A.—3a

82

general principle which leaves to the local Legislature of every colony the creation of other local institutions, and the enactment of any laws which are to have their operation within the local limits of the colony We also think that the Legislatures now to be established ought to have the power of amending their own Constitutions by resolving either of these single Houses of Legislature into two Houses. Whatever the result may be in either of the four colonies, your Majesty will thus at least have the satisfaction of knowing that free scope had been given to the influence of public opinion in them all, and that this constitutional question has been finally adjusted in each, in accordance with that opinion For the same reason we think it desirable that the Legislatures now to be created should be intrusted with the power of making any other amendments in their own Constitution which time and experience may show to be requisite. Wo are aware of no sufficient cause for withholding this power, and we believe that the want of it in the other British colonies has often been productive of serious inconvenience." It is only desired that this power of amendment of the Constitution of the colony should be exercised upon a vote of a majority of two-thirds of the whole number of members of the New Zealand Legislature. The other reasons which lead to the request that the Governor only should exercise a veto power on local questions are strengthened by the fact that he necessarily possesses much more knowledge of their probable utility than any servant of the Crown residing in England can possibly do; and his immediate confirmation of or vetoing any local enactment would prevent that injurious doubt and delay which results from the necessity otherwise existing of transmitting an Act to England aud receiving an answer after the lapse of such a period of time as may have completely altered the circumstances which led to its having been passed. The recommendation contained in the seventh resolution is in accordance with the form observed in the Legislature of the United Kingdom, which the experience of centuries has shown to be so excellent in practice that it would be supererogatory for us to enlarge upon the utility of following the same form in New Zealand. The reasons why the salaries of the Governor and Judges should be excepted from the control of the local Legislature must be so evident to your Lordship that it is equally unnecessary for us to enumerate them; but, with these exceptions, we desire most firmly to press upon your Lordship the right of the colonists, by means of their representatives, to appropriate the whole of the revenue raised in the colony. So clear and demonstrable do they consider this right to be, that it is a matter of considerable doubt whether they would recognise, or allow themselves to be permanently ruled by, any colonial Legislature not having this power. Most certainly, should any Legislature so fettered attempt on the one hand to levy any direct taxes while on the other a portion of the revenue derived from taxation was exempted from its control, it would, we are confident, be found difficult to collect them. We are, indeed, unable to conceive what reasons can be advanced why the principle which establishes that the Legislature of a country should alone expend the money contributed for public purposes by that country should not be at once admitted as a right incontrovertibly ■ inherent in the inhabitants. And when, moreover, they are British subjects, accustomed to regard this power as a right of citizenship accruing; to them at their birth, it will be understood how entirely opposed to all their ideas of justice and liberty would be the attempt to deprive them of it. In support of this claim we refer with great pleasure to the Report of the Lords of the Council, which we have before quoted, where we find the following remarks in connection with the subject: " Passing to the subject of a civil list, we have to observe that the very large proportion of the revenue of New South Wales at present withdrawn from the Legislature by the permanent appropriation of Parliament has been a continual subject of complaint and remonstrance in the colony since the passing of the Constitutional Act of 1842, and we cannot conceal our opinion that these complaints are not without some foundation. It appears to us hardly consistent with the full adoption of the principles of representative Government that, as to a large part of the public expenditure of the colony, the Legislature should be deprived of all authority ; nor does there appear to us to be any real occasion for imposing a restriction upon the powers of that body which manifests so much jealousy as to the manner in which those powers may be exercised. The expenditure thus provided for is all incurred for services in which the colonists alone are interested. The colonists themselves are mainly concerned in the proper and efficient performance of those services; and it appears to us that they ought to possess, through their representatives, the power of making such changes from time to time in the public establishments as circumstances may require." We believe that your Lordship's sentiments are so entirely in unison with the principle here laid dowrn, which most perfectly represents the wishes of the colonists, that we confidently expect the efficient support of your Lordship to this request. Tour Lordship will perceive that the eighth resolution contains a most important request, which it is the belief of the colonists is essential for the purpose of producing that unity of action, accompanied by economy, which alone can confer a uniform national character upon the different portions of the colony which it should be the desire of all to establish, and which the maintenance of the present system of Provincial Councils (which we understand are likely to be still further increased in number) is calculated utterly to destroy. One centrally-situated Executive, with the aid of steam vessels to keep up a rapid and regular communication between the settlements, would be infinitely more direct and efficient in its action and far less costly in its maintenance than any number of Provincial Councils could hope to be, while to meet the wants of each separate district municipalities, with extensive powers of legislation on questions merely relating to such district, would amply suffice for all their local wants. By this means the inhabitants of each district would have their local laws enacted by those residing in it and completely conversant with its circumstances; and they would be enabled to carry out the required measures without the risk of their clashing with the wishes of any other settlement, probably very dissimilarly circumstanced. And this simple mode, which is eminently suited to the genius of the colonists of New Zealand, would be free from the expense of the more pretending Provincial Councils, which, while requiring the presence of representatives from many settlements holding views on many subjects opposed to those of any one community, would in reality possess no power superior to that which might be at once vested in each local municipality. The