A.-S.

10

I have just read. It is the first time in the history of Eesponsible Government in Queensland that an attempt has been made on the part of the Upper Chamber to amend an Appropriation Bill. In the session of 1884, on the 11th December, I considered it my duty to call attention to amendments which had been made by the Upper Chamber in the Crown Lands Alienation Bill, and which distinctly infringed upon the privileges of this House. And in the session, on the 22nd September, I called attention to amendments made by the Upper Chamber in the Local Government Act of 1878 Amendment Bill. On that occasion I again felt it to be my duty to call the attention of the House to amendments by which I thought the privileges of this Chamber were decidedly invaded and infringed upon. But the amendment in the Appropriation Bill is of a much graver character, and, in calling the attention of this House to the amendment which has been made, it will be my duty at once to disclaim anything in the nature of a political contention. My desire is simply to call the attention of the House to the grave constitutional question which is involved in the amendment of the Appropriation Bill. If it is admitted that the Upper Chamber possesses co-ordinate powers with the representative branch of the Legislature, then Eesponsible Government in Queensland is entirely at an end; because the claim to amend a money Bill, if admitted, must undoubtedly extend to the amendment of taxation Bills ; and thus the public policy of the country could be entirely thwarted and set aside by a Chamber which is responsible to no one. The voice of the public outside would be entirely set on one side, and the opinions and will of the majority in this House would also be entirely set on one side. This is therefore, as I said before, a matter of very great importance indeed, and one which I think this House should take proper time to consider before it arrives at a decision. I should not like, on the present occasion, to trouble the House with any long extracts from the different constitutional writers who have written upon this question ; but there is one extract from " Hatsell's Precedents" which I consider it my duty to read, because it is one upon which the House of Commons has acted from the time it was delivered up to the present moment; and I may say, further, that the House of Lords has, from that time to this, acquiesced in it. It is probably one of the most ancient claims set up by the House of Commons, and will probably, on that account, be the more entitled to our consideration and respect. The occasion when this opinion was given was on the 9th May, 1689, when the Lords amended the Poll Bill by adding a clause for appointing Commissioners to rate themselves. To this the Commons disagreed, and on the 15th May the Commons appointed a Committee to draw up reasons and report them to the House; and this was one of the reasons: — All money, aids, and taxes to be raised or charged upon the subjects in Parliament are the gift and grant of the Commons in Parliament; and are, and always have been, and ought to be, by the Constitution and ancient course and laws of Parliament, and by the ancient and undoubted rights of the Commons of England, the sole and entire gift, grant, and present of the Commons in Parliament; and to be laid, rated, raised, collected, paid, levied, and returned for the pul lie service and use of the Government as the Commons shall direct, limit, appoint, and modify the same. And the Lords are not to alter such gift, grant, limitation, appointment, or modification of the Commons in any part or circumstance, or otherwise to interpose in such Bills than to pass or reject the same for the whole, without any alteration or amendment though in ease of tbe subjects. Prom the time that was delivered in 1689 up to the present time, and ■ including the ninety-one

instances collected by Hatswell, where the Lords interfered with supply Bills, and where the Commons insisted upon their rights, and where the Lords have almost invariably acquiesced in them, except in some minor details, the reasons I have read to the House have been invariably acted upon. It is therefore for the House to take into its most serious consideration the important matter which is brought before them by the Legislative Council's message. I discharge my duty in calling the attention of the House to the gravity of the question. It is one of extraordinary importance, because, as I said before, it is the first time in the history of parliamentary government in this colony that the Upper Chamber has attempted to amend the Appropriation Bill; and their claim to possess co-ordinate powers with the representative Chamber is of such a character that I believe, if it is acceded to, the whole of the policy of the Government, as expressed by the people, can be revolutionized and entirely set on one side by the other Chamber. I think I have discharged my duty now by calling the attention of the House to this matter. It is for the House itself to decide upon what course it will take in view of the extreme gravity of the present circumstance. Mr. Gbiffith then moved, That the Legislative Council's amendments be considered in Committee to-morrow. Debate ensued. Question put, and passed.

Enclosure 2. Tho Colonial Secketaey to Sir A. Musgeave. Colonial Secretary's Office, Sin, — Brisbane, 26th November, 1885. With reference to the Joint Address to Her Majesty lately agreed to by the Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly of this colony, submitting a case on which they desire to obtain the opinion of Her Majesty's Privy Council, I have the honour to offer the following observations for your Excellency's consideration. 2. Your Excellency will doubtless have observed that the questions submitted (and in particular the second question) are rather questions as to the constitutional rights and powers of the two Houses of the Legislature than technical questions as to the construction of the statute law. So far, at least, as the Legislative Assembly are concerned, J think I am right in saying that the literal interpretation of the words of the Constitution Act is regarded as a matter of small importance as compared with the larger question, Whether, on a true construction of the written and unwritten Constitution of the colony, the two Houses of the Legislature should be regarded as holding and discharging, relatively to one another, positions and functions analogous to those of the House of Lords and House of Commons. For the assistance of Her Majesty's Government, and in compliance with a promise made by myself to the Joint Committee by which the Joint Address was framed, I enclose copies of the official reports of the debates in both Houses on the question which gave rise to the Address, which will indicate the line of argument adopted by both Houses respectively. 4. I am not aware of any instance in which a similar case has been submitted for the opinion of the Privy Council. Tho only analogous case that I have been able to discover is that of the case submitted in 1872 by both Houses of the Legislature of New Zealand for the opinion of the Imperial Crown Law Officers. Some reluctance, however,