CHINA UNDER THE JAPANESE (2)

New Zealand Listener, Volume 6, Issue 134, 16 January 1942, Page 9

CHINA UNDER THE JAPANESE (2)

Living Conditions In The Interior

Written for "The Listener" by

BARBARA J.

COLLINS

B.A.

(Cantabd.), late Education Dept., Shanghai Municipal Council .and

accredited Lecturer for the China Relief Fund

T was possible to go to Nanking until a few weeks ago, by air, and flying you could see that the devastation was limited to the vicinity of the railway lines. Three miles away things were almost untouched except for the ruins still to be seen of factories, schools and military barracks. Train communication between Shanghai and Nanking was possible but the line was unsafe because of guerilla activities. Travel, however, was not encouraged by the Japanese for foreigners. A military pass was first required stating the day of travel and the train on which one was going, the purpose of\ one’s journey, and the time of return. The first difficulty was to get to the station, which is in Japanese occupied territory in Shanghai, and no taxi would go from the International Settlement as too many Chinese taxi drivers had disappeared. The trains operating were Japanese railway stock, and on arrival at Nanking a rigorous search of your luggage and person was conducted by Japanese soldiers,

A City of Refugees Nanking is still a city of refugees. Before the war it housed a million people; to-day the population is about 500,000. The concrete government buildings remain intact and are used by the Puppet government, but the shopping centre which was completely burnt out has not been rebuilt, and as most of the living houses were razed, the majority of the population are now in mud huts. The city walls are guarded by Japanese sentries who search everyone going in or out. The town is under Wang Ching Wei policing, but. there are frequent spells of Japanese martial law if Japanese dignitaries are passing through. At night the police stations are locked up and the police vanish-wisely, since they are armed with guns without cartridges. So at night burglary and guerilla activities thrive. The Japanese do not dare to go outside the city walls at night, The Chinese coolies work for the Japanese army; restaurants for Japanese do a flourishing business, as do photographers and dentists, but the brightest paint is on the front of the opium

shops (which are for Chinese, not for Japanese patronage). Arrows point in from the kerb to "Kuan Tu" or Official Earth, as opium is called, and it has been stated that one-third of the population are using it, There is no trade for the Chinese business man; there are no foreign goods except Japanese; there is no transport except through the Japanese Transport Company. The Japanese practice of coming in on a "dry share" basis is ruinous to the initiative of the Chinese. The Japanese partner puts in no money, but gets official permits and conducts necessary arguments with the police and army people. He takes 50 per cent. of the gross profits. Chinese :money is still in use except for light and water bills and railway transport.

Rice Monopolies When the rice situation became acute in Nanking, the International Relief Committee tried to buy rice in the open market outside the city but the Japanese refused permission, the argument being that the Japanese army is responsible for even distribution of rice throughout the occupied areas. The rice monopolies force the Chinese rice dealers to approach the Japanese authorities or their puppets for purchasing permits for which they have to pay heavily. In addition to this they are forced to pay a 5 per cent. transit duty, to buy a _ transportation permit, and a 50 per cent. business tax on each bag of rice. China before the war produced 57,000,000 tons of rice a year, sufficient

for her population. In Shanghai the Relief Committee estimated that we needed 1,500 tons or 15,000 bags a day. Rice coming into the town was completely checked from the hinterland by the .Japanese; for it is estimated they were shipping 700,000 bags of rice to Japan each month from the Yangtze ports. Shortage was also caused through the destruction of buffaloes and cattle by the war, through the destruction of irrigation pumps, so that the producer areas became consumer areas, and through many of the collecting and milling centre villages being destroyed. In Shanghai 41,075 people died of starvation in 1939 and were buried’ by the Public Benevolent Society. The cost of living had gone up nearly 350 per cent. By December last year rice riots were prevalent. Food crops in the Yangtze delta were reduced almost to individual needs. The Shanghai Municipal Council had to import rice through Hong Kong from Indo-China and Rangoon and pay a heavy shipping freight. With the aid of charitable societies it was possible to sell broken rice to the very poor, and 100 distributing centres were set up in the town where one dollar of charity rice could be bought per person per day. The Salvation Army was feeding daily 4,000 destitutes in the town. Charity food queues were seen everywhere. When I left Shanghai this year tice was selling at about 140 dollars a picul-roughly the amount required per month per small Chinese household. The average Chinese wage was about 50-60 dollars a month!

In Peiping there is a shortage of meat, flour, rice and coal. The shortage is artifically produced. The railways are under the Japanese, and as there is a shortage of freight cars, and freight has been handed over to a Japan monopoiy company, space is given to the highest bidder. Cargoes often have to wait weeks for delivery. There is no free import of flour from Manchukuo. In North China and Manchuria only 20,000,000 bags of flour were produced in 1940, while the estimated need in Manchuria alone is 35,000,000 bags. Most of the mills seized cannot operate to full capacity owing to the shortage of wheat, which also brings repercussions on the soaring prices of the rice market. In January, 1940, when cargoes finally did arrive in Peiping from Tientsin, they were commandeered by the Sino-Japanese Chamber of Commerce, Many rice and flour firms refused to continue business, But the Japanese in Peiping remain unaffected by the shortage. They have ration cards and draw their supplies from their own organisations at official rates. Public services have also deteriorated. Several thousand applications are waiting for telephones, each province in North China has now its own issue of stamps, but there are frequent failures in sanitation. On the other hand there has been a great increase in official activities. For instance, there is the meat monopoly. Peasants in the districts surrounding Peiping who want to bring their pigs to market are not allowed to slaughter them themselves but must buy a licence and then take the beast to a_ licenced slaughterhouse to be killed. Even if a peasant kills only for his own use he is heavily fined.

Japan had bold economic ambitions before her invasion. She planned to triple or quadruple the production of coal, charcoal, iron ore, and other commodities. To-day there is an acute shortage of coal in China. The Japanese have seized the coal mines of Shansi, Hopei, Shantung, and North Honan, which have large scale mines, but they are constantly harassed by guerillas and cannot work the mines. At Tatung, for instance, inundation and sabotage brought the mining to a_ standstill, while on the Chahar border transportation difficulties caused by the guerillas made the mines ineffective. There has been little export of iron for industrial use to Japan. In Shantung the guerillas are so active that the iron mining has ceased. All the Japanese can do is to seize whatever iron they can find domestically among the Chinese-such as beds, doornails, and farming instruments. In Shanghai we saw in Japanese zones large collections of such scrap iron being made. A Cement Boom Two industries however flourish. Salt is being exported freely to Japan from Changlu, Tsingtao, Haichow, and southern Shansi. Also the Japanese are working satisfactorally nine large cement factories producing 1,140,000 tons a year. This is in great demand in Korea and Manchukuo for war purposes. In Korea in 1931 300,000 tons of cement was needed, but in 1939 1,200,000 tons was needed, but they are still unable to ,produce sufficient for their needs owing to the growing shortage of labour and man--power in Japan.