A.—No. 4

Whilst such is the case I fear that the enemy, emboldened by what is really so great a success on his part, will become still bolder and more daring, when in the face of this a large reduction is made in the force serving in the country. But there appears from your letter to be an additional reason why we should not attempt to attack this place, viz.: —Because it is possible that its capture with a loss on our side exceeding that of the enemy might have an injurious moral effect on the natives, and encourage them in postponing their submission: or in other words, in continuing the war. If this is correct, it is with regret I should find that the presence of so large a force in the country for more than two years has ended in placing the country in a position of such insecurity ; nor can I see how the lives and property of Her Majesty's European subjects, or of her Native allies, can be regarded as being so free from danger that the force in this country can be reduced, when close to an important European settlement it is impossible to attack a small body of enemies who hourly threaten it, lest we experience such a reverse as may augment instead of diminishing the existing danger in this country. I admit that the arguments used would show that we should not venture at so great a risk to attack the place; but on the other hand, they seem to show that the force here should not at such a time be reduced. The power of determining the period at which the force in this country is to be reduced has been left by Her Majesty's Government wholly in your hands. In giving you my opinion in the unreserved manner I did in my letter of the 19th instant, I think I interfered with the discretion confided to you to the fullest extent that I was justified in doing. I have carefully reperused the last paragraph but one of that letter. I find that I could not express more clearly my opinion of what in my belief would best secure the safety of this country, and the fulfilment of the instructions of Her Majesty's Government. The telegrams received last night and this morning regarding the intending submission of Wm. Thompson and his people, tend to confirm me in thinking that the conclusions which I expressed in my letter to you of the 19th instant are sound, and. I am not able to add anything to that letter which would in my belief either assist you in coming to a decision or promote the advantage of the service, I shall therefore not attempt to add anything to it. All I would ask is that you would, as soon as you can, come to a decision as to what you intend to do and acquaint me with it, that I may then with such means as are at my disposal do my best to secure the safety and peace of this part of Her Majesty's possessions. I have, &c, Lieut.-General Sir D. A. Camerou, K.C.B. G. Geey. No. 125. Lieut.-General Sir D. A. Cameeon to His Excellency the Goyebnoe. Sic,— Head Quarters, Auckland, 31st May, 1865. I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 27th instant, on the subject of the withdrawal of troops from the Colony. There is little in that letter except the last paragraph, which calls for a reply. As however, your Excellency has referred to your private letter of the 6th February last, to show that you had given me a discretionary power to move troops from place to place as I thought necessary, I beg to state that I could only consider that power given to enable me to have at my disposal, the means of carrying out your instructions in the most effective manner ; not to render me independent of those instructions, still less to empower me to act in opposition to them. The letter in question was written before you instructed me to occupy the coast line between Wanganui and Taranaki, and when in pursuance of those instructions, I had established entrenched posts, to the continued occupation only of which I could suppose you attached importance; when in answer to my enquiry you intimated your wish that they should be maintained throughout the winter, I could scarcely consider myself at liberty to abandon them afterwards, even temporarily, without your sanction, for the purpose of carrying out any plan of my own. It appears to me somewhat strange for the Governor of a Colony to give the officer commanding the troops instructions for a certain object, and afterwards to inform him that he would have received the unanimous approbation of Her Majesty's Government and his countrymen if he had done something else that he thought better. With reference to your remarks as to the expediency of now attacking the Wereroa Pa, I would observe that the numerous army which you state to be at present in the Colony, (and which I may remark is distributed in posts on lines amounting to some hundreds of miles in length, with the finest artillery in the world, and abundance of scientific appliances) is not wanted for such an operation as an attack on the Wereroa Pa; and were the army in the country much more numerous than it is, I should consider it unadvisable at the present time to assemble a large force for a formal attack on this position, by which there is in my opinion, no reasonable grounds for expecting that the advantages your Excellency desires could be obtained. I stated my opinions fully on this subject in my last letter, and expressed my readiness to attack the position if, after the expression of those opinions, you thought proper to instruct me to undertake the operation. As your Excellency however still confines yourself to the expression of opinions in which I find it impossible to concur, and leaves the decision of the question to me, I must exercise my own judgment as to the time and manner of getting possession of the place; and I shall not allow myself to be influenced by remarks, however disparaging, to undertake an operation for the success of which I alone am responsible, in a manner which I do not fully approve. Under any circumstances, I consider that the capture of the Wereroa Pa at the present moment is not of sufficient importance to justify the detention of the whole force in the Colony, after the instructions received from Her Majesty's Government. I see no reason to alter the opinion I have already expressed, that the time has come when the force in the country may be reduced with safety ; an opinion strengthened within the last few days by the submission of William Thompson, the King, and other leading men, on whom it must be

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