I.—6a.

S. KENNEDY.]

79

nesses that the fog xvas heavier north of the station than south of it. I hope that was the case, because it xvould to a very great degree excuse the station staff for not putting out fog-signals. I xvill admit that this fog may have arisen very suddenly, and that the man in charge of the station and the signalling may have had very little warning of the fog coming on—in fact, the accident may have taken place almost before he had warning. But I think it is proved conclusively that there was on that morning a very dense fog indeed on the north side of the home signal at New Lynn. Even Driver Benney admits there xvas a fog. but he says he could still see tho signal. Now. I xvant you to note this: xvhen he pulled ahead to back bis train into the siding, ho says he stood three or four minutes waiting for a signal; and his fireman corroborates that and says throe or four minutes; and Driver Benney says that the reason why he could not get a signal was because of the fog : that is in his evidence. Vet that man wants to say there was not much fop and that bo could see the signal. You will notice, if you carefully peruse the evidence, that there is a small discrepancy between that of Driver Benney and the guard as to xvhothor a signal could bo seen xvhen be had pulled up or xvhothor it could not be seen. Now. I think T have shown you that the cause of the accident was that the regulations xvbicb tho Department have to administer xvere not carried out. That xvas tho cause of tho accident ; but xve find that all these men on xvhom responsibility devolves for the safety of a train at a place like New Lvnn, near the foot of a falling gradient and in time of a fog—those men have each ignored tlie rules; none of thorn have taken tho rosnonsibilitx- that the rules nut upon them. T xvill try to enumerate a few of them. First of all wo have the tabletporter. Ho does not recognize that Now Lynn is near the foot of a falling grade: ho snvs it is not. Ho says that Rule 158 does not apply to Now Lvnn. Then we will take tho guard of train No. 6. We have a rule in the rule-book that a guard, xxdion approaching a station where a train is crossed, is to alloxv no other duty to interfere xvith his looking out for signals. Tt is unnecessarx- for them to say that no other duty is to interfere xvith it. because xve have at the top of each page this rule, " Tho first and most important dutx - of every member is to provide for the public safety." We are also told that attention to signalling is our first duty. Therefore the guard xvas xvarnod doubly. He xvas warned in the first place by the rule directing him to look for signals and to allow no other duty to interfere xvith that. Ho xvas also warned bx- bis first duty being tho protection of the public safety. Now, the guard told yon point blank in It's evidence that he did not carry out bis responsibilitx?; ho entirely ignored it. He says ho had too much to do in the cars. Tdo not dispute that. Ido not want to blame the guard, but T want to point out that there are a number of men who have a responsibility xvith a train entering a station : it does not all rest with the driver. You start xvith the man xvho forms the regulations, whoever that may be; then you have the men to see that the regulations are put into force; then you have men who are supposed to carry out these regulations, aud a groat number of those regulations are for the protection of the engine-driver. Now. T think T have shown you that these men have, each one of them in turn as wo came down to them, entirely neglected to carry out their part of the business that xvould ensure tho safety of this train on tfip morning in question. It then came down to tho drix-er. There is one rule that T almost missed—Rule 245. regarding the crossing of trains at flag stations, and T think this is a flag station. Rule 245 stipulates that at a flag station the first train arriving shall take tho siding. That is one more rule that confirms xvhat we have contended all along, that No. 5 should have entered at +ho siding. Wo wore told by one of our witnesses—Mr. Margan—that there have boon a number of vorx T narrow escapes from accident at New Lvnn. Ho said that he saw one himself, where tho engines stopped a foxy yards from one another. Ho stated that he xvas nutting in five declarations made before Justices of the Peace to this effect. Noxv. T think you must admit, on looking at tho xvhole of the evidence, that there must have been a vorv lax mode of working trains at New Lvnn. Tf tho public began to see that there xvas danger—and witnesses have stated that they expected an accident —T think tho Railway Department should have recognizor! tho danger, because there undoubtedlx- was danger. Tho proof of the pudding is in tho eating of it, and you have come to tho eating now—the NewLynn collision. Tf the" public could see this —and thox- not only saw it but took action, for they warned the Minister that it was likely to occur—then surely vnnr Railway officers should have soon it and known of it, and should have done what they noxv hax'o done—instructed that the regulations be carried out. That is all they have done now: nothing more. I think, if the public could soo that, there must be some blame attached to your Railway officers for not having seen it at tho same time. Mv association wrote to the Conoral Manager of Railways and they complained that fog-signalling xvas not being carried out on the Auckland Section, but T am not quite sure whether tho General Manager had an opportunity, from the time xve complained until the time tho accident took nlace. of bringing the fog-signalling into effect ; but it xvill show you that the members of tho Drivers and Firemen's Association recognized that there was a danger, and they approached the General Manager with regard to it. and warned him that the regulations xvere not being complied xvith. and asked him to see that they xvere. 2. Was that a general statement, or in connection xvith Now Lvnn onlv?—Tt was a general statement regarding the Auckland Section. Now when tho accident has taken place every man tries to clear himself. You xvill have noticed, as T did. that in Mr. McVillv's examination of several witnesses he was trying to find somebody else to blame than the tablet-porter; he was trying to find some one else to blame irrespective of those who controlled tho signals at the station that day. and ho dropped on the driver, of course. Ho quoted Rule 211, and he made the witness say that if that rule had boon carried out there would have been no collision ; and T agree with him. But is that fair to the engine-driver? Ts it fair that all these men of xvhom T have spoken who have a responsibility xvith regard to tho safety of tho public and tho working of signals should ignore their responsibility and all the blame be put on to the driver? Tho men who framed these regulations did not intend that. They recognized that during a fog or falling snow an engine driver could not see the signals, and they provided a means that made it safe to run trains in