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the General Assembly. By this Act, therefore, the Crown has been secured a certain sum for the payment of the fixed salaries of a Chief Justice and of one Puisne Judge, while the appropriation of the rest of the revenue, after deducting this sum and other fixed charges, is left to the General Assembly. It is material to consider what is the effect of this legislation on the power of the Crown to appoint Judges—mentioned in the 10th section of the ordinance of 1844. One most important effect it certainly had—viz., that, as it appropriated certain specific sums for the payment of Judges, and as the appropriation of the rest of the revenue was left wholly to the General Assembly, the Crown had thenceforth no power, express or implied, by contract, promise, or otherwise, to pledge for the payment of the salaries of any additional Judges the revenues the control over which it had parted with. It would be wholly in the discretion of the General Assembly as to whether or not such Judges should be paid. There was nothing, however, to take away the general power of the Crown, expressly recognised by the ordinance of 1844, to appoint such Judges as it thought fit, in the same way as it could appoint any other officers whose office was determinable at pleasure' —subject, of course, to the power of the Assembly to refuse to provide for them. The grant of a Constitution to the colony would prevent the Crown erecting a new Court, but could not prevent the Crown from appointing additional Judges, subject as above mentioned. As the Judges were then removable at pleasure, the exercise of this power, even if the Assembly refused to provide salaries, would have led to no sensible inconvenience. So things remained until the passing of " The Supreme Court Judges Act, 1858." That Act repealed section 10 of the ordinance of 1844, and enacted, by section 2, that the Supreme Court should consist of one Judge, to be appointed in the name and on behalf of Her Majesty, who should be called the Chief Justice, and of such other Judges as His Excellency, in the name and on behalf of Her Majesty, should from time to time appoint. This, therefore, is simply a re-enactment of that part of section 10 which relates to the appointment of Judges, with the alteration that the appointments, instead of being made directly by the Queen, arc to be made by the Governor on her behalf. The 3rd section, however, made the important alteration that the commissions were to continue in force during good behaviour, instead of being determinable at pleasure, as they were under the ordinance of 1844. The 6th section of the Act provided that a salary equal at least in amount to that which at the time of the appointment of any Judge should be then payable by law should be paid to such Judge so long as his patent or commission should continue and remain in force. The 7th section provided for the appointment of temporary Judges, to hold office during pleasure, and that every such Judge shall be paid such salary, not exceeding the amount payable by law to a Puisne Judge of the Court, as the Governor may direct. The Act of 1858 must, of course, lie construed with reference to the law as it then existed—that is to say, to sections 64 and 65 of the Constitution Act, and the schedule thereto. Specific provision had therefore been then made by law for the payment of a Chief Justice and one Judge. If the power which the Crown originally had to appoint Judges is now limited, it must first have become limited by virtue of " The Supreme Court Judges Act, 1858." Did, then, this Act limit the pre-existing power ? The 2nd section expressly reenacts the 10th section of the ordinance of 1844. The material alteration in the law made by the Act of 1858 was to render the judicial office tenable during good behaviour instead of during pleasure. The Legislature, therefore, having that main object clearly in view, deliberately reconferred upon the Crown the same power, word for word, to appoint Judges to hold office on this tenure as it had when the appointments to the judicial office were held at pleasure. If, then, it be sought to limit the power by a mere implication from subordinate sections of tlie Act, the implication must be absolutely irresistible. If the Legislature had intended to limit the power, nothing would have been easier than to have said so in plain words. It is sought to limit the power by the provisions of the 6th and 7th sections. Section 6 is evidently intended as a re-enactment, in a slightly different form, of that part of section 65 of the Constitution Act which prohibits the salary of a Judge being diminished during his term of office. The words of the section assume, no doubt, that, at the time of the appointment of a Judge, a salary will be payable to him by law. The words of section 7 assume only that a salary will be payable to a Judge by law, but not necessarily that the fixing of the salary will precede his appointment. Ido not think the assumption which might appear from the peculiar wording of section 6 is sufficient to control the general power given to the Crown by section 2, and to prescribe affirmatively that it was a condition precedent to an appointment that the salary should, at the time of the appointment, have been made payable by law. Section 11 of the Act of 1882, however, alters the language of section 6 of the Act of 1858,