ALLIED BLUNDERS IN THE WAR.

Digger (Invercargill RSA), Issue 40, 17 December 1920, Page 14

ALLIED BLUNDERS IN THE WAR.

Very frank criticism of Allied war policy and methods of command is contaiixed in an artiele, "At the Supreme War Council," in the September "Blackwood's," by Captain Peter Wright, late Aseistant Seeretary, Supreme War Council. Captain Wright maintains that "for a period that can almost b,e called of years the British and French were. at least seven to four to the Germans on the Western front and almost double in material." At the end of 1917:— Bntain and France alone were, and liad been for two years, numerically stronger tnan Germany. . . . How muc}x morftj and how crushing, had their numericai superiority been when more than 120 Russian and Rumanian divisions were lighting on their side. Yet they had failed to win the war. This failure Captain Wright attributes to the lack of unity, both of command and plan, of the Ailies. Upon Sir William Robertson he is specially severe. "His plan, and he had no other, was to raise more and more men. If the two sides were allowed to go on killin, g eacli other in France indefinitely, when all the Germans were dead there would still be a few Ailies left and they would win the war." But at the end of 1917 German divisions were pouring from the east to the western frout. Germany might be counted on to fling them against the weakest point in the Allied line, and that pressure might be sufficient to inflict disaster upon the Ailies before sufficient help could be brought up from other parts of the front. Hence, says Captain Wright, the scheme of a General Reserve, to he formed from the Armies of the west and to be piaced under the control of the Executive War Board — Foch, Wilson, Bliss, Cadorna. This plan was elaborated after Carporetto by Eoch and Wilson. It gave eaeh Command ei'-in-Chief the advantages of a Generalissimo. The General Reserve was ,a bankirg account on wbich each could draw if he were attacked ; his drafts would be fixed by the War Board according to their judgment. On the other hand, h,e had none of the disadvantages of a Generalissimo. No Commander-in-Chief could suspect his forces were being exploited for the benent of an Aiiy's forces, for each nation had its rerresentative on the Vvar Board. Focb, says Captain Wright, foresaw that the German blow must fall either towards Cambrai or towards Reims. His plan was to concentrate the larger part of his General Reserve round Paris, ready to be flung in on the flank of the German attack, whether it were towards Amiens or towards Reims; for "the more successful the Germau's attack is, the longer and therefore the more open aria unguarded his flank will be." But the General Reserve was nevei foi'msd. Why? Because, says Captain Wright, Haig and Petain met at the end of February and formed a plan which was wholly inconsistent with and destructive oi tlie plan of the General Reserve. This plan of the British and French Ccmmand. .ers-in-Ghief was unknown to Foch. That is Captain Wright's belief. The immediate consequence was that the General Reserve vanished, for the Italians at once withdr.ew their nssent. Captain Wright does not blame Sir Douglas Haig — his refusal "was natural, for he could not undertake the double liability of taking over more French line (as far south as Barisis) and feeding the General Reserve as weli." But the defeat of Gough's Army in March at once became inevitable if the Germans should attack him. From the first week of March, when the plan of the General Reserve was abandoned, Gough's Army was doomed. During the fortnight that preceded the battle no „ne on the immediate Staff of Foch liad itny doubt that. a catastrophe was inevitable. It, came. Reinforcements, which would have been speedily available if the major part of the General Reserve had been con. centrated as Foch had planned, could not be brought up in time. And then, in the midst of disaster, after the British had sustained what Captain Wright describes as "the greatest defeat we have ever suffered in our history, measured hy any standard," Foch was at last given his cliance. • He was only appointed towards the middle of the day on Tuesday. But at a quar, ter to five, a few hours after his appointment, he managed to get through to Lebeney on the telephone. He now had authority to command. He at once order ed him to take all his troops out of the line farther south on a front of six miles, risk leaving a gap there, and send them up in front of Amiens. Against these, on tlie Wednesday, tlie last effort of the spent German wave broke itself. So Foch, as soon as he was given a chanee, found in himself at once . . • tlie means of retrieving the faults and eiioi-,> of other leaders, and so saved them, h't only just, on the edge of ruiai.