access to the sea, without the

complications resulting from such artificial arrangements as those involved in the international control of Danzig, and from the juxtaposition of Danzig and Gdynia. THIRD, we must take;into account the insistence of the Soviet Union that the eastern frontier of Poland, as it existed in 1939, be rectified to include within Russian territory the regions inhabited by non-Polish- populations living to the east of the Curzon Line. FOURTH, inasmuch as these boundary changes would deprive Poland of a considerable portion of her eastern territories, some equivalent restoration must be made if she is to become that "strong and independent Poland" which not only the U.S. and Great . Britain are pledged to see reconstituted, but which likewise has been seocanmen Officially by the Soviet overnment as an objective of ita own policy. The only solution of these four questions is to give Poland the province of East Prussia, at the same time readjusting the frontier between western Prussia

and the old Polish Corridor so as to give the new German state, of which western Prussia will form a part, an area of the old Corridor. This will leave the seaports of Danzig and Gdynia in Polish hands. Transfer of Populations [N any readjustment of so radical a character, the resultant transfers of population must take place over a reasonable period of time under the diréct supervision of the international organisation. Any individual who desires to remove from one sovereignty to. another must be afforded free opportunity to do so, with a guarantee of full and equitable compensation for such property as he is unable to remove or of which he may be deprived. It is roughly estimated that only onethird of the population of East Prussia consists of individuals who are either Polish nationals or of Polish descent. (continued on next page)

* (continued from previous page) The human problem involved in’a transfer of populations on so vast a scale is very great. However, in the only instance in recent times-the exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece, after the first World War-the transfer was not only humanely and successfully carried out but is to-day recognised by both Greece and Turkey as having been beneficial to both. It will of course immediately be alleged that any such adjustment as that proposed would constitute a flagrant violation of the assurance contained within the Atlantic Charter relative to the right of self-determination of all peoples. As I interpret that assurance it would prevent the transfer of peoples against their will from the jurisdiction of one sovereign government to that of another. It should make it impossible for Germans to be forced to become Polish nationals counter to their own free deci-| sion. It should prevent Poles from being compelled to live under Russian sovereignty, or vice versa. That, it seems to me, is the essential freedom implicit in the promise held out in the Atlantic Charter. If the assurance of the Atlantic Charter were to be so construed as to make impossible any orderly transfer of territories in any part of the world, there could be undertaken at the close of the war no remedial measures to provide for the solution of problems which . have afflicted central and eastern Europe for many centuries, and the continuation of which in the post-war years would make impossible the creation of a stable and peaceful Europe.