A.—l.

submission to affronts which they might consider would render war preferable to peace, or to treaties being negotiated which vitally affected their interests ! Within a period which in the life of a nation may be considered quite brief, the population of the colonies will grow to the dimensions which, as has been said, would place their decision beyond doubt. But as they attain to this numerical strength the feeling will mature, and it is impossible to predicate when it will commence, when it will become ominous, when irresistible. The culmination of the sentiment, and the nature of the terms, depend somewhat on whether the separate colonies federate amongst themselves or retain their individual entities. An Australasian Federation, for example, would grow earlier to ask for a share in the Government of the Empire than would the colonies separately, and would be more excessive in its demands. If, then, what to the writer seems the mathematical certainty is recognized, that the colonies will within a few years insist upon having a voice in the affairs upon which peace, war, and treaties depend, it becomes a question, Should they attain to this voice gradually or by a violent wrench, when endurance is stretched to its extreme limit ? Apart from the fact that under a violent strain the conditions are not likely to be so suitable or equitable as if they are gradually matured, there is everything in favour of educating both the Mother-country and the colonies into a workable system by tentative and early steps. This is so obvious that it would seem nothing more need be said to prove that the question is of an urgent nature. If it be conceded that Federation is the sole alternative to the break-ing-up of the Empire within a comparatively short period, and that it means that the several parts of the British dominions must have a share in the Government of the whole, it becomes necessary to consider how that share can be given. Obviously the share must be proportional to the importance of the portions represented, and in this fact there is a strong argument for early action, because, whilst early action will not give undue strength to the outlying dominions, it will accustom them to wisely co-operate as their strength increases. The easiest way of arriving at a conclusion as to the means to be adopted is te first examine the difficulties to be overcome. It would be a mistake to conceal that the obstacles are of a formidable nature. The principal ones may be thus enumerated:— Ist. That it is necessary to strictly guard against any interference by the Federal Government with the internal affairs of the constituent parts of the Federation. 2nd. That the parliamentary system of the Mother-country is wholly wanting at present in any means by which representation could be given to the colonies without a liability of their interfering in local affairs. 3rd. That the colonies at present do not contribute to the cost of maintaining the external policy of Great Britain, and that it would be incongruous to give them control over expenditure to the defrayal of which they provide no share. 4th. The difficulty of securing representation which would give satisfaction to the colonies, and of bringing them to an agreement with any system arbitrarily framed. The first and second obstacles point to the creation of a new Parliament to deal only with external affairs, which would, of course, include the means of attack and defence. But it may be at once admitted that any contribution the colonies would be willing to make to the cost of the forces of the Empire, at the present stage of their development, would fall far short of an amount which would warrant so great a disorganization of the existing parliamentary system of Great Britain as a distinct Federal Parliament would entail. The colonies are not now in a position to ask for anything of the kind, though obviously, when, in population and importance, they grow nearer on a par with the Mothercountry, a Federal Parliament would be a necessary adjunct to Federation. It is not to be expected that the third obstacle can be met without a great deal of consideration and negotiation, As to absolute cost, it is probable that

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