HOW IMPORTANT IS SINGAPORE?

New Zealand Listener, Volume 5, Issue 125, 14 November 1941, Page 8

HOW IMPORTANT

IS SINGAPORE?

antes Written for " The Listener" by

ROBERT H.

NEIL

(late Captain, Royal Scots Fusiliers) —

HE ultimate object of all war is the destruction of the enemy’s forces. In land warfare one arrives at that end partly by the capture of various geographical positions. In the case of warfare at sea or in the air, however, neither fleet nor air squadron, unassisted by land forces, is capable of capturing a position; an air force cannot even take prisoners. But although neither naval nor air warfare can be described as a war of posts, yet it is true to say that the breaking of an enemy’s sea or aif power cannot be achieved without posts. History shows how greatly naval strength depends on the possession of bases upon which fleets can retire to refit, and replenish with stores, fuel, ammunition, and so on. Broadly speaking these posts can be divided into two categories: (a) Overseas bases; (b) fuelling stations. An overseas base must always be capable of defence; a fuelling station may or may not be according to circumstances. Sometimes an overseas base is also a fuelling station. Land And Sea Communications In the case of a land force, the success of its strategical plans depends on its communications. These lines of communication follow definite routes, such as roads, navigable rivers, railways, which are more or less vulnerable along their whole length and therefore require definite protection. Sea communications, however, are only fixed where they converge on defiles such as the Straits of Dover, the Straits of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, or the Straits of Malacca. Although in peace there are undoubtedly conventional sea routes, there is no obligation on the part of any vessel to use them, particularly in time of war. One may, therefore, say that, while the communications of an army can be cut by an enemy anywhere along their length, those of a fleet can only be cut at the defiles. A further difference between land and sea forces is that whereas, as an army advances, so its railhead supply depots

follow closely in rear, a fleet is bound sooner or later to return to its base, even though a proportion of its needs is brought to it by supply vessels. For this reason war vessels are described as having a certain radius of action, depending on their size and fuelcarrying capacity. It is of course obvious that the maintenance of naval supremacy by any power demands the acquisition of bases in the vicinity of these nodal points for the defence of its own commerce, which implies the power of being able to take the offensive by attack or blockade, against the mercantile as well as the armed fleets of an enemy. Requisites of Overseas Bases For the proper maintenance of an overseas base, however, there are three requisites: (1) Its communications with the home "base must be kept free by the

fleet so that it can be supplied with all the various stores, ammunition, guns, spare parts, fuel; etc., necessary for the vessels and aircraft based on it. (2) It must be secured by fixed defence; otherwise it is open to capture by a.force in the absence of the fleet or air squadrons. (3) It must be capable of docking the largest battleships of the fleet. It is axiomatic that no maritime fortress can be reduced by sea or air power alone. It. is invariably necessary to land a force at some other point on the coast in order to turn it from the landward side. It is often said that such and such a place commands such and such a defile. But no place commands anything beyond the range of vision, and then only so long as its guns can be kept supplied with ammunition. One may say, however, that so long as Great Britain and the Dominions hold undisputed command of the routes leading to their overseas bases, so long will those places command the straits over which they stand guard. Potentialities of Singapore Let us now apply these principles to Singapore. This base stands at the southern end of the Straits of Malacca. For 200 miles to the westward the average width of the Straits is under 25 miles, whilst to the eastward are numerous small islands which facilitate air, submarine and minefield defence. The result of this is that so long as it is kept supplied, Singapore commands

and is in a position to block effectually the principle line of communication between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. Its proximity to Burma, India, and the Iranian Gulf and the safety of its communications therewith due to British military possession of the Suez Canal, render it always certain of essential supplies, i.e., coal, oil, and such military stores as are obtainable from India. The country to the north, the narrow Malay Peninsula, is under British protection, is easily under the control of British naval guns, and therefore does not offer very good prospects to an enemy who might think of making a landing with the object of attacking Singapore from the north. In any case, there being no important land routes leading to it, any landing force would have to be supplied by sea, a contingency which would necessitate previously obtaining command of the sea, Meets All Conditions One therefore sees that Singapore fulfils all the conditions necessary for an overseas base, as not only is it able to defend itself from sea-borne attack, but its geographical position and the narrow approaches to it will make any such attack particularly hazardous. At the same time, the nature of the country to the north and the fact that it stands on an island renders it safe from land attack, while for. the same reasons ’ attack by air would either have to be (Continued on next page)

SINGAPORE (Continued from previous page)

seaborne, or based within striking distance. And since the Dutch are our allies, the island of Sumatra or any other of the Dutch East Indies offers no menace to Singapore so long as we hold command of the sea. Another advantage of Singapore is its geographical position vis-a-vis India. A glance at the map will show that there are only four sea routes irto the Indian Ocean, i.e.: (1) From the Atlantic via the Cape of Good Hope. (2) From the Atlantic via the Suez Canal, (3) From the Pacific south about via Australia. |

(4) From the Pacific via the Straits ef Malacca, The Suez Canal being guarded by British bayonets, any enemy proposing to attack India by that defile would first have to drive the British Navy from the seas and our troops out of Egypt. The Straits of~Malacca as

pointed "out "above, are ~ guarded "by Singapore, and so long as Great Britain holds command of the sea this gateway of India is also secure. Singapore is therefore a geographical centre of the Empire; and is a vital necessity to the security of our maritime sea’ routes and the defence of Australia and New Zealand.