The Freethought Review. WANGANUI, N.Z., MARCH 1, 1884. THEOLOGY AND POSITIVE SCIENCE.

Freethought Review, Volume I, Issue 6, 1 March 1884, Page 8

The Freethought Review. WANGANUI, N.Z., MARCH 1, 1884. THEOLOGY AND POSITIVE SCIENCE.

Comte’s great generalisation— each branch of our knowledge passes successively through three different theoretical conditions, the Theological or fictitious, the Metaphysical or abstract, and the Scientific or positive—throws a flood of light upon the whole course of the history of opinion. This “law of the three stages,” as it is usually called, is deduced from the fadl that mankind has actually thought in the manner thus indicated, and from considering the mode in which the human mind is compelled to ac f t by its constitution and its relation to the universe. It is confirmed by observing what takes place in the case of each individual. Every man is “a theologian in his il childhood, a metaphysician in his youth, and a “natural philosopher in his manhood.” No doubt this statement must be taken broadly. Both in the race and in the man each of the “ three stages ” may co-exist in relation to some ideas, and it is rare to find anyone who regards all phenomena from the scientific standpoint. Only a slow and very gradual process of evolution can bring this about, but the tendency is obvious enough. In our time it is admitted that all real knowledge must be based on fact, but it is equally true that isolated fadts are almost useless. We can hardly perceive and remember them, much less follow any train of reasoning about them, without the guidance of some theory. In the ordinary practical affairs of life we may not perceive the operation of this mental law, but it is there, nevertheless, embodied in habit, in the gramatical forms and organic structure of language, and in the simplest process of inference. “This “ necessity of observing fadts in order to form a theory, “ and having a theory in order to observe fadts,” is, as Comte points out, “ the fundamental reason for the “ theological character of the primitive philosophy.” It is only gradually that the real relations of phenomena to each other can be worked out, but their real or supposed relation to man’s wants or wishes seemed self-evident. However little primitive man knew of that vast world of sky and mountain, flood and forest, in which he found himself, he at least knew, or thought he knew, that he was the most important being in it. It is our emotions, not our reason, which impel to adtion, and as belief always has in its ultimate analysis a reference to action, it is easy to see why man, in the infancy of our race, was so ready to transfer his own attributes to surrounding objects. What is poetry to us was reality to him. Beginning with “ Fetichism,” he conceived all he saw to be animated like himself, but in different degrees. The conception of supernatural intelligences separate from the things they were supposed to control, was a later development. The two ideas may still be traced even in classical literature. Thus Ovid, describing the mode in which Chaos, a “ rude and undigested mass,” was arranged by “ God “ and bounteous Nature,” refers to the sun as a Titan and to the sea as Amphitrite. Hume, in his “ Natural History of Religion,” is substantially in complete accord with one of the latest writers on this subject, Dr. E. B. Tylor, the well-known Athropologist, In short, it is only those who have not studied the question who can find any difficulty in tracing the origin of belief in the supernatural to its source,[''not in the knowledge, but in the ignorance of mankind. This being the case, it is clear that all such beliefs ought to have but very little weight as evidence of their truth. An increasing perception of the unity of

nature has produced Monotheism from Polytheism, but noble as the completed structure may appear, and great as has been its social, and even scientific utility, we cannot shut our eyes to the inherent weakness of the materials of which it is composed. Like Russian ice-palaces, it has lasted during the long night of superstition, but must gradually melt away in the bright sunshine of modern science. At best, we have but an hypothesis to deal with. A personal God may exist so long as personality does not imply anything contrary to experience, but the mere power to imagine such a being is no proof whatever of his existence. Indeed, a proposition incapable of proof may be logically regarded as false, so that, like any other assumption, its truth can only be decided by an appeal to evidence and reason. As for the metaphysical a priori arguments for the existence of God, they invariably break down at the point where it is essential to their validity that relative knowledge should become • absolute. Kant no less than Hume perceived this distinctly, and evaded the difficulty by an appeal to the " Practical Reason," which really meant very much what theologians mean when they tell us that without a God conscience and morality are delusions. To this* the doctrine of evolution furnishes a sufficient reply. Morality and conscience are growths of the social organism, and Humanity furnishes that ideal which theology seeks for in a divine person. There remains, then, the well-known argument from design, which, though scientific in character, is weak in logical force. It rests upon that imperfect induction known as analogy, and in any case reaches but a very little way towards rendering the existence of the kind of Deity which theology postulates, in the slightest degree probable. The theory of final causes really implies an anthropomorphic God, and such a being cannot be inferred from the order of the universe. Instead of design modern science sees only correspondence between an organism and its medium. Contrivance presupposes fixed laws ; given the air and mechanical powers, a man may construct a flying machine, but given a flying bird, all we can say is that wings and the air are necessary conditions of its existence. Apart from the relation of air and. wings, there would be no bird at all. Similar reasoning applies to every portion of the universe known to us, including our own consciousness. In short, the principle of relativity applies, and excludes all knowledge of the absolute. In accordance with the law of the " three stages," the gradual recognition of this fact is inevitable. But when we have eliminated the changeful element of the human imagination from nature, we are by no means left, as the theologians tell us, "without chart or compass" for our guidance through life. On the contrary, "that power, not ourselves," the knowledge of which is our highest wisdom, must become more directly regulative than ever. When it is no longer thought possible that the arbitrary personality supposed to rule the world can be propitiated by some quasi magical process, such, e.g., as the " Atonement," men will give more heed to the principles which should guide individual and social life before either can attain its highest good. Science, moralised by devotion to the interests of Humanity, though it may compel us to abandon many cherished illusions, will relieve us from many needless fears, and will furnish a far firmer basis for morality than can be obtained by appealing to " survivals " of a philosophy which has fulfilled its mission. R.P.