47

H.—9

at any time this privilege may be rescinded. I was given to understand by one of the trustees who at present represent the owners of the range that the trust would shortly expire. I went over some Government ground near Lawyer's Head on which a good range could be made. lam strongly of opinion that this work should be undertaken. 20. Telegbaphic Communications. The protection of the landing of the cable connecting New Zealand with Australia is a matter requiring serious consideration, to which due weight should be given. lam of opinion that the cable should be landed within the protection of the guns in Wellington Harbour, and this could be easily done without interfering with the mine-field. Communication between Auckland and Wellington may be considered fairly safe : a small secondary line to duplicate one exposed point would be required. Communication with the South Island is by cable : from its landing to Christchurch the line lies in a safe position; thence to Timaru the line is safe, but between that and Oamaru there is nothing to prevent a boat's crew from landing and cutting the wires. A duplicate line should turn inland from about Rangitata to Palmerston, to connect there with Naseby line, or else run direct to Naseby and thence to Dunedin.

6.—GENERAL CONDITIONS GOVERNING MY RECOMMENDATIONS. I have found that in the colony a certain feeling exists of doubt as to whether there is any necessity for the maintenance of defence forces or for the up-keep of defence works. It is certain that such doubts arise from a want of appreciation of the necessity, and this is owing to the fact.that.bald recommendations have from time to time been made on purely technical grounds not understood by the general public, who, being altogether an intelligent public, naturally ask why such things should be done. The greater the intelligence the more reason for explanation. Without explanation, the intelligent man, not knowing the basis on which calculations are made, is apt to deduce wrong results from false data, which he is forced to set up owing to lack of knowledge of the real considerations. I therefore think it advisable to plainly state the conditions which have guided me in formulating the recommendations put forward in this report. I have been constantly met by the following arguments, which, though true to a certain extent, are in reality fallacies. It is argued that the defences of the chief ports of New Zealand would be absolutely useless against a heavily-armoured squadron carrying all the appliances for countermining and such like operations ; and it is asked, " If the defences are so useless, why should they be maintained?" Also, it is argued that if five hundred men in the attack have Magazine rifles they will have a very great advantage over five hundred men in the defence armed with a weapon even slightly inferior ; and that therefore it is madness to arm the men who will have to defend New Zealand with anything but the very best of weapons. These two cases may be taken as fairly true samples of the criticism which the public makes as regards our forces and defences. They do not know of their own knowledge, and it has not been explained to them, that it is practically out of the question for a heavily-armoured fleet, with all the necessaries of war, to come to these shores ; while, on the other hand, it is a very practical matter for two or three cruisers and privateers to come here ; and they have no knowledge of the vast superiority which men acting in a well-selected defensive position have over an equal number of men attacking such a position ; nor has it been explained that in such a broken country as surrounds our chief ports the value of very long-range rifles is considerably reduced; nor do they fully understand that a Magazine rifle in the hands of any but very well-disciplined troops may, instead of being a tower of strength, be a source of weakness, owing to the rate with which ammunition may be consumed without attaining a due result: but they may rest assured that five hundred steady men (without being the best soldiers in the world), armed with a good and serviceable weapon, such as the Martini-Henry, and placed in any of the defensive positions guarding our chief ports from a land-attack, would be fully and more than fully equal to double the number of men, however well disciplined and armed, working in an unknown country, to the attack of positions of the strength of which they have no knowledge. Nor is the raisou d'etre, for the fortification of our chief ports fully understood. The rvle of our navy is the defence of our commerce while on the sea. In war time it may be accepted as a fact that our commerce will be confined to definite trade routes. On those trade routes our merchantmen will be met and passed along by our ships of war. While on those routes they will enjoy comparative safety. If they leave those routes they will do so at their own risk. From this it can be deducted that during war time there will be a great difficulty in effecting insurance on vessels which, from their start until they reach their destination, deviate from the routes which will be laid down by the Admiralty, and unless their port of- destination is so sufficiently fortified that they will be protected therein from the risk of being seized by an enemy's cruiser or privateer. Therefore it is necessary to provide safe harbours for these vessels on their arrival, or else submit to have the whole commercial work of the colony paralysed during war time. Proceeding , on these lines, it is incumbent that we should sufficiently fortify our principal ports for the protection of ocean-going steamers on their arrival, and also for the care and protection of the colony's own merchant shipping ; and last, but by no means least, that the ships of war in these waters should have safe refuge in the face of a temporarily too powerful enemy, and ports in which they may depend on renewing their coal-supply.