A.—2

84

preparatifs militaires auxquels se livre le Gouvernement Imperial, notamment dans le voisinage immediate de la frontiere franchise, prennent chaque jour une intensite et une acceleration nouvelles. La France, resolve a faire jusqu'au bout tout cc gui dependra d'elle pour maintenir la paix, s'est bornee jusqu'ici aux mesures de precaution les plus indispensables. Mais il ne semble pas que sa prudence et sa moderation ralentissent les dispositions de l'Allemagne; loin de.la. Nous sommes done, peut-etre, malgre la sagesse dv Gouvernement de la Republique et le calme de l'opinion, a la yeille dcs evenements les plus redoutables. De toutes les informations gui nous arrivent, il resulte que si l'Allemagne avait la certitude que le'Gouvernement anglais n'interviendrait pas dans un conflit ou la France serait engagee, la guerre serait inevitable, et qu'en revanche, si l'Allemagne avait la certitude que l'entente cordiale s'affirmerait, le cas echeant, j usque sur les champs de bataille, il y aurait les plus grandes chances pour que la paix ne I'iit pas troublee. Sans doute nos accords militaires et navals laissent entiere la liberie dv Gouvernement do votre Majeste, et, dans les lettres echangees en 1912 entre Sir Edward Grey et M. Paul Cambon, l'Angleterre et la France se sont simplement engagees, l'une vis-a-vis l'autre, a causer entre elles en cas de tension europeenne et a examiner ensemble s'il y avait lieu a line action commune. Mais le caractere d'intimite que le sentiment public a donne, dans les deux pays, a l'entente de l'Angleterre et de la France, la eonfiance avec laquelle nos deux Governemcnts n'ont cesse de travailler au maintien de la paix, les sympathies que votre Majeste a toujours temoignees a la France, m'autorisent a lvi faire connaitre, en toute franchise, mes impressions, gui sont cedes dv Gouvernement de la Republique et de la France entiere. C'est, je crois, dv langage et de la conduite dv Gouvernement anglais que dependent desormais les dernieres possibility dune solution pacifique. Nous avons nous-memes, dcs le debut de la crisc, recommande a nos Allies une moderation, dont ils ne se sont pas departis. D'accord avec le Gouvernement Royal et conformement aux dernieres suggestions de Sir E. Grey, nous continuerons a agir dans le meme sens. Mais si tons les efforts de conciliation partent dv meme cote, et si l'Allemagne et l'Autriche peuvent speculer sur Pabstention de l'Angleterre, les exigences de l'Autriche demeureront inflexibles et un accord doviendra impossible entre la Russia et elle. J'ai la conviction profonde qua l'heure actuelle, plus l'Angleterre, la France et la Russie donneront une forte impression d'unite dans leur action diplomatique, plus il sera encore permis de compter sur la conservation de la paix. Votre Majeste voudra bien excuser une demarche gui nest inspiree que par le desir de voir I'equilibre europeen d&initivement raffermi. Je prie votre Majeste de croire a mes sentiments les plus cordiaux. R. Poind are. [Translation.] Dear and great Friend, — Paris, 31st July, 1914. In the grave events through which Europe is passing, I feel bound to convey to Your Majesty the information which the Government of the Republic have received from Germany. The military preparations which are being undertaken by the Imperial Government, especially in the immediate neighbourhood of the French frontier, are being pushed forward every day with fresh vigour and speed. France, resolved to continue to the very end to do all that lies within her power to maintain peace, has, up to the present, confined herself solely to the most indispensable precautionary measures. But it does not appear that her prudence and moderation serve to check Germany's action; indeed, quite the reverse. We are, perhaps, then, in spite of the moderation of the Government of the Republic and the calm of public opinion, on the eve of the most terrible events. From all the information which reaches us it would seem that war would be inevitable if Germany were convinced that the British Government would not intervene in a conflict in which France might be engaged ; if. on the other hand, Germany were convinced that the entente cordiale would be affirmed, in case of need, even to the extent of taking the field- side by side, there would be the greatest chance that peace would remain unbroken. It is true that our military and naval arrangements leave complete liberty to Your Majesty's Government, and that, in the letters exchanged in 1912 between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon, Great Britain and France entered into nothing more than a mutual agreement to consult one another in the event of European tension, and to examine in concert whether common action were advisable. But the character of close friendship which public feeling has given in both countries to the entente between Great Britain and France, the confidence with which our two Governments have never ceased to work for the maintenance of peace, and the signs of sympathy which Your Majesty has ever shown to France, justify me in informing you quite frankly of my impressions, which are those of the Government of the Republic and of all France. It is, I consider, on the language and the action of the British Government that henceforward the last chances of a peaceful settlement depend. We, ourselves, from the initial stages of the crisis, have enjoined upon our Ally an attitude of moderation from which they have not swerved. In concert with Your Majesty's Government, and in conformity with Sir E Grey's latest suggestions, we will continue to act on the same lines. But if all efforts at conciliation emanate from one side, and if Germany and Austria can speculate on the abstention of Great Britain, Austria's demands will remain inflexible, and an agreement between her and Russia will become impossible. lam profoundly convinced that at the present moment the more Great Britain, France, and Russia ran give a deep impression that they are united in their diplomatic action, the more possible will it be to count norm the preservation of peace.