8.—9.

44

the surviving grandchildren, and that the time for distributing the estate was when, after twenty years from testator's death, the youngest grandchild for the time being attained the age of twenty-one years, and that all grandchildren living at the period of distribution were entitled to share in the capital whether they were born before or after testator's death. (5.) The Public Trustee v. A. (1925 N.Z. L.R. 744, 1925 G.L.R. 468). ~ This case dealt with the effect of the Legitimation Amendment Act, 1921-22. The following are the facts : " A person died intestate having previously been married to one J. S. D. Of this marriage a child was born. Prior to the marriage, however, another child of J. S. D. had been born, of which the deceased intestate was the father. The last-named child was not legitimated during the intestate's lifetime, but after his death the mother registered legitimation under the provisions of the Legitimation Amendment Act, 1921-22. The point to be decided was that whether the child who was born out of wedlock and therefore illegitimate at the time of the intestate's death was entitled to share in the estate of its deceased father by reason of its subsequent legitimation. The Court decided in favour of the legitimated child, holding that on legitimation the rights of the child legitimated were to be adjusted as if such child had been actually born legitimate. (6.) Webb v. Hodge (1925 N.Z. L.R. 22). —A testator devised his property to two sons by name, and declared that if they should not marry and should have no children the property should, after their decease, be given to two nephews of testator. There was a further provision that the property was not to be sold, and was to be kept in testator's family. The testator's two sons survived him, both being unmarried and childless. The Court, being asked to consider the will, decided that the testator's two sons took a life interest as joint tenants, but that if both sons married and had children they should become entitled to the fee-simple ; that in the event of one of the sons marrying and having issue the joint tenancy would be determined, and such son would thereupon take his moiety of the property absolutely, his brother merely retaining his life estate unless and until he married and had issue. (7.) In re Guy (.1925 G.L.R. 47). —This case was brought to obtain the ruling of the Supreme Court as to the meaning and effect of a will. The testator left the income from one-half of his estate to his wife for life, with power to resort to the capital of such one-half so as to bring the wife's income up to £200 per annum.. After the wife's death such half-part was given to testator's children or their issue. The balance of the estate was bequeathed to testator's children, but it was provided that if any child or children of testator predeceased him or his widow leaving a child or children surviving testator or his widow such grandchildren of testator were to take the share their deceased parent would have taken. The Court held that, as regards the first half of the estate in which testator's widow was given an interest, all testator's children took vested interests immediately at testator's death, such interests, however, being divested in the case of any child by such child's death in the lifetime of testator's wife. As regards the residue of the estate, testator's children were held to take immediate vested interests. The word " issue " may be limited to " children," but as used in this context the Court decided that it meant descendants of every degree. (8.) Crawshaw v. The Public Trustee (1925 G.L.R. 145). —A testator who had married twice had but one child of the first marriage. For a considerable time prior to his death he was boarded and kept by his daughter and her husband. A few days before his death he married the second time, and immediately after the marriage made a will in favour of the second wife. Although no definite arrangements had been made between testator and his son-in-law regarding payment for the testator's keep by the latter the daughter and son-in-law of testator claimed payment for their services. The Court found that the son-in-law and his wife had not rendered the services to the testator in the vague undefined hope of obtaining a benefit under the testator's will, but that, on the other hand, there was an understanding between the parties that testator was to pay for such services. Judgment was accordingly given for amount which the Court fixed as representing the value of such services.