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for adequate inspection, might realize to a degree consistent with security the majority's provisions regarding ownership and management; and {d) a new approach to the fundamental problem of control arising from a scientific contention that the amount of fissionable materials which could be used for peaceful purposes is so small that it might be relatively easier than had been envisaged to control its use for military purposes. Some members of the Committee, probably as a result of the disclosure that the Soviet Union might now possess the atomic weapon, were also inclined to seek compromises. The British representative, however, pointed out that if the Soviet Union now had the secret of the atom bomb, the substance of the matter was unchanged and the need for effective control of atomic energy and the real prohibition of atomic weapons was made all the more important. It was not correct to claim, as had been claimed by the Soviet Union, that the majority plan had been based on the perpetuation of a United States monopoly of the atomic bomb, and that the United States, following upon the recent atomic explosion in the Soviet Union, should put forward new proposals. The majority plan had, in fact, been based on the supposition that the United States would not retain indefinitely the monopoly of the atomic bomb. It was the only plan which in the present circumstances would achieve the object set out as its goal, and while it was deplorable that, because no agreement could be reached, the whole world had to live under the dread of atomic weapons, it would be even more deplorable for all nations to accept an ineffective plan which might lull the peoples of the world into thinking that they had achieved security while, in fact, they lived under greatly increased danger. The New Zealand delegation agreed with this attitude, and at an early stage in the general debate Sir Carl Berendsen pointed out that it was the United States, the nation which had first produced the atomic bomb, which had generously offered to place its knowledge at the disposal of all mankind, subject to the modest yet essential condition that the minimum necessary precautions be taken to prevent abuse. This promise rightly postulated an international controlling body, unfettered by the veto which had made such a mockery of the security functions of the United Nations, with a full and unrestricted right of inspection to secure compliance. All the world, with the exception of the Soviet Union, was ready to accept international control and supervision, and to allow inspection by authorized international observers. The obvious conclusion was that those who were willing to accept inspection had nothing to hide, while those who declined such inspection were inevitably and properly suspect. The situation remained unaltered whether or not the Soviet Union possessed the secret of the atomic bomb, and there could be no solution to the problem unless all the nations of