NIBBLES FROM JUTLND.

Digger (Invercargill RSA), Issue 25, 3 September 1920, Page 4

NIBBLES FROM JUTLND.

In this war the navy suffered from no unseen hand, but from an unsecing brain. In the times to come, Jutland wiil be looked upon by our people as a day of tremendous opportunity and monumental failure. "Nelson was no seaman," said Codrington. "His ship was always in bad order," said St. Vincent. The answer is that he was the greatest leader the sea has ever produced. During the whole war, Germany lost in big ships only one battleship and one bat-tle-crui,ser, both at Jutland. We lost thirteen battleships and three hattle-crul-sers. The thirteen battleships were none of them lost in the fights of fleets versus fleets, but in the attrition of war, which shows the overwhelming importance of gaining decisive results when the one opportunity ca-me. As Admiral Mathew's failure at Toulon brought out Hawke, so Lord Jellicoe's failure at Jutland brought out Beatty.

The enemy escaped. What matter. Routine! discipline! the rigid line! in half an hour Lord Jellicoe signalled the King George V. to follow the battle-cruisers, but they were out of sight, for they had followed the enemy. We had lost the enemy, but the inexorable "imponderabila" or rules were satisfied as they had been satisfied by pa-st indecisive actions which add to the lessons but not to the laurels of the British Navy. We remained in command of the sea. Therefore we had won a victory! In less than twelve months the communications were tottering to the onslaught of the submarine showing that the preservation of one's ships is not a substitute for the destruction of the enemy. Lord Jellicoe only mentions Nelson's name once in his hook. The Battle of Jutland has been one of the wars great mysteries. Mr Balfour issued an explanation. WTe all issned ex. planations ; but, as Mr Balfour somewhere remarked in his "Foundations of Belief," it is not explanations which survive, but the thing itself. Certainly the thing has outlived the explanations, and the consequences are with the world today.

The proud record of the British navy is a wonderful one of magnificent fighting, and this war is no exception ; it is that of a had starter, though a good stayer and a sure winner. If vitally false principles of war are held by the navy, nothing can prevent its defeat hy a materially inferior foe animated by a true doctrine of war. There is nothing so detrimental as criticism of a command, if it does not achieve its object at once. It undermines tne prestige and authority of the leader both with the country and his comrades, and it heartens the enemy. Success is apt to blind men to the need of adaptation to changed cgnditions, and to cause the command at the Admiral ty, and in the fleets, to rely on experience rather than on well-directed studies. I he latter are generally more important, for, as Frederick the Great pointed out, he had a couple of mules which had been through twenty campaigns and were mules still. Trust the man on the spot. If you do not trust him, change him. In England, the navy has hitherto treated the past, except for the voluntary efforts of young officers who work under an almost offensive official discouragement, as though it were negligible wreckage at the bottom of the sea. One has only to read Foch's "Principles of War" to see that all his war staff training aimed at promoting independence of judgment by discussion, for it is only hy constant examin.ation and straight challenging that truth is set upon her tlirone. The real training of a navy for war takes place during peace. In the practice of a profession such as the navy, a man needs to be a student all his layB if he is to get out of the ordeooed grooves of that profession.— "The Battle of Jutland," by Commander Carlyon Bellaixs, M.P. •