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effect that other clauses in the Act may not be compared if necessary. On the contrary, Jessel, M.R., says the case is within the very words of " the statute/ and Lindley, J., says that he protests against old decisions being substituted for " the statute." But, as cases in which one part of a statute was invoked to interpret another part, we were referred to Colquhoun v. Brooks (II Appeal Cases, 499), in which not only the words of the statute directly applying to the matter in hand, but the words of other statutes in pari rnaterid, were considered and commented upon as explaining words which yet, when read by themselves, had a distinct meaning. So, in Moyle v. Jenkins (51 L.J., Q.B. Div.,112), the Court held that, although one section of an Act, if it stood alone, would support a certain contention, yet that another section must be read with it as explanatory. It was distinctly laid down as incorrect to rely upon qne section as an argument. In Cox v. Hakes and Another (15 Appeal Cases, 506), Lord Herschell puts the proposition in very plain terms : " It cannot, 1 think, be denied that for the purpose of consti'uing any enactment it is right to look not only at the provision immediately under construction, but at any others found in connection with it which may throw light upon it, and afford an indication that general words employed in it were not intended to be applied without some limitation," Treating this proposition as being settled law, I can arrive at no conclusion but that a Judge of the Supreme Court, when appointed during good behaviour, should have a fixed salary, even if I confine my attention to " Tho Supreme Court Act, 1882; " and the next step is to inquire whether the Legislature have been mindful to make proper provision in the matter. This I find to be the case by " The Civil List Act 1863 Amendment Act, 1873," which distributes the sum of .£7,700, granted by " The Civil List Act, 1863," for defraying the expenses of the salaries of the Judges of the Supreme Court, by applying it to the payment of the annual salary of the Chief Justice, .£1,700; and the annual salaries of four Puisne Judges, each .€1,500 ; thus disposing of the whole snra which had been appropriated to Judges under "The Civil List Act, 1863," among those who were in office at the time of the commencement of v The Supreme Court Act, 1882." Thus those Judges and their successors had their salaries ascertained and determined, while there was no provision for any Judge who might be appointed during good behaviour in excess of the number then in office. Clearly, the Legislature never contemplated such a thing as the appointment of a Judge without a salary. Such a construction of the Act was not foreseen; and, even in the appointment of a temporary Judge, provision was made by section 12 of "The Supreme Court Act, 1882," and previous Acts for his salary. Since the passing of " The Civil List Act, 1863," there has been no difference in the amount paid to each of the Judges, although previously to 1873 it was voted in a lump sum; and, although it would appear that in 1875 the appointments of Mr. Justice Gillies and Mr. Justice Williams were made some three or four weeks before the resignations of their predecessors were gazetted, the permanent number of Judges holding office during good behaviour has always since 18G3 been one Chief Justice and four Puisne Judges. And, going farther back, to " The Supreme Court Judges Act, 1858," I find the same words as in " The Supreme Court Act, 1882 " —that the Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and of such other Judges as the Governor, in the name and on behalf of Her Majesty, shall from time to time appoint. The law ever since that date, until the appointment of Mr. Edwards, has been held to apply to a limited number of Judges. As to whether there was any technical irregularity in the appointment of any of the Judges who were in office in 1882, I do not think it necessary to give any opinion, If, in fact, mistakes were made in any of them, it is no argument in favour of the validity of the appointment which is now under review; and all such previous mistakes, if any, were, as to the Judges in office, in my opinion cured by the Act of 1882, since there could be no question as to the persons who were referred to in that Act as being in office at the time of the commencement of that Act. The individuals are as clearly indicated as if they had been named. My opinion as to the invalidity of the appointment upon consideration of the colonial statutes alone being so decided, it is perhaps hardly necessary for me to invoke the constitutional principle, now long recognised, that the Judges should be independent of the Executive Government. It would indeed, in my opinion, be a gross scandal, greatly to be deplored, if, while five of the Judges of the Supreme Court held this independent position, assured of their places and of their salaries so long as they were not guilty of any misbe-