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it was full then, as it is now, and remained so till the Ist April. Therefore, if there was any vice at all in the appointment of Mr. Justice Edwards, there was, logically speaking, the same inherent defect in the appointment of four of their Honours, who have presided in this Court for many years past. Now, I submit that there was no vice in the appointment of any one of the Judges, and that there is no vice in the appointment of Mr. Justice Edwards, and that we are entitled in construing the Act of 1882 to take into consideration what the Legislature did in construing the provisions of the Act of 1858. The Legislature then recognised the right of the Governor to appoint a Judge, even though there was not at that time in force any statutory provision for the payment of that Judge. That is the view we submit to your Honours. The Legislature did recognise the right of the Governor to appoint a Judge, leaving it to the Legislature itself, consisting of the three branches, subsequently to make provision for the payment of that Judge. That being so, I submit that the true reading of the Act of 1858 is that there was unlimited power of appointment left in the Governor, as the Bepresentative of Her Majesty, unaffected by the provisions of the Civil List Act; and that if a Civil List Act subsequently came into operation, and provided for the payment of those Judges, their Honours derived their right to hold the office of Judge, not because that Act came into operation, but because they were properly appointed by the Governor under the general clause of the Supreme Court Act. I submit that is no narrow construction, no technical construction ; it is the principle which, as I endeavoured to submit to your Honours yesterday, underlies the whole legislation, from the Charter of Her Majesty down to the present time, by which the Supreme Court is constituted —that the Queen has reserved to herself, through her executive officer, the Governor, the power to appoint Judges to the Supreme Court bench, and that that power to appoint Judges is not limited either by implication or by the provisions of any statute. I claim, therefore, that every one of the authorities my learned friend quoted in his favour are authorities in favour of the position we take up on behalf of the defendant—that each one of those cases, from Eegina v. Cutbush to Bell-Cox v. Hakes, recognises the principle that where there has been contemporaneous interpretation, either by the Courts of justice or by the public—because that is the principle which underlies the whole of the cases with reference to dealings with property, or by statesmen, or by the Legislature—that that interpretation, even though it might do violence to the words of the statute, is the one which will be adopted by the Courts. Now, I submit that the canon of interpretation which we have placed before your Honours does no violence to the words, but shows clearly that the Legislature correctly apprehended the intention, or, rather, that the Advisers of the Crown correctly apprehended the intention, of the Legislature in making the appointments which have been made to this Bench since the resignation and anterior to the resignation of the late Chief Justice. Now, there are one or two cases that I wish to refer your Honours to, in addition to the cases quoted by my learned friend. There is the case of Gorham v. Bishop of Exeter, reported in 15 Queen's Bench Eeports, page 74. I quote that for the purpose of showing that the contemporaneous construction put upon a statute need not necessarily be a judicial construction. In that case Lord Campbell, in delivering the judgment of the Court, states, on page 73, — " Were the language of statute 25 Hen. VIII. c. 19, obscure instead of being clear, we should not be justified in differing from the construction put upon it by contemporaneous and long-continued usage. There would be no safety for property or liberty if it could be successfully contended that all lawyers and statesmen have been mistaken for centuries as to the true meaning of an old Act of Parliament." My friend may say that the statute in that case practically became a branch of the common law because it had been in existence for so many years, and that long and uninterrupted usage had grown up to interpret the terms, and that it was dealing with property. I submit that that argument is all the stronger if we are dealing with a modern statute; and if we find that since the passing of that modern statute, and immediately after the passing of that modern statute, a certain canon of interpretation has been applied to it, and a certain usage and meaning has been given to the powers contained in that particular statute. And if the Judges took notice of the meaning which statesmen had placed for a long period of time on the provisions of an old Act of Parliament, I submit that all the more ground is shown that the meaning which has been applied by contemporaneous statesmen should be the construction of the Act to be adopted by the Court; and when an Act of Parliament is passed, and appointments have been made under that Act of Parliament, based upon a particular construction of that Act, that would have very great force indeed in determining what the true construction of the powers contained in that Act of Parliament may be. Then, there is another case ; indeed, there are many other cases. lam afraid lam keeping your Honours an undue length of time, perhaps, in referring to these cases ; but it is a matter of such considerable importance that I feel it is necessary to quote one or two other cases in addition to those cited by my learned friends. I submit to your Honours the case Eegina v. Leverson, in L.E., 4 Q. 8., 394. That was in reference to the Central Criminal Court. The head-note of the case states :— " A verdict and judgment having been given against the defendant on an indictment in the Central Criminal Court, error was brought on the following grounds : 1. That, two Commissioners being necessary, under 4 and 5 Will. IV., c. 36, to constitute the Central Criminal Court a Court for the trial of an indictment, an Alderman sat for this purpose with the Judge of the Sheriff's Court, who tried the indictment, and, the trial having lasted several days, a different Alderman was substituted in the course of the trial, whereas the Court should have consisted of the same two Commissioners throughout the trial. 2. That the trial took place in a second Court, while the general sessions were being held before other Justices in their ordinary place of sitting; whereas by 4 and 5 Will. IV., c. 36, a, single Court only is established and authorised to be held. 3. That, in consequence of the changes which had been made by different statutes in the jurisdiction of the Sheriff's Court, the Judge of that Court, who presided at the trial as Judge, had ceased to be a Commissioner under 4 and 5 Will. IV., c. 36, and was therefore incompetent to act as a Judge under the Commission of Oyer and Terminer in the trial of this indictment. Held, that none of the grounds of error were tenable,"