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Crown would appoint to the office, and arrange provisionally with the appointee what salary he was to receive. Until Parliament met, the Crown would pay the arranged salary either out of a sum for contingencies already voted and available for the purpose, or out of "Unauthorised expenditure." When Parliament met, the salary of the"officer would appear upon the estimates, and it would be in the absolute discretion of Parliament either to refuse to vote the sum proposed, or to reduce the amount. Nothing that had previously taken place between the Crown and the appointee could in the least fetter that discretion, nor could the appointee complain of a breach of faith on the part of Parliament if Parliament refused to vote his salary, because Parliament had never undertaken to pay any salary. If Parliament refused to vote the salary, the natural consequence would be that the appointee would resign his office. If he did not, and if the Crown considered it undesirable that he should continue to perform the duties of his office without salary, the Crown could remove him. Until resignation or removal, however, he could legally perform those duties. If the Crown appointed to an office tenable for life, but determinable on misbehaviour or by the Crown on the address of both Houses, without any salary having been previously appropriated to the office by Parliament, the Crown in like manner would have no power to fetter the discretion of Parliament as to whether it should appropriate any salary, or the amount of such salary, or whether it should pass an Act providing for a salary out of the Civil List, or whether it should simply vote a salary for the current year. The appointee could not complain of any course the Parliament thought fit to take, because Parliament had made no bargain with him, and had not authorised the Crown to make any bargain. If Parliament thought the appointment an unnecessary one, or disapproved of it on any ground— and of its right to disapprove Parliament is the sole judge—the refusal to provide funds is the legal and constitutional method of giving effect to the opinion of Parliament. The power of the purse is the substantial check on acts of the Executive which, in the opinion of Parliament, are either unnecessary, or improper, or contrary to the conventions of the Constitution. In an ordinary case where the Crown appointed to an office tenable for life, and involving onerous duties, the appointee, if Parliament refused to provide a salary, might be expected to resign. If, however, he did not do so, then, no doubt, the Crown could not, of its own motion, and in the absence of misbehaviour, remove him, as the office is for life. Apart, however, from the question of misbehaviour, the office is determinable by the Crown on the address of both Houses. If, therefore, Parliament considered it to be unseemly that a Judge should hold office after Parliament had expressed its disapproval of his appointment by refusing to provide him with a salary, Parliament might address the Crown to remove him on that ground, and if the Crown concurred in the opinion of Parliament the Crown could remove him, though he had been guilty of no misbehaviour. No doubt the ordinary practice of the Crown on an address is to remove only if misbehaviour is proved; but the power is not confined to that, and if the address showed a valid reason for removal there is little doubt but that the power would be exercised. The whole matter, therefore, would rest with Parliament. If, as is generally conceded, it is desirable in the public interest to maintain the independence of the judicial Bench, we have no right to assume that Parliament, whose business it is to protect the public interest, will not act so as to maintain that independence. If Parliament thinks fit to appropriate a salary to Mr. Justice Edwards, why should it not carry out the policy which has been carried out in the past, and make that salary independent of annual appropriation ? If, indeed, it did not do this, but made an appropriation for the current year only, the neglect to make a similar appropriation in subsequent years would, by the 11th section of "The Supreme Court Act, 1882," which provides that the salary of a Judge shall not be diminished, be a breach of pixblic faith which we cannot suppose Parliament w rould be guilty of. It may be said that, if Parliament does not think fit to appropriate a salary, and the office is not vacated by resignation, a Judge continuing to hold office without a salary, and waiting for something to turn up in the future, is in a great deal less independent a position than a Resident Magistrate whose salary is subject to annual appropriation, and who is removable at pleasure, and that the continuance of such a state of things is a menace to the independence of the Bench. The answer is that, if such a state of things is improper and (night not to be allowed to continue, Parliament has the power of putting an end to it by an address to the Crown. In the present case, until such time as the matter may be finally dealt with by Parliament, the position will undoubtedly remain most unsatisfactory. The Judge is absolutely dependent upon the Ministry of the day for the payment of any salary, and has to come before Parliament as a suppliant to ask that a salary be given him. It is difficult to conceive a position of greater dependence. No Judge