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a title, neither could it after its repeal. He cited also cases in the Supreme Court showing that land under restrictions is not seizable and saleable by the Sheriff; and, lastly, he cited Poaka v. Ward to show that no subsequent legislation has altered the status of any title under the Act of 1873, and therefore (in spite of section 16 of the Act of 1888) such title remains unsaleable by the owners and unseizable by the Sheriff. It certainly appears to me that if this Court is to be guided in this matter by the decisions of the Supreme Court, then the seizure and sale of Eena Parewhai's share by the Sheriff ought to be held unlawful; but we may be asked why we should follow these decisions (affecting only one purchase in this block), while at the same time we consider ourselves entitled not to follow Poaka v. Ward, which decision avoids every sale of every share ? Our reply to these questions is : That, although we decided that this statute authorises validation notwithstanding the case of Poaka v. Ward, or rather perhaps in consequence of that decision, it does not follow that the Legislature intended us to treat as proper for validation every kind of illegal transaction. The Sheriff' is a public officer deriving his right "of sale from the law only. He is not an agent of the defendant Eena Parewhai to sell with her assent. The law gives him a power to convey estates compulsorily under certain circumstances to a purchaser against the owner's will. Such power can only exist where the law gives it, and, therefore, if in Eena Parewhai's case the law gave no power to the Sheriff, we could not treat his sale as a transfer of her interest. The law gave no such power to the Sheriff. This Validation Act would apply to sales voluntarily made by the parties themselves, unlawful, it is true, but made bond fide and in an honest and straightforward transaction agreed to by all the parties at the time it was made. Eena Perewhai's was not such a sale. It was an illegal compulsory sale by a person who was not her agent, nor in any way empowered by law to sign for her. We now come to four shares claimed against Mr. Tiffen on behalf of minors. VI. — Hoera Banginui's Case. ■ There are two Native owners in the Puhatikotiko Blocks, both of whom claim the name and shares of Hoera Eanginui. One is a grown man named Eanginui Pero, but, according to the evidence of Mr. Tiffen, he also calls himself Hoera Eanginui. The other is an infant named Hoera Eanginui. The infant and the adult are both in the list of No. 7 Block under their respective names of Eanginui Pero and Hoera Eanginui. Only one of them is in this Block No. 1, and is called in the list Hoera Eanginui, and the question is whether the name in No. 1 belongs to the adult or the infant. Mr. Woon, as agent for J. G. Kinross, bought these two shares standing in the name of Hoera Eanginui, one in No. 7 and one in No. 1, from the adult Eanginui Pero; but Mr. Woon took Pero's signature to both deeds of sale in the name of Hoera Eanginui, and not in the name of Eanginui Pero. In the form of declaration, however, that was signed by that vendor when he was signing the said deeds of sale, Mr. Woon describes him as " Hoera Eanginui, or Pero." It is therefore quite clear that Woon knew at the time of the transaction that the man selling to him was Pero, and that his signature in the No. 7 block was for the share owned in that block in the name of Eanginui Pero. It is likewise probable that Woon then also knew that there was an infant, " Hoera Eanginui," an owner in the same Block No. 7, whose share Pero was not entitled to, for as purchase-agent Woon must have supplied himself with a list of owners from the Court files, as all purchase-agents necessarily do. But, whether Mr. Woon was deceived or not, he could not buy from Pero what belonged to the infant Hoera Eanginui in No. 7 ; therefore the only question for the Court is whether the share in No. 1 in the name of Hoera Eanginui belonged to the infant or to the adult. We have considered the voluminous evidence given on both sides as to the identity of this Hoera Eanginui, and we have no doubt whatever that the Hoera Eanginui who owned in No. 1 was the minor, and not Eanginui Pero. When he conveyed his share in that block as Hoera Eanginui, instead of the name in which his own share stood, we believe he did it to give a colour to his sale in the other block, and to his pretence that the share in that block belonged to him. A number of small circumstances, too numerous to be set out here, have satisfied us that Hoera Eanginui in the No. 1 Block was the infant, and therefore that Eanginui Pero, when selling that share, sold it without right to sell it. We will therefore certify that the shares of Hoera Eanginui in both blocks belong to the infant Hoera Eanginui unsold ; and we will certify in the No. 7 Block that the share sold by Eanginui Pero in the name of Hoera Eanginui was the share of Eanginui Pero himself, held in his name of Eanginui Pero, and that the said share ought to pass to Mr. Tiffen under the deed signed by Eanginui Pero in the name of Hoera Eanginui. Vll.— Mini Eerekere's Case. Mini Kerekere, a married minor, nineteen years of age, sold to Mr. Ferris, as agent, a share then vested, by order of the Governor in Council, in his father, Peka Kerekere, as trustee. By the statutes then in force relating to the estates of Maori infants, the share of the infant Mini was, by virtue of such order, absolutely vested in the trustee, with full powers of management, and also full powers of sale. During the minority the infant had no right whatever left in him. The trustee was entitled out of the proceeds of the estate to pay what he pleased for the support or education of the minor, and the rest he was bound to invest in securities; but the minor had no right during his minority to interfere in any way, either in the management or in the sale, or in the application of the proceeds of sale. When Mr. Ferris was negotiating with Mini Kerekere for the purchase, he had full notice from Mr. Frederick Jones that Mini was under age; but, notwithstanding that notice, and although he (Mr. Ferris) might have settled the question by stepping across the road from his own office to the Native Land Registry, he preferred to act on his own unassisted judgment concerning Mini's age. He took Mini's signature, and paid him the purchase-money, £12 ; but he also took the very