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(b) Supervisory Authority A supervisory authority should be set up consisting of those Powers actively interested in the continued observance of the peace treaty by Japan and prepared to undertake the necessary obligations to ensure that this result is achieved. These obligations would be the provision of representation on the supervisory authority, and of a due share of the staff and inspectorate, an undertaking to join in enforcement action should such be required, and the provision of a share of such patrol forces as may be agreed upon. These Powers might well be the members of the Far Eastern Commission. Whether the control obligations entered into by the smaller number of Powers become embodied in the peace treaty or in a separate control agreement, it will be important to ensure that the non-control signatory powers (there are about forty-eight nations nominally at war with Japan) fully assent to the control provisions. Japan should also admit in advance the validity of supervisory or enforcement action. No member of the supervisory authority should have a right to veto any decision, as this would prevent the authority from making the clear and speedy pronouncements necessary for the smooth working of the system. Decisions should therefore be by some form of majority vote. The supervisory authority, upon determining that a breach of the treaty obligations has occurred, would normally instruct the Japanese Government to remedy the breach. Failure by the Japanese Government to do so would be followed by the application by the supervisory authority of enforcement measures, of a type and intensity appropriate to the magnitude of the breach. (/) Inspection The control system will need to include methods of obtaining information upon the degree to which the Japanese Government is carrying out the treaty. It will be necessary to ascertain whether or not Japan is in fact remaining disarmed and demobilized. No significant measure of re-armament could be achieved in Japan without a noticeable increase in the import of key raw materials such as iron, bauxite, and oil, and upon this point the supervisory authority could be comparatively well informed without much detailed inspection, but it would seem wise to arrange for the supervisory authority to have at its disposal more specific information as to the functioning of the Japanese economic system and as to the progress or otherwise of the practical application of democratic principles within the Japanese State. Such information could be gathered by an inspectorate staffed by and worked under the supervisory