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only; and that, however able they may be, they have neither the knowledge nor the experience necessary to qualify them to deal with the larger questions of Imperial defence, for the consideration of which the Colonial Defence Committee was formed. I am led to make the above remarks by the perusal of a paper recently drawn up by the commandant of the Queensland Forces, in which it is stated that he sees " no serious difficulty to an enemy in landing twenty or thirty thousand men on the coast of Queensland." If this opinion were sound it is evident that the standard of defence of the Australasian Colonies would require to be raised to an extent which could not be contemplated ; but it cannot be accepted, inasmuch as it is inconsistent with experience based upon a knowledge of the resources of other Powers, and of the possibilities of naval warfare. If the general aspect of the military position of the Australasian Colonies, as clearly laid down by the Colonial Defence Committee, is rightly understood, it will be seen that the main requirements are (1) moderate local defences, and (2) an organization which will enable those defences to be available at short notice. I have, &c, KNUTSFOED. The Officer Administering the Government of New Zealand.

Enclosure. PROPOSED ORGANIZATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE AUSTRALASIAN COLONIES.— (REPORTS BY MAJOR-GENERAL J. BEVAN EDWARDS, C.8.)

Eemahks by Colonial Defence Committee. The Colonial Defence Committee have had under consideration the Eeports of Major-General J. B. Edwards, C. 8., on the Military Forces and Defence of the Australasian Colonies, which have been referred to them by the Secretaries of State for War and the Colonies. While, for reasons which will be stated, they are unable to agree in some of the recommendations embodied in these reports, they are impressed by the ability displayed, and the care which has been bestowed upon them. Before proceeding to consider the recommendations of the Inspecting Officer in the case of the individual colonies, the Committee desire to reassert the general principles which should guide these colonies in adjusting the standard of their defences. It is essential that such principles should be constantly borne in mind, since the absence of a definite basis of policy necessarily leads to wasteful expenditure. The general requirements of defence which present themselves to the Australasian Colonies depend solely upon the probable nature and strength of the attack. No country can be provided against every remote contingency which may be suggested, and reasonable probabilities, rather than possibilities, form the ultimate basis of the war preparations of every great Power. The Colonial Defence Committee have in various memoranda expressed their views as to the conditions of probable attack in Australasian waters, and these views have been embodied in Colonial Office circular despatch of the 14th January, 1890. It may be useful, however, to recapitulate these conditions. On account of their geographical position, and of the now considerable population in all these colonies except Western Australia, there is no British territory so little liable to aggression as that of Australasia. In view of the armed forces maintained, and the strong spirit which animates them, territorial aggression, except on a large scale, is out of the question. To endeavour to place small bodies of troops on shore would be to court disaster, with consequent injury to the prestige of any Power which attempted such a policy. Any force destined for aggression, even if safely landed, must be of a strength sufficient to conquer and hold either an important strategic point or a considerable portion of territory, under the certain condition of losing its communications by sea. Field operations on Australasian territory would require a large expeditionary force of all arms, fully equipped ; and the idea of attempting such operations with the small landing force available even from a strong squadron of cruisers may be altogether dismissed. It is evident that transport for a large expeditionary force could not be prepared in any of the advanced bases of any Power without the fact being known, when a corresponding redistribution, if necessary, of the British navy would be made. Such an expedition, whether despatched from an advanced base or from Europe, could not hope to reach its destination until the British navy had been definitely worsted. Even then the difficulties and the risks would be so considerable that, in view of other enterprises of a more hopeful nature, it is almost inconceivable that the attempt would be made. History affords no parallel of such difficulties successfully overcome. Attack upon the Australian littoral thus reduces itself to raids by an enemy's cruisers based upon his defended ports. Such raids might be undertaken to obtain coal, which might be urgently required, or with the object of attempting to extort an indemnity under threat of bombardment. Coal, if on shore, could not be seized, even in a port possessing no coast defences, without lauding

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