WHAT SHALL WE DO WITH GERMANY?

New Zealand Listener, Volume 12, Issue 297, 2 March 1945, Page 6

WHAT SHALL WE DO WITH GERMANY?

The Search For A Solution HIS article is condensed from 2 discussion broadcast in the Home Service of the BBC. It took place, of course, before the Crimea Conference, and should be read in the light of the decisions reached there. For if the "Big Three" did not solve the problem of post-war Germany at that confererice, they at least agreed on the method by which they intend to tackle it.

ARBARA WARD: I think that the difficulty facing us, in ‘devising a settlement for Germany, is that we have got three separate problems which to some extent contradict each other. The first is that the Nazis have committed the most awful atrocities in Europe and they have made the nations of Europe suffer in a most atrocious way. We have therefore a first need for justice and reparation. Then we have another problem and it is on our side. The British people are not. war-minded, they go to war with difficulty, and yet, if you are not ready to go to war to enforce a peace, that peace is in fact not enforced. We have got therefore to consider what in 20 or 30 years’ time the British people would be ready to enforce: it may be very little. Lastly, we have surely to devise a settlement which in the long run-it may be a long run-is such that the Germans will finally live under it, otherwise we are faced with police-work for ever. I think there is some way in which these three problems can be brought together. I think that we have got to make a really tough settlement, but to make it for a strictly limited period of time. By tough, I mean that we have got first.of all to insist on complete occupation, naturally. Under this occupation we have got to deal in the most drastic way with German war-criminals; a_ great many of them will have to be shot because they are murderers; secondly, a great many of the Nazified youth movements and the Nazi S.S. could, I think, be usefully, and from the point of justice, perfectly properly, employed on something like penal servitude for restoring the devastation the war has created. Finally, I think for a period of years, six or eight perhaps, German economy should work primarily to restore the evils which the war has created: in a physical sense, for example, sending machines to Russia, building canals in Holland, and so forth. More Drastic Than Versailles Lord Vansittart: I agree with Mr. Eden in thinking it may possibly be misleading to talk of the difference between a soft peace and a hard peace, but what is certainly not misleading is to talk of a drastic peace, and I think it is evident that if people will not keep a soft peace they will not keep the drastic one either or vice versa. That is what happened last time. After all it’is in the nature of things that the settlement this time is going to be much more drastic than the Treaty of Versailles was, and it will just have to be’enforced. I take it for granted that East Prussia is going to be detached from the Reich. I believe that to be an element of Russian policy; I hope it is. I should certainly support it. In addition, I think. there must certainly be a regime of precaution for the Rhineland, and a drastic decentralisation of the German administration. That I think would have to be part’ of the treaty. It may be also that there will be tendencies towards If those tendencies occur I certainly not discountenance or ter fhem as we did last time. You {beginning of decentralisaId certainly welcome. that. Kingsley Martin: We encouraged decentralisation in the Rhineland last time, surely? The French did their best.

Vansittart: We didn’t encourage decentralisation, particularly in the case of Bavaria. Now I take it that our object is to prevent the German nation as a whole from making any further aggressions, and therefore there must be thre main objectives: material disarmament; spiritual or mental disarmament; and the

aecentralisation or the Reich. Not one of these three objectives can be obtained without prolonged occupation. If it is again going to be prematurely ended all prospects of a reformed. Germany will just disappear. "Sentimental — Twaddle" Martin: Most of the adjectives used about the peace as "soft" and "tough" "and all these things are rather sentimental twaddle. What we want is a sensible peace, and I would give as the test of a sensible peace one that will last, "one that we shall continue ‘to believe in, one that will prevent war, one that will keep Germany disarmed and one that will help to put the world on its economic legs again, because I do not think that unless you put the world on its economic legs again the peace will last in

fact. Now, take the most important of the things we have to do-disarmament. Now, in -fact, disarmament was carried out against Germany after the last war, and rearmament was never in fact secret. And the reason why Germany was rearmed was because she was a wonderful market for armaments, because the business people who sell iron and metals and tungsten, and all the other precious metals you need for rearmament, and oil and all the other things, were naturally anxious to supply Germany in the ordinary way of business because she was a natural market for them, just as they supplied Japan with oil right up to the eve of Pearl Harbour. The second reason why Germany was allowed to rearm was because the Allies quarrelled, and they rather wanted to build up Germany against the other. Particularly they were afraid of Bolshevism, and they liked the idea of a strong

Germany in the middle of Europe. When you talk about enforcing the peace, you have got to think therefore not only about controlling German industry, but whether you are going to be able to ration our own industry, whether you are going to stop our business people selling the things to Germans quite as soon

again. One of my complaints about the sort of talk that goes on about the hard peace for Germany is that the people who talk most about it are often the very people who. are most inclined to want to supply Germany with the things she will be asking for in a few years’ time. ° But if-the Allies remain united — particularly Britain and Russia-then there isn’t any way at all ‘in which Germany | (which should be completely helpless at the end of the war) can become dangerous again. The British Conscience Ward: I think the drastic period should be a period of years during which time. the Allies are more ready for enforcement: And when I talked about disarmament I was talking about a long-term feature

of the settlement. The reason why I want all our attention to be centred on disarmament is this: there is, and I’m very~-glad of it, in the British people a very deep-rooted sense of moral justice and of the things that are decent and the things that cannot be done. And I think that if you write into the treaty very drastic and crippling economi¢ and territorial clauses, Britain’s own conscience will come up in 20 years’ time and say, "No, no, we can’t do that." And then as for getting the British to go to war about it, you can just whistle in the wind. But on the question of disarmament I think there is a chance that we’ve learned a severe lesson. You do not learn much from history, but I think you can learn a little. I am optimistic to that degree. And I think that if in 20 years’ time any Germany came to us and said, "In the name of justice, let us have

doodles, let us have tanks," we should just break into laughter. I don’t think that that will contradict, even in the long run, anything that the British are prepared to back. Control of Key Materials Vansittart:. I entirely agree on the necessity of maintaining the Russian alliance. I think that is the cardinal point. Then I think we must not exaggerate in any way the extent to which Germany was rearmed by foreign connivance »or assistance. The re-armament of Germany was in the» main-indeed most exclusively — the handiwork of the Germans themselves. In regard to what Miss Ward has said, I quite agree that there- are points on which you cannot expect people to go to war, but you can expect them to use force if any have left themselves with the means of using force. Now, for instance, I think that Germany will have to be most strictly rationed in all the key war materials, things like tungsten and bauxite and chrome and all that sort of thing. : Martin: But those are the things we supplied her with. My point was that we re-armed Germany by allowing her to. have them. Do we want it to happen again? Vansittart: In future I hope the control will be véry rigid and if in any way Germany is detected smuggling in sufficient of these materials to lay up war stocks, that we shall interfere by force and that will be a function of the occupation, which is bound to be prolonged for that reason, if for no other. Taylor: This question of disarmament leads me on to a more general one. It seems to me that we are always using the words "We must control German industry"; "After the war the victorious powers must control German industry and direct it to this or that." But I must confess that it seems to me far more difficult to control the industry of a country which is a going concern than to cut off great chunks of it. That is not an economist’s judgment; it is. a remark from outside. International Control Martin: When I talked about rebuilding in Europe, I did not suggest that Germany should come first; on the contrary, there is Russia to come first, and many other devastated countries to come first. But what I was saying was that we might actually have an international consortium to take over this gréat centré of heavy industry in the Rhine and the Ruhr, which has in fact been used by, I think, the most dangerous class in human history to make wars. Ward: I don’t think that the German heavy industrialists should be allowed to carry on-they are a warmongering class. Secondly, I don’t altogether like the idea of rationing German supplies, not because I don’t think you ought to tation Germans, but because I’m sure, with Kingsley Martin, that the solution is international control and using those productive resources for the full benefit of Europe. Vansittart: May I ask there whether you would contemplate that you should make it for ever impossible for the Germans to attain a dominant position, in regard to the Ruhr? (continued on next : ne se

Taking Part in the Discussion:

In the Chair: A. J. P. TAYLOR (Fellow of Magdelen College, Oxford)

. (continued from previous page) Ward: They should have a position in regard to their numbers which is a minority in all Europe, certainly — including ourselves. "A Leap in the Dark" Martin: We have got to work with some Germans some time I suppose, and here I imagine that both Taylor and Vansittart and in fact all of us will agree, My trouble is that after the last breakdown of Germany in 1918-1919 we killed. the wrong Germans. I want to make sure this time that we find work-ing-class Germans who have been antiNazi during the war to collaborate with, and we really get rid of these heavy industrialists these Junkers and these Nazis. We must do the job properly this time. Vansittart: I should say it was entirely problematical at present what Germans we shall find to collaborate with and when. I am exceedingly sceptical about it at the present moment. It’s a leap in the dark. But one thing I think is quite sure-that you won’t find any at all unless-and here I come back perhaps to my King Charles’s head-you are prepared not only for a prolonged but in many respects a ruthless occupation; you will not find any at all because what there might have been will have been murdered on a very large scale. Martin: But you must collaborate with some Germans during this period of occupation: there is no alternative. Vansittart: If you can find them. Martin: You cannot administer the whole of Germany yourselves. Ward: Then decide their type now. Agreement on One Point Taylor (chairman): Now we. have almost come to the end of our time. Have we agreed on anything? Well, yes, we have all agreed on this point I total disarmament of Germany for good. We have agreed on some sort of control — manipulation — of German industry; not agreed very much, I think, on the way it should be done or what should be done with the Germany industry that is being controlled. You will see that we have left out a very big question-per-haps left it out deliberately-I mean the speatioe of frontiers. Some of us would bo that considerable portions of pre8 Germany should be detached from and given to other countries. Some would argue against this. I think we can say that, whether this is done or not, even if quite large parts of Germany were detached, the problem of dealing with a Germany in Europe would remain; and therefore perhaps that is an excuse for our leaving this question out. : It will be in fact the most practical question, the most immediate question, and will cause a great deal more conflict and dispute in this country and probably in the United States than will the really urgent vital questions. The thing that we agreed on above all-the thing that we all have most at heart and’ look to not as the long-term solution over centuries, perhaps, but the solution for our lifetime-and our children’s lifetime, is to stand firm with Russia and to build up a security system in Europe for all the independent peoples of Europe so that they can exist even if the Germans, as I think is possible, continue to be a problem. ;